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A STUDY OF THE CREATION OF A FEDERAL 
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MAY, 1987 
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This dissertation researches, documents and analyzes 
the history of the creation of the Federal Cabinet-level 
Department of Education from 1857 to 1979 when it became 
law under President Jimmy Carter. In addition it 
intensely studies the period of 1977-79 as the various 
branches of the Federal government moved towards the 
eventual enfranchisement of education as a fully-ranked 
Secretariat. It focuses on the Executive Branch of 
the Carter Presidency in its approach to creating a 
separate DOE, its relationship within the administration 
and outside it that affected the ebb and flow of opinion 
as the machinery of government worked its way. The 
documentation is inclusive of intense original research 
VI 
into the personal and private papers of the Carter 
administration particularly from the Carter Library 
archives located in Atlanta, Georgia. It is supplemented 
by related documentation and personal interviews with 
various administration leaders, interest groups, past and 
present Members of Congress, and published articles and 
editorials. 
This is not an isolated chronology of the success 
of a concept being transformed into law. It is a com¬ 
mentary on the process of the making of Federal education 
legislation resultant from the actions of those involved 
within and outside traditional educational constituencies. 
It is the story of protection of territory by self- 
interest and self-service. It is in fact the making good 
on a political commitment by a President of the United 
States to a friendly interest group on a subject of 
priority and concern to him. It is educational reform in 
a democratic society. It is government by compromise. It 
is politics as the art of the possible with the creation 
of a separate Department of Education, more symbol than 
initially desired, but with the potential of a substantive 
future. 
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Chapter 1 
History of Effort for a Department of Education 1857-1975 
Historically, education in the United States primarily 
has been financially supported and administered outside 
of the federal government by states, local communities 
and private agencies. However, federal involvement in 
education has existed since 1787 with the passage of land 
ordinances that encouraged free public schooling. 
The placement of education in the structure of the 
federal government has long been the subject of debate; 
In 1867 a department of education "with no cabinet repre¬ 
sentation, was formed."* 1 * * This department designed, "to 
collect and disseminate education facts and statistics was 
2 
first proposed in 1838 by Henry Barnard of Connecticut," 
and promoted through 1854 when "a plan for the establishment 
of a Department of Education ... was formulated and 
presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the 
ii 3 Advancement of Education." 
This department was urged upon the Congress by the 
National Teachers Association (NTA) by resolution in 1865, 
1 I 
(The NTA was renamed in 1870 National Education Association 
[NEA]), and similarly in 1866 by the National Association 
of School Superintendents for "... the establishment of a 
national bureau of education."4 
The actual legislation to create the Department of 
1 
2 
Education was filed and promoted by Congressman James 
Garfield of Ohio. A year of debate concluded with the 
bill being passed by Congress and signed into law in 
March, 1867 by President Andrew Johnson. The arguments on 
the floor of the House of Representatives focused on the 
positive elements of better education versus the role of 
the federal government. Garfield led the fight saying 
"Money spent for education (is the) most economical of 
expenditures ... (it was) cheaper to reduce crime (through 
education) then to build jails ... (and that) expense is 
a relative question and depends upon (the) importance of 
object for expenditure^ Said Garfield, "(we spend) 
hundreds of thousands of dollars to promote agricultural 
interests ... to introduce the best modes of culture in 
all that pertains to animal husbandry." Complimenting 
that was Representative Samuel Moulton of , who 
suggested that "Agriculture applies to only one class of 
7 
men - education applies to every man, woman and child." 
Argued Moulton, "(The) Constitution provides that it shall 
be the duty of Congress to pass all laws which shall be 
1 I 
necessary for the common good and welfare ... the 
Department of Education (is) no invasion of states 
rights. 
Countering these arguments were Congressman Andrew 
who stated he felt a "Department of Rogers of New Jersey 
3 
Education was unconstitutional."9 He was supported in 
that view by Representative Samuel J. Randall, Jr., of 
Pennsylvania, who concluded that the "States (are) able 
to do their own work."10 The bill passed with support 
gathered under the message sent by House member Ignatius 
Donnelly of Minnesota that "Conditions of the South, (makes) 
arguments for passage."11 Said Donnelly, "(we need) 
12 
education for (a) more intelligent citizenship." 
Even after becoming law the DOE was controversial 
because of the lingering concern over the centralization 
of power. When created, it "Gave little power to the 
Commissioner who was head of the Department though not a 
member of the President’s cabinet."13 The following year 
after its creation, in 1867, "because of concern about 
preservation of local control of education, the department 
was downgraded to the status of an office in the Department 
of Interior"14, and in "1869 the Bureau of Education was 
established as the "Office of Education" ... (with) the 
salary of the Commissioner ... reduced from $4,000 to 
$3,000.”15 
The Office of Education languished for the next 
seventy years with a history of legislative initiatives 
all proving unsuccessful. Occasional debate in Congress 
provided a sense of the will of the American people 
through their elected Representatives. 
4 
Speaking against a Department of Education in the 
late nineteenth century were Congressmen from a wide 
geographical range. Said John Storm of Pennsylvania, the 
kiH ••• is unconstitutional ... would lead to uniform 
system of text books ... will be beginning of series of 
acts looking to complete control of schools.Agreeing 
was John Harris of Virginia who felt a Department of 
Education would "... lead to centralization in government 
... result in submission to power.These negative 
opinions took strength from Constitutional and States’ 
Rights arguments. Said Representative Richard Coke of 
Texas, "Public education (is a) matter wholly within power 
and jurisdiction of states and wholly outside jurisdiction 
of general government." Added John Morgan of Alabama in 
1886, "(our fore) fathers did not make this government to 
meet the fancies and the isms and the new ideas that might 
arise from time to time." George Gray of Delaware 
stated that the "Framers of the Constitution had little 
faith in man, hence the boundaries and limitations of the 
Constitution. 1,22 Finally, Ephraim Wilson of Maryland, 
said in 1886, "... (the) States (are the) best judge of 
(their) own educational necessities ... (the) people of 
Tennessee shall not be taxed to educate the children of 
2 3 Massachusetts or Louisiana." 
Proponents of a DOE in the last half of the Nineteenth 
5 
Century based their arguments on the need to have 
excellence in education. Said Washington Townsend of 
Pennsylvania in 1871, "(The Constitution says) that 
Congress shall have the power to pass all laws which shall 
be necessary for the common good and welfare; - to provide 
means of meeting needs of a growing country.Economic 
arguments were offered by George Hoar of Massachusetts that 
the "... simple capacity to read and write adds 25% to 
wages of working class of a state." He was supported 
in 1876 by Justin Morrill of Vermont who felt that the 
"Responsibility of illiteracy of tomorrow (is) on men of 
today."2^ Hoar in 1886 said that the "People of every 
American state who are to share in American citizenship 
and American government should be able to take an intel¬ 
ligent share in that citizenship."^ As an omen for the 
future, in 1888 Henry Blair of New Hampshire noted that 
"Teachers associations of (the) country representing 
300,000 teachers have practically as one body memorialized 
Congress to pass (a DOE) bill."28 The Congress did not 
comply and the twentieth century began with education at 
i 
the Federal level "established as a bureau ... as a small, 
inconspicuous agency"28, as it had been since 1869. 
In 1910 Congressman Joseph A. Gouldon of New York 
started the era of serious effort for the establishment 
of a cabinet-level Department of Education with Bill H.F. 
6 
12318. However, there is "no record that this Bill (H.R. 
12318) was ever reported from the Committee"30, and it was 
never debated on the floor of the Congress. 
"The movement for (DOE) ... began in earnest in 1918 
when the National Education Association appointed a 
"Commission on the Emergency" in education. After an 
exhaustive study of the educational needs of the United 
States, a bill was drawn up which, as did subsequent 
bills ... embodied two great principles - the creation 
of a Department of Education with a Secretary in the 
President's Cabinet and Federal aid to the states for 
31 
the promotion and encouragement of education." 
The archives of the National Education Association 
document the enormous effort undertaken between 1916 and 
1930 to pass legislation for a D.O.E. that at times 
included Federal Aid. A plethora of bills were introduced 
and debated all unsuccessfully. Among the most prominent 
were: 
THE SMITH BILL (S. 4987) 
In October 1916 Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, 
1 I 
introduced this bill. A hearing was held in the 
Senate Committee on Education and Labor on December 
5, 1918, but no action was taken for the creation of 
a Department of Education. 
7 
THE SMITH-TOWNER BILL (S. 1017 AND H.R. 7) 
In the third session of the Congress of 1916 this 
bill was introduced by Congressman Horace Mann Towner, 
of Iowa, in the House of Representatives (H.R. 16400). 
Having failed this bill was revived and reintroduced 
in the next Congress by Senator Hoke Smith in the 
Senate and by Congressman Towner in the House of 
Representatives. A Joint Committee Hearing was held 
on this bill (Smith-Towner, S. 1017 and H.R. 7) in 
July of 1919, and on January 17, 1921 it was favorably 
reported from the Committee on Education in the House 
of Representatives and on March 1, 1921 by the 
Committee on Education and Labor in the United States 
Senate. The bill however did not come to a vote in 
either body. 
THE TOWNER-STERLING BILL (S. 1252 AND H.R. 7) 
The former Smith-Towner bill was revised and in 
the special session of the 67th Congress beginning in 
April 1921 it was reintroduced by Congressman Towner 
in the House of Representatives and by Senator Thomas 
Sterling of South Dakota in the Senate, and was 
known as the Towner—Sterling Bill. This bill 
during the Congress was held in the Committee on 
Education in both houses - the authors of the bill 
thought it not wise to bring the bill out of the 
8 
committee until the Joint Committee of the Executive 
Departments of the Government made its report. This 
report was not made until near the close of the 67th 
Congress which did not enable the Towner-Sterling 
Bill to get a full hearing and debate. 
A BILL FOR A DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
In the first session of the 67th Congress, May 
5, 1921, a bill providing for a Department of Public 
Welfare (Fess-Kenyon Bill, S. 1607 and H.R. 5837) was 
introduced in the Senate by Senator William S. Kenyon 
of Iowa, and in the House of Representatives by 
Simeon D. Fess of Ohio. This bill proposed to give 
to education a subordinate position. The bill was 
referred to the Committee on Education and Labor in 
the Senate and to the Committee on Education in the 
House of Representatives. Joint Hearings were held 
on this bill before the two committees on education. 
The creation of such a Department was seriously 
opposed by the friends of the Department of Education 
bill (Towner-Sterling Bill, S. 1252 and H.R. 7) and 
1 I 
on May 18, 1921 they appeared before the members of 
the Joint Committee and voiced their opposition to a 
Department of Public Welfare with a subordinate role 
Following this hearing no further for education. 
9 
action was taken by the committee on education of 
either house and all attempts to favorably report 
the public welfare bill was defeated. 
STERLING - REED BILL (S. 1337 AND H.R. 3925) 
In the 68th Congress the Sterling-Reed Bill, 
which was identical with the former Towner-Sterling 
Bill was introduced in both houses on December 17, 
1923 - in the Senate by Senator Thomas Sterling and 
in the House of Representatives by Congressman Daniel 
Alden Reed of New York. Hearings were held on this 
bill before the Senate Committee on Education and 
Labor. 
Representatives of the organizations actively 
supporting the bill were present and voiced their 
wholehearted endorsement of this measure. Teachers 
organizations representatives spoke of the keen 
interest of the reading public in this legislation. 
Prominent educators came from many parts of the 
country and clearly presented to the Committee the 
technical questions of the bill. From every section 
1 l 
of the United States telegrams containing strong 
statements of support came in every hour during 
the course of the hearing; on November 12 1923, 
representatives of the organizations supporting the 
Sterling-Reed Bill met and were unanimous in their 
10 
protest against the creation of a Department of 
Education and Welfare wanting to have a Department 
of Education alone. When on January 26, 1924 the 
proponents of the bill were given an opportunity to 
appear before the Committee on the Reorganization of 
the Executive Department of the Government they were 
able to file a protest against such a Department 
which had been incorporated in the plan presented by 
Walter F. Brown, chairman of the Committee. During 
the winter and through the spring of 1924 hearings 
were held practically every week on the Sterling-Reed 
(DOE) Bill before the Committee on Education in the 
House of Representatives. The same strong case for 
the bill that was presented before the Committee on 
Education and Labor and the Senate was made before 
this committee. Leading educators and businessmen 
and representatives of national organizations 
appeared before the committees on every phase of 
the measure. 
On June 3 the Reorganization Committee reported 
out a bill for the Reorganization of the Executive 
Departments of the Government (Smoot-Mapes Bill S. 
5445 and H.R. 9629) which was placed on the calendar 
of both houses. This bill included a Department of 
Education and Relief. Congress adjourned on June 4 
11 
before action was taken on the Sterling-Reed Bill by 
either Committee on Education. 
THE DALLINGER BILL - A BILL FOR DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION AND RELIEF 
Congress convened on December 1, 1924, and on 
December 5 Congressman Frederick Dallinger of 
Massachusetts, introduced a bill (H.R. 633) for a 
Department of Education and Relief which was identical 
with that portion of the Reorganization Bill, Smoot- 
Mapes providing for the creation of such a department. 
On December 11, this bill was discussed and voted 
on by the Committee on Education in the House of 
Representatives. This committee did not vote to send 
the bill favorably to the floor for a vote. They pre¬ 
ferred to wait for action on the whole Reorganization 
Bill which seemed likely to be considered in the 
House of Representatives. 
No active campaign was waged in this session of 
Congress for the Sterling-Reed Bill. It seemed 
advisable, since the Reorganization Committee had 
already reported a bill which was on the calendar of 
both houses, awaiting consideration, for a Department 
of Education and Relief. 
On Friday, January 30, 1925, Senator Smoot of 
Utah, attempted to make the Reorganizaton Bill the 
12 
unfinished business of the Senate. His proposal was 
rejected by a vote of 41 to 25. 
REVISION OF THE EDUCATION BILL - WITH OMISSION OF 
FEDERAL AID TO THE STATES 
In the spring of 1925 the supporters of the 
movement for a Department of Education, realizing that 
it would be impossible to secure the support of the 
administration for a bill calling for a large federal 
appropriation to the states for education, decided 
that the bill should be revised. Accordingly, plans 
were made which resulted in a complete revision. 
Conference after conference was held at which notable 
educators and laymen gathered to discuss the revisions. 
From these conferences the Curtis-Reed Education Bill 
(S. 291 and H.R. 5000) evolved and was introduced in 
the 69th Congress. This bill differed from the 
former bills for a Department of Education in that 
it omitted the federal aid feature and provided 
singularly for a Department of Education with a 
Secretary in the President's Cabinet. 
THE CURTIS-REED BILL (S. 291 AND H.R. 5000) 
This bill was again sponsored by Congressman 
Daniel A. Reed of New York, the chairman of the Com¬ 
mittee on Education in the House of Representatives, 
who introduced the bill on December 11, 1926. In 
13 
the Senate the friends of the measure secured the 
leadership of Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas, the 
majority floor leader of that body, who introduced 
the bill on December 8, 1925. 
The proposals of the Committee on the 
Reorganization of the Executive Departments of the 
Government were not received with sufficient favor in 
Congress to justify pressing for their enactment into 
law of an Education and Relief Department. 
Accordingly on December 10, 1925, a new bill for the 
Reorganization of the Executive Departments of the 
Government (Smoot-Mapes, S. 1334 and H.R. 4770) was 
introduced. This bill provided for a Reorganization 
Board to cooperate with the President in making 
adjustments within existing departments. This left 
the field clear for an active campaign for the 
creation of a separate Department of Education as 
called for in Curtis-Reed. 
On February 24 through 26, 1926, a Joint 
Committee Hearing was held on the Curtis-Reed Bill 
(S. 291 and H.R. 5000). Educators from all over the 
United States appeared at this hearing and presented 
arguments for the creation of a Department of 
Education. Technical questions pertaining to the 
Curtis-Reed Bill were explained by these experts. The 
14 
representatives of supporting organizations proposed 
that the professional people who were in Washington 
attending the meeting of the Department of Superin¬ 
tendence of the National Education Association (NEA), 
which was being held at that time, be given the time 
which was allotted the proponents of the bill. These 
representatives filed statements in the report of the 
hearing setting forth reasons why their organizations 
supported the creation of a Department of Education. 
However, no action was taken on the bill by the 
Committee on Education of either House or the Senate 
in the long session of the 69th Congress. 
A BILL TO ENLARGE THE BUREAU OF EDUCATION - THE 
PHIPPS BILL 
On March 11, 1926, Senator L.C. Phipps of 
Colorado, chairman of the Committee on Education and 
Labor in the Senate, introduced a bill of extension 
of the purpose and duties of the United States Bureau 
of Education (S. 5663). On May 6, 1926, this bill 
was reported favorably by the Senate Committee on 
Education and Labor. 
CURTIS-REED BILL REINTRODUCED 
At the opening of the Seventieth Congress the 
Curtis-Reed Bill was reintroduced in the Senate on 
December 13, 1927, by Senator Charles Curtis as S. 
15 
1584 and in the House by Congressman Daniel A. Reed 
as H.R. 7. A hearing on H.R. 7 was held on April 
25-28 and May 2, 1928, before the Committee on 
Education in the House of Representatives. Mr. Peed 
as chairman of the committee helped present the case 
for a Department of Education. There were numerous 
speakers in behalf of the bill. In addition, 
statements and resolutions endorsing the measure were 
placed in the record from 34 state superintendents of 
public instruction, 30 state or sectional education 
associations, and 22 lay supporting organizations. 
Representatives of only 10 national organizations 
appeared against the bill. The total number of 
statements for the opposition was less than one-fourth 
as many as those in support of the measure. 
However, no action was taken on the bill by 
the Committee on Education of either House during 
the Seventieth Congress. 
THE ROBSION BILL 
On February 18, 1929, just before the 70th 
Congress adjourned, John M. Robsion of Kentucky 
introduced in the House of Representatives a bill 
(H.R. 17165) calling for a Federal Department of 
Education with a secretary in the President's Cabinet 
16 
The 70th Congress closed without action being taken 
on the Robsion bill. 
On the very first day of the special session of 
the 71st Congress, Congressman Robsion reintroduced 
his bill for a Department of Education as (H.R. 10). 
No action was taken during this session of Congress 
on this legislation. 
THE CAPPER BILL 
On September 4, 1929, during the special session 
of the 71st Congress Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas 
introduced in the Senate a bill (S. 1586) which 
proposed to create a federal Department of Education 
with a secretary in the President's Cabinet. This 
was exactly the same as the Robsion Bill as proposed 
in the 70th Congress. 
On December 11, 1929, at the regular session of 
the 71st Congress Congressman Daniel A. Reed re¬ 
introduced his bill, without change, for a Department 
of Education with a secretary in the President's 
Cabinet. 
A.gain no action was taken on either the Capper 
Bill or the reintroduced legislation of Congressman 
Reed. 
The debate during all of these legislative efforts 
from 1916-1930 were along similar lines as in the late 
17 
nineteenth century. Congressman William Kenyon of Iowa 
spoke of "... when men cannot read the Constitution, nor 
the statutes, how can they grasp the ideals of this 
republic ... this (DOE) will put a fire under the melting 
pot and make Americans out of illiterates who come to our 
shores." Speaking in 1919 of World War I, Senator Hoke 
Smith of Georgia told his colleagues of the increasing 
public interest spurred on, "... when 700,000 out of the 
4,000,000 boys called to the war could not read and write 
the country awoke to (the) fact that a national as well as 
a state responsibility existed (for education)." 
Continued Smith two years later, "We (in Congress) appro¬ 
priate $100,000,000 for good roads; we appropriate freely 
for hog cholera and for foot-and-mouth disease of cattle. 
Let us open the National Treasury to contribute to (the) 
highest of all causes, the training of children."34 
It was in the early 1920's with increasing pressure 
to create a Federal Department of Education that the argu¬ 
ments of the Catholic Church were brought to the floor of 
the House of Representatives. Congressman William H. King 
of Utah said, "Catholic opposition ... (is) ... based on 
policies and influences at work to weaken individual 
initiative and character ... (Catholic opposition) based 
on (the) fear of standardization of lives and thoughts of 
people as well as social, political and economic conditions 
18 
in (the) land ... (and) that a (DOE) will lead to 
establishment in Washington of autocratic power that will 
standardize and bureaucratize (the) educational system of 
the States of the Union.in response Furnfifold 
Simmons of North Carolina said that the "Real basis of 
Catholic opposition is that Catholic Schools will receive 
no benefit . . . while Catholics will have to contribute to 
it." Utah's King refuted this, stating "I deny the 
power and authority of the federal government to tax 
people of Utah or of Massachusetts to educate the people 
o 7 
of Texas."' Answered Simmons, "(the) Catholics have not 
opposed measures of similar import (as a DOE) such as good 
roads."^ 
As the debate continued, "President (VJarren) Harding 
in 1922 sought to elevate (educations) status ... Harding 
asked the Commissioner of Education, Philander Claxton, to 
prepare a bill creating a new Cabinet-level Department of 
Education and Welfare. Claxton complied but opposed the 
bill, informing Harding that he believed that a National 
School Eoard should be created that would have the power 
to appoint the chief educational officer of the govern¬ 
ment, who would not be a Cabinet Officer. Claxton s 
resignation was promptly requested and accepted, and the 
bill, although transmitted to Congress, received no 
consideration. 39 
19 
During the balance of the 1920's, those advocating a 
DOE were still unable to overcome its detractors. There 
was focus on the economies a DOE would bring when 
Taxpayers of the land (would) be benefited through 
efficiency and economy (made) possible by coordinating 
activities (and) elimination of duplication"40 to the 
argument to help a President who already had, "... Cabinet 
secretaries whose major duties ... (were) ... to advance 
the interests of agriculture, commerce and labor, but no 
one to do so for education, the basic element in the 
advancement of the other three."4^ All these arguments 
were unsuccessful. 
The Catholic Community continued its opposition to 
a DOE. The Catholic Review of the Week in late 1927, 
stated that "... this campaign for a Federal Department of 
Education is of the hardy, perennial kind, like complaints 
about the weather, and smoking - car discussions on 
prohibition. (The DOE) would establish immediate federal 
control of the local schools (and other legislation) would 
establish a machinery which if allowed to operate will by 
degrees establish federal control."4^ 
Opposition began to elicit editorial comment. The 
Washington Post in 1927, stated "There is no good reason 
why there should be a separate and distinct Federal 
Department of Education, ... The Federal Bureau of 
20 
Education has ample authority and dignity to handle 
whatever properly belongs in this important field."43 
President Calvin Coolidge, as the second successor 
President to do so, called for a DOE, when he stated, "For 
many years it has been the policy of the federal government 
to encourage and foster the cause of education. Large sums 
of money are annually appropriated to carry on vocational 
training. Many millions go into agricultural schools. 
The general subject is under the immediate direction of a 
Commissioner of Education. While this subject is strictly 
a state and local function, it should continue to have the 
encouragement of the National government. I (Coolidge in 
1928) am still of the opinion that much good could be 
accomplished through the establishment of a Department of 
Education and Relief, into which would be gathered all of 
these functions under one directing member of the 
Cabinet."44 Echoed the San Francisco Examiner, "Times are 
advancing - distance between communities is disappearing - 
public school education today is a matter of NATIONAL 
concern, and there should be a NATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION headed by a SECRETARY FOR EDUCATION IN THE 
NATIONAL CABINET."45 
In 1931, "A National Advisory Commission on Education 
appointed by President Hoover ... recommended the creation 
of a cabinet-level Department of Education, but Hoover 
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made no such recommendation to Congress and no action was 
taken."46 
Therefore, until 1939, the office of Education 
remained a bureau of the Department of Interior as it had 
been for the past seven decades. At this time it was 
"renamed (the) Office of Education (and) transferred to 
the Federal Security Agency which later became the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1953.1,47 
This move in 1939 was a direct result of President 
Franklin Roosevelt's "Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1939." 
That and eight other plans and studies between then and 
1970 shaped the debate on a new Department of Education. 
The following is a summary of the efforts that occurred 
in this thirty year period; 
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S REORGANIZATION PLAN NO. 1 OF 
1939 
It established the Office of Education in the 
newly created Federal Security Agency. This agency 
brought together the Public Health Service, the 
Social Security Board, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps, the National Youth Administration and the 
Office of Education. "The move was recommended to 
Roosevelt by his three advisors on organization: 
Louis Brownlow, Charles Merriam, and Luther Gulick. 
that bureaus dealing with services The theory was 
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to people were scattered in anomalous settings and 
should be brought together so that they could be 
overseen and coordinated, if need be, by a top 
official who was concerned with human needs. 
PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S FIRST HOOVER COMMISSION ON 
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1946-49) 
This Commission engaged the Brookings 
Institution to address the subject of "Federal Policy 
and Organization for Education," which was mainly the 
labor of Hollis P. Allen of Claremont College. Allen 
recommended the creation of a 12-member National 
Board of Education who would appoint a Commissioner 
of Education emphasizing the "principal of keeping 
education programs aloof from political influence and 
oversight.President Truman took no action on 
this proposal. 
THE FEDERAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION SELF-STUDY, (1960-61) 
A committee, chaired by Dr. Homer Babbidge, chose 
not to deal with the concern of consolidation of 
education programs spread throughout the federal 
government, but rather to focus on how the office at 
that time "Should be internally organized and 
strengthened."50 The study "... recommended a 
significant reorganization ... advocated no transfers 
of functions into or out of ... (and recommended) a 
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Board of Advisors to the Commissioner to be appointed 
by the President."51 None of this was enacted. 
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 1964 TASK FORCE ON GOVERNMENT 
REORGANIZATION 
A task force to look at twelve areas of govern¬ 
ment, including education, was created and chaired by 
Don K. Price of Harvard University. 
The report recommended a Department of 
Education, with Cabinet-rank, "to include those 
agencies whose purpose is to support the educational 
and basic research programs of the Nation's institu¬ 
tions of learning, including the humanities and 
cultural affairs as well as the sciences. HEW would 
then become the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare."5^ Said the report, "Because the schools 
have been afraid of Federal domination, the govern¬ 
ment has never had a comprehensive policy for the 
advancement of education and research. But it is 
unrealistic to think we can protect the freedom of 
5 3 
education by pretending to ignore it." President 
Johnson concurrently named a reorganization study to 
look specifically at education. 
PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S 1964 TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION 
Chaired by John Gardner, President of the 
Carnegie Corporation, this group was charged to study 
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education in broad terms. 
The task force was divided on the issue of a 
cabinet-level Department. However, the majority felt 
that "... the new Department should be created by 
lifting the present Office of Education out of HEW 
and building around it. A completely new department 
should be organized, drawing functions from various 
parts of the government which now are carrying on 
. . . . . R4 
significant educational missions.' 
In November, 1964, Johnson appointed John 
Gardner to be Secretary of HEW, and, "... for the 
balance of President Johnson's term, nothing more 
was heard about the proposals of the Gardner Task 
Force ... instead Gardner turned his mind to the 
5 5 
creation of a super-Department of HEW ..." 
THE CORSON STUDY (1965-66) 
After becoming HEW Secretary, John Gardner asked 
John Corson to conduct a study with two HEW Assistant 
Secretaries, James Kelly and Donald Simpson, on how 
best to structure the huge Department of HEW. They 
looked at the existing HEW and felt it should have 
three Departments; Health, Education, and Individual 
and Family Services. It was a short-lived proposal, 
as publicity turned the Bureau of the Budget against 
it. 
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THE HEINEMAN TASK FORCE ON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 
(1966) 
This was a "secret" task force headed by Ben 
Heineman, the Chairman of the Board of the Chicago 
and Northwestern Railway Co. Among the ten members 
of the task force was Hale Champion, former Director 
of Finance for the State of California (later Jimmy 
Carter's Undersecretary of HEW working for Joseph A. 
Califano, Jr., who in 1966 was head of Johnson's 
White House Domestic Policy Staff and liaison to the 
Task Force. Califano under Carter would hire as his 
Executive Assistant, Ben Heineman, Jr., the son of 
the Chairman.) 
"The Heineman Commission addressed itself 
explicitly to the question as to whether a new 
Department of Education should be created, and 
concluded that it should not be. It was afraid that 
such a department would turn into a significant self- 
interest pressure group, narrowly oriented ... It is 
especially important that the President have his man 
running the show in HEW rather than a voice for any 
special set of interests."56 
THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF RESEARCH AND ADVANCED 
STUDY (1969-70) 
A Congressional Subcommittee on Science, 
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Research and Development chaired by Congressman Mim 
Daddario (D-Connecticut), asked a panel to study the 
organization of science functions existent in the 
federal government. It recommended a National 
Institute of Research and Advanced Studies (NIRAS), 
which would include consolidation of federal 
responsibilities for basic research and graduate 
education. The proposal had little or no support in 
the Congress but the work of the panel was referred 
to later in the decade, "... as to whether a 
Department of Education should be created and if so, 
whether research, including mission-oriented research, 
should be moved out of the mission agencies and into 
5 9 
a Department of Education." 
PRESIDENT NIXON'S ASH COUNCIL STUDY (1969-71) 
A group headed by Roy Ash then President of 
Litton Industries was asked to study the 
organization of the Federal Government. It 
reported, "Education ... would be placed under an 
"Administrator for Human Development" who would be 
answerable to (a) Secretary of Human Resources. 
(This Administrator) was clearly to be a line officer 
with the full range of management and control staffs 
that normally accompanies line responsibility. Thus 
" would be subordinated more explicitly education 
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within (this) new department than within HEW - one 
echelon further away from the President."57 
This concept had no Congressional support or 
external groups pressing its approval. President 
Nixon was its proponent through 1972, without 
success. 
Therefore after more than 100 years of debate, the 
status of the Department of Education in the early 1970's 
was almost exactly where it began in 1867. Although 
enormous amounts of federal money for education flowed 
to the states, particularly after the 1965 passage of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, no proposal for 
the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Education 
had been successful through the intense legislative fights 
of 1916 to 1930 or the ensuing forty years of Executive 
Branch studies and proposals. 
In, 1972 Congress did create a "Education Division 
(in HEW), headed by an Assistant Secretary for 
Education."5® However, as a result of a legislative 
compromise although the Assistant Secretary was technical¬ 
ly the head of the Division, control rested with the 
Commissioner of Education, who headed the Office of 
Education further compounding the bureaucratic control of 
educational programs. 
In the 1970's continuous advocacy for a Department 
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of Education was voiced by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D- 
Connecticut), who had served as HEW Secretary under 
President John F. Kennedy. 
His contentions were substantiated in 1976 by the 
publication of a study by the American Council of 
Education in Washington, D.C. conducted by Rufus A. Miles 
a former HEW Assistant Secretary. This study concluded 
with a recommendation for the creation of a new department 
as the presidential election of 1976 began in earnest. 
Footnotes 
1 Jordan, K. Forbis, "Education: Proposals for a 
Cabinet-level Department". The Library of Congress, 
Issues Brief IB78068, March 1, 1979 
2 National Education Association: Archives; "Brief 
Sketch of the Movement for a Department of Education" 
3 Ibid., p.1 
4 Ibid., p.1 
5 Garfield, James, Hon., Comments in the Congressional 
Globe, 1866, p. 3050 
6 Ibid. 
7 Moulton, Samuel, Hon., Comments in the Congressional 
Globe, 1866, pp. 3044-3045 
8 Ibid. 
9 Rogers, Andrew, Hon., (New Jersey), Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1866, p. 2968 
10 Randall, Samuel J., Jr., Hon., Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1866, p. 3048 
11 Donnelly, Ignatius, Hon., (Minnesota), Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1866, p. 2967 
12 Ibid. 
13 National Education Association: Archives; "Brief 
Sketch of the Movement for a Department of Education 
14 Jordan, K. Forbis, "Education: Proposals for a 
Cabinet-level Department". The Library of Congress, 
Issues Brief IB78068, March 1, 1979 
15 National Education Association: Archives; Brief ( 
Sketch of the Movement for a Department of Education 
18 Storm, John, Hon., (Pennsylvania), Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1872, p. 568 
29 
30 
19 Harris, John T., Hon., (Virginia), Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1872, p. 855 
20 Coke, Richard, Hon., (Texas), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1886, p. 1609 
21 Morgan, John T., Hon., (Alabama), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1886, p. 1639 
22 Gray, George, Hon., (Delaware), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1886, pp. 1692-1693 
23 Wilson, Ephraim K., Hon., (Maryland), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1886, p. 1644 
24 Townsend, Washington, Hon., (Pennsylvania), Comments 
in the Congressional Globe, 1871, p. 1376 
25 Hoar, George, Hon., (Massachusetts), Comments in the 
Congressional Globe, 1872, p. 591 
26 Morrill, Justin, Hon., (Vermont), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1876, p. 2961 ("Father" of 
land-grant colleges) 
27 Hoar, George, Hon., (Massachusetts), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1886, p. 1642 
28 Blair, Henry W., Hon., (New Hampshire), Comments in 
the Congressional Record, 1888, p. 513 
29 Democratic Study Group, House of Representatives 
"Fact Sheet" No. 96-8, Department of Education, June 
4, 1979, Washington, D.C. 
30 National Education Association: Archives; "Brief 
Sketch of the Movement for a Department of Education" 
31 Ibid. 
32 Kenyon, William S., Hon., (Iowa), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1919, p. 4564 
33 Smith, Hoke, Hon., (Georgia), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1919, p. 2057 
34 Smith, Hoke, Hon., (Georgia), Comments in the 

















King, William H., Hon., (Utah), Comments in the 
Congressional Record. 1921, p. 3044 
Simmons, Furnifold, Hon., (North Carolina), Comments 
in the Congressional Record. 1921, p. 3039 
King, William H., Hon., (Utah), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, 1921, p. 3044 
Simmons, Furnifold, Hon., (North Carolina), Comments 
in the Congressional Record, 1921, p. 3046 
Miles, Rufus A. Report on the Department of 
Educationfor the American Council on Education, 
Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 38 
Capper, Arthur, Hon., (Kansas), Comments in the 
Congressional Record, February 6, 1930 
Cartwright, Wilburn, Hon., (Oklahoma), Comments in 
the Congressional Record, March 31, 1930 
Catholic Review of the Week, "The New Federal 
Education Bill", authored by Paul Blakely, S.J., 
December 24, 1927 
The Washington Post, newspaper Editorial "No More 
Bureaucracy, Please," December 12, 1927 
Coolidge, Calvin, Annual Presidential message to 
Congress, December 6, 1927 
The San Francisco Examiner, newspaper Editorial, 
"The Congress Should Establish a Federal Education 
Department", April 26, 1928 
Miles, Rufus A. A Study of the Department of 
Education for the American Council on Education, 
Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 39 
Democratic Study Group, House of Representatives 
"Fact Sheet" No. 96-8, Department of Education, 
June 4, 1979, Washington, D.C. 
Miles, Rufus A. A Study of the Department of 
Education for the American Council on Education, 
Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 39 
Ibid., p. 40 
32 
50 Ibid., p. 41 
51 Ibid. , p. 41 
52 Johnson Task Force on Government Reorganization, 
Washington, D.C., Price, Don K. (Chairman), 1964 
53 Ibid. 
54 President Johnson' s 1964 Task Force on Education 
Washington, D.C., Gardner, John (Chairman), 1964 
55 Miles, Rufus A. P 
Education for the 
Washington, D.C., 
l Study of the Department of 
American Council on Education, 
1976, p. 46 
56 Ibid., p. 49 
57 Ibid., p. 51 
58 Ibid., p. 52 
59 Ibid. 
Chapter II 
Prelude to Carter Presidency 1976 
In his autobiography Why Not The Best, Jimmy Carter 
expressed his concern that "Federal education laws must 
be simplified to substitute education for paper-shuffling 
grantsmanship ... Is a comprehensive education program 
beyond the capacity of the American people?"1 Carter 
asked. "I think not"^ he said. 
As a candidate for President of the United States in 
1976, Carter consistently emphasized his commitment to 
education, particularly as it was reflected in his career 
as a public official. His campaign speeches show he 
repeatedly spoke of the fact that his "... first (public) 
position was the chairmanship of a local school board. 
(He) ran for the State Senate because of (his) concern for 
public education in Georgia and successfully sponsored 
there (Georgia's) first overhaul of education financing. 
Ten years later, during (his) term as Governor, a second 
even broader reform was successfully completed after two 
years of hard work ... and ... as President (he pledged) 
my priorities will not change; I will remain committed to 
n 3 
quality education for all our citizens." 
Early in the 1976 Presidential Campaign, the National 
Education Association developed a questionnaire for 
candidates on educational issues. Carter in response to a 
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direct question, said "I am in favor of creating a 
separate cabinet-level Department of Education. Generally 
I am opposed to the proliferation of federal agencies, now 
numbering some 1900, but I believe should be reduced to 
200. But the Department of Education would consolidate 
the grant programs, job training, early childhood 
education, literacy training, and many other functions 
currently scattered throughout the government. The result 
would be a stronger voice for education at the Federal 
level."4 
With that commitment, the NEA for the first time in 
their history endorsed a candidate for President. After 
comparing Carter's views to those of incumbent President 
Gerald Ford, he was endorsed at the NEA national conven¬ 
tion in the summer of 1976 by the "... delegates vote (of) 
85 to 15 percent ...”5, and the 1.8 million members of the 
NEA went to work in the election. "The NEA's endorsement 
of President Carter and its active participation in the 
national convention and campaign were given generous 
credit by the President and his staff as an important 
ii 6 factor in his election." 
Carter during his campaign had consistently under¬ 
lined his attitude towards the DOE. In late 1975 he said, 
"The only (new) department I would consider creating would 
be a separate Department of Education. I spelled out this 
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position when I met with the leadership council of the 
NEA a year ago ... (1975) . .."7. in early 1976 in Change 
magazine he wrote "... a Department of Education would 
consolidate ... functions currently scattered ... the 
result would be a stronger voice for education at the 
federal level."® In a statement several months later in 
the NEA Reporter he said, "Generally, I am opposed to the 
proliferation of federal agencies ... but the Department 
of Education would consolidate ... functions ... scattered 
throughout the government."® And in the publication of 
the NEA rival teacher association/union AFT's (American 
Federation of Teachers) the American Teacher, Carter 
stated, "As President, I will initiate a comprehensive 
attack upon the basic problems of education in America ... 
the following is necessary: the creation of a cabinet- 
level post to specifically represent education."10 
This public commitment Carter made was to the 
National Education Association (NEA) which in 1976 was 
more than one hundred years old. It began as a 
national organization "at a meeting in August 1857 in 
Philadelphia ... (becoming) a kind of superholding 
company that coordinated the state associations by 
providing an annual convention where ideas, theories 
and principals were discussed, leaving the practical 
application to the local organizations. 
11 
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The NEA had "... been involved in this (Department 
of Education) effort for a number of years (when) known 
then as the National Teachers Association ... successfully 
urged President Andrew Johnson and Congress in 1867 to 
establish a national education agency."12 
The NEA continued for the latter part of the 
Nineteenth Century with the stated purpose "To elevate the 
character and advance the interests of the profession of 
teaching, and to promote the cause of popular education in 
the United States. The profession takes precedence over 
13 
the teacher, and the purpose determines the form." 
Until the early 1900's, the "NEA was dominated by 
representatives of higher-education institutions who were 
the President's of the organization ... their focus was to 
attract the top educators in the world to come annually 
and present papers to their convention."14 At this 
time there was "... a considerable fight within the NEA 
concerning the need to concentrate on those who were in 
the classroom - the teachers. It was an effort lodged 
against the old guard ... (and) women stood up and fought 
...; among them Margaret Haley of Chicago who wanted a 
closer alignment with labor feeling the alignment would 
give teachers bigger clout with salary and employee 
benefits."15 She led her local organization away from 
the broader interest NEA into the organization of the 
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"American Federation of Teachers ... in 1916 ... (the) 
aim to form a national organization that supported full 
union rights for teachers and (hoped) that full profes¬ 
sional status and academic freedom could ... be achieved 
through affiliation with the trade union movement."^ 
During the next fifty years the NEA "opposed 
(National) teachers unions ... but then began to recognize 
the need to unify and started to consider that their 
individual members locally were automatically part of the 
State organization and thereby affiliated nationally,"17 
giving them broad-based influence. 
At this same time in the 1960's "Walter Reuther of the 
AFL-CIO National headquarters (looking) at their needs for 
more craft affiliates ... (was) smart enough to see blue- 
collar workers were declining and wanted to replace them 
with softer-type jobs such as public employees - and 
1 ft promoted the AFT in labor circles." 
The NEA-AFT rivalry within education over teacher 
affiliation led to "an alliance (of the NEA) with the 
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees (AFSCME) in 1971 ... and in 1972 the National 
Education Association-Political Action Committee (NEA- 
PAC) was (formed) ... to foster (through campaign 
contributions) the establishment of PAC's, to involve 
teachers in political activities, and to assist in the 
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election of pro-education candidates."19 
At the time of this alliance of AFSCME (which was a 
brother AFL-CIO organization to the AFT) Albert Shanker 
the New York leader of the United Federation of Teachers 
(UFT) was elected President of the American Federation of 
Teachers (AFT). At this point the "AFT had a half-hearted 
kind of endorsement for a Department of Education as 
opposed to the strong case made by the NEA, but Shanker's 
views were now reflected at the AFT and he brought a 
different perspective, one based on working with the 
Education and Labor Committee in the House, not splitting 
it up and then looking for direction from a Department of 
Education." 20 
When Carter was elected in November, 1976, the 
NEA began to look forward to the inauguration in 1977 
as the beginning of the fulfillment of their longstanding 
desire for a DOE. Having a President who supported their 
point of view would be critical in dealing with Congress 
which had "... since 1908 (had), nearly 130 pieces of 
legislation introduced ... proposing an Education 
Department ... none (of which) reached the floor (for 
a vote).21 
The AFT "felt it had no role to play ... and ... 
regardless ... the rivalry with the NEA ... as well as 
substantive concerns over a Department of Education made 
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it impossible to overlook misgivings."^2 They were 
therefore prepared to oppose an NEA effort for a DOE. 
The major proponent in Congress, Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) was prepared to fight as he had 
previously for a DOE. Ribicoff as HEW Secretary under 
President Kennedy felt a DOE would "significantly improve 
the design and management of Federal education programs ... 
stresses the importance of maintaining good inter¬ 
governmental relations ... (makes sure) that education 
policymaking ... will always reside with State and local 
boards of education ... (but) gives proper recognition and 
2 3 increased status (to education) ... . 
He and proponents of a DOE would face opposition from 
those historically in opposition (strict Constitutional 
constructionists. Catholic and other religious private 
school advocates, et cetera) as well as a new Congress, 
like predecessors, who did "... not like mammoth concen¬ 
trations of power, programs, and money in a single 
department ...24. An effort to break up HEW to create 
a DOE would face a new Congress and President with "... 
separate electoral bases ... which virtually ensures a 
degree of institutional tension ... and a Congressional 
Leadership dealing with a body with a contemporary 
individualistic tone with ... senators and 
representatives in ... business for themselves ... likely 
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to view themselves first and foremost ... not as members 
of a party or as part of a President's team. 
The Government Transition team preparing for the 
Carter administration was headed by Atlanta lawyer Jack 
Watson. Their work had begun in July 1976 to help form 
the substance of a new Administration. One of the highest 
priorities was to plan for a Government Reorganization 
Project designed to restructure the federal government in 
line with campaign promises. Subsumed in that would be a 
possible creation of a Department of Education. 
Chosen in the late fall of 1976 to be the Secretary 
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was Joseph A. 
Califano, Jr., a Washington lawyer and former Domestic 
Policy Advisor to President Johnson. Califano had 
historically been against a DOE and had written in 
articles and books about his concern over the splitting 
of education from related health and welfare areas. 
He had helped late in the Campaign "... as a Counselor 
on the Family ... (perhaps) Hamiltons' (Jordan's) way to 
send a signal that Carter was acceptable to the liberal 
wing and Washington's establishment. His appointment 
to the HEW position was pressed by Vice-President-elect 
Mondale, because he was "... ethnic, able and an old 
friend of mine ... I'm not sure Carter was ever happy 
about it but he fundamentally, I believe, did it for 
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At the close of 1976 President-elect Carter said, "I 
think the public is ready for a clear expression from the 
national viewpoint about what we should do for education 
in this country. Its something that has been relegated to 
a secondary position in the past. The only new department 
that I know of that ought to be created is a separate 
Department of Education. I will pursue this goal in the 
2 fl 
context of an overall reorganization of government.' 
His clarity and commitment on a Department of 
Education (DOE) would now be tested in dealing with friend 
and foe both within and outside his Administration. 
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Chapter III 
History of Effort for a Department of Education 1977 
The events of the almost three years of the Carter 
Administration that it took to see final passage of 
legislation creating the Federal Department of Education 
will be presented here in chronological order. Placed 
against the broader context events will be detailed to 
demonstrate how this White House dealt with this 
particular issue; one of many critical areas being 
debated and pushed by its opponents and promoters at any 
given time, requiring the attention of an administration. 
As a first priority in January 1977, President Carter 
proposed a government reorganization plan that would 
become the framework for changes in the Executive Branch 
of Government. His campaign pledges and personal 
interests motivated the President to make education reform 
a particular focus. 
A large number of special interest groups were pre¬ 
pared to help shape education reform, and to specifically 
promote a separate Department of Education. 
One of these groups, The Council of Great City 
Schools, was a coalition of the largest urban school 
districts and their superintendents in the nation. 
Awaiting the new administration were the results of a 
survey conducted among that membership. While stating 
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clearly that "Local boards of education should be free from 
unreasonable restrictions on the administration of their 
^^fairs, from undue control by other governmental agencies, 
and from cumbersome legal procedures at federal, state, 
and local levels which impair the delivery of effective 
education services ... and ... that ... local control, 
state responsibility, and federal concern must be main¬ 
tained as the guiding principals of school governance;"1 
they also stated a firm endorsement of a "cabinet level 
position for education ..." This was a recurrent theme 
throughout the struggle to establish a Federal DOE. On 
one hand professional educators firmly stated their 
independence from all control at the Federal level but at 
the same time were anxious to have the recognition that 
would come from education being institutionalized in the 
Cabinet Room of the President of the United States. 
In the first week of the Administration, a letter 
from the higher education community in America was sent to 
the new Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Joseph 
Califano. The President of the American Council on 
Education, Roger Heyns, on behalf of eight additional 
organizations^ addressed the status of education at the 
Federal level. Unlike the big-city school superintendents 
he did not call for a cabinet secretary for education but 
spoke to organizational changes that could be made that 
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would centralize authority over educational programs while 
strengthening local authorities. Heyns suggested this 
might be attained within HEW, perhaps at an Under Secretary 
level. But regardless, "Education needs to be elevated 
in status within the Executive Branch, and its bureau¬ 
cratic core needs to be consolidated."4 Joseph Califano 
as the responsible cabinet officer, was, in these first 
few days not only the recipient of these requests for 
educational bureaucratic change, but also was beginning 
to establish his relationship with the White House. As an 
experienced Washington insider, he understood the flow of 
power. During these crucial first days while Hamilton 
Jordan and the White House staff were finding their way 
in the government bureaucracy and trying to be responsive 
to those who helped elect Jimmy Carter as President, the 
experienced Califano reentered the familiar corridors of 
influence in Washington. 
The President had made a considered decision that 
a separate education department, as well as many other 
proposals, should be thoroughly studied by a Government 
Reorganization Staff that would make recommendations 
to him. He used his second meeting with the entire 
Democratic House and Senate leadership to discuss those 
plans. Coordinated by his Congressional Liaison, Frank 
Moore, the briefing lasted sixty minutes. The outline of 
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the needed legislation to set up and fund the reorgani¬ 
zation study was conducted by Thomas B. (Bert) Lance 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 
Stuart E. Eizenstat, the President’s Assistant for 
Domestic Affairs and Policy.5 The meeting focused 
on the major points of reorganization and its proposed 
enabling legislations, "provisions, constitutionality, 
and timing." 
The congressional leadership, although supportive 
of reorganization as a concept, were clearly concerned 
about the pending legislation concerning educational 
appropriations rather than focusing on a Department of 
Education. In the first weeks of the new session of 
Congress six major House bills and one Senate bill request¬ 
ing monies far beyond the anticipated Carter budget for 
educational programs were introduced. These included 
"career education in elementary and secondary schools ... 
public work projects, including schools in areas of high 
unemployment ... five year extension of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act, as amended. • • • and (extension 
of) summer funding, commodity distribution and nonfood 
assistance programs under the School Lunch and. Child 
Nutrition Acts through fiscal 1982".7 Attention was 
focused on a cabinet level position for Education when 
Senate Bill 225 was filed by Senator Abraham Ribicoff. 
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He had been a proponent of this position for his entire 
federal career including the two years he spent as 
President John Fitzgerald Kennedy's first Secretary of 
Health Education and Welfare. 
Carter reached out to the higher education 
community by convening formally on February 18th a White 
House visit for their representatives. Stuart Eizenstat 
coordinated the meeting and the specifics were assigned 
to his associate, Bert Carp. Among the group were 
Kingman Brewster of Yale, William Friday of the University 
of North Carolina and Barbara Newell of Wellesly College. 
Friday was asked by the White House to be the unofficial 
leader and was delegated to help encourage the discussion 
and conversation and referred to a need to reduce "unneces- 
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sary paper work burdens," and focus on education at the 
highest level. The concept of more attention being given 
to education was discussed but not to the point that would 
lead the President or his visitors to any consensus on a 
Secretary - level position for education. 
In this early period of the administration that 
the White House staff was in the throes of gaining 
control of the process of government. It was not until 
fully three weeks into the term before Carter acting on 
Hamilton Jordan's concern wrote to the members of his own 
* 19 
Cabinet to "notify Hamilton Jordan in writing" after 
49 
they had settled on someone they wished to hire at high 
levels and not to proceed with the nomination until "... 
Jordan had reported back to you ..."20 In the minds of 
the Senior White House staff the greatest violator of the 
ethic of having Presidential input into their departments' 
hiring was Secretary Califano.21 At this critical time 
when the White House staff was trying to get control or 
at least on top of the hiring process, the Congress was 
feeling they were being mishandled by an inexperienced 
. 22 White House. It began to show serious enough signs 
of deterioration that Jordan felt compelled to address 
a memorandum to Carter that members (of Congress) were 
objecting to stated references by the President about 
Congressional work habits and recesses. Jordan urged 
Carter to be "... careful about any references to Congress 
2 3 
that might be considered critical or pejorative ..." 
and suggested that at some point "... you consider making 
positive references to the Hill, and specifically to the 
quality of members that have come in in the 94th and 95th 
Congresses."24 Jordan concluded his memo by suggesting 
"Praises that could be interjected (by Carter) at various 
points might include: talented, competent, energetic, 
serious, a new breed, hard-working, conscientious. A few 
of these kinds of comments could go a long way in main¬ 
taining good relations with Congress. 
25 
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As to the DOE the President was not taking the 
personal lead to lobby the educational field or to make 
the proposed department a focal point of debate. When 
Vice-President Mondale addressed a National Student 
lobby Conference in Washington in mid-March (with Califano 
and his staff present) he followed a script that called 
for him to, "... reaffirm the President's commitment to 
a coherent strategy to assure financial access to higher 
education ... encourage student participation in the 
political process ... and to demonstrate ... concern for 
unemployment among students . ,."26 There was no reference 
to a DOE. 
Moving ahead rapidly, Secretary Califano in his first 
sixty days produced a proposed reorganization of the 
educational component within HEW. Acceptance of this 
would allow him a better argument to let education 
remain within his department; where he felt it should for 
substantive reason. Others, particularly in the White 
House felt that this was a serious turf battle and a way 
for Califano to calculatingly undermine what he knew were 
his President's wishes. The White House received and 
distributed these reorganization charts in late March to 
the senior staff;27 Califano proceeded however, without 
White House comment. 
After two months of unsuccessful attempts to see the 
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President the National Educational Association formally 
wrote Carter in late March after becoming "... increasing¬ 
ly anxious regarding our plight."28 Terry Herndon the 
executive director of the NEA mentioned in a letter that 
they (the NEA) were losing membership support in some 
areas of the country attributable in some part to their 
support of Carter's presidential bid, and he focused 
directly on their major concern. Wrote Herndon, "... 
your promise for a cabinet-level department of education 
appears to be of no consequence to your appointees. Many 
fears and anxieties would be quelled if you would reaffirm 
this promise and make a specific announcement regarding 
2 9 
schedules and assignments for its fulfillment." 
Concerned that a meeting occur by President Carter with 
Herndon and NEA President John Ryor, the NEA government re¬ 
lations lobbyist Rosalyn Hester Baker wrote Hamilton Jordan 
attaching a copy of Herndon's letter to Carter. She said 
she knew Jordan was "... aware how important it is that 
such a meeting take place ... and ... (she) will follow up 
with your office next week."88 Jordan immediately had his 
personal assistant inquire to the White House scheduling 
office where this stood as " ... (Jordan) thinks we should 
do it in view of their (political) support. The meet¬ 
ing was scheduled for April 27, a full three months after 
the Inauguration. 
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^^^^^9 tli© efforts needed to win support from 
Congress on future legislation, Frank Moore (Carter's 
legislative aide) at this point worked to get the 
President to spend more time with the Congress. He 
wrote Carter, "We continue to receive a great deal of 
criticism ... about the lack of prior consultation with 
members (of Congress) about programs that affect them. 
A study by Tim Kraft (Carter Appointment Secretary) 
about your first four weeks showed that although 
forty-five hours were budgeted for congressional rela¬ 
tions, only twenty-five hours were used ... it is 
important that we begin to make active scheduling 
proposals as well as reactive ..." This memorandum 
served as an unintentional counterpoint to a personal 
letter Carter received a week later from Congressman Dan 
Glickman of Kansas. Glickman wrote that "Your (Carter's) 
openness and desire for input from the American people are 
beautiful examples of making people part of the method of 
deciding how to do things. I am only suggesting that you 
think about allowing the same things with all Members 
of Congress ... I believe many ... Members . . . feel that 
they are not needed by this Administration . . . you need not 
wait for an important bill or a crisis to occur in order 
to obtain Member's support."33 A routine of informal 
briefing sessions and breakfasts commenced. Some in the 
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White House were concerned that this was evidence that the 
tradition of the leadership of the party in power to be 
able to deliver the Congress to a President when needed 
was over, and that Speaker O'Neill and others were public¬ 
ly abusing the Congressional liaison staff when in fact it 
was they themselves who no longer had any influence. The 
Congress had become 435 individual power-brokers all who 
wanted to deal directly with the White House and not be 
subservient to the antiquated Seniority system, which was 
particularly existent in the House.34 
Stuart Eizenstat (Carter's Domestic Policy Advisor) 
began to focus his domestic policy attention on education 
in the early spring. He asked his staff associate. Dr. 
Elizabeth Abramowitz to present him an overview of campaign 
promises and current legislation that addressed them. She 
presented a comprehensive look at education issues which 
included the promise to, "Create a separate cabinet level 
Department of Education."35 At the conclusion of her 
memorandum she suggested she would update Eizenstat in two 
weeks after an attempt through HEW and Congressional staff 
meetings to "... determine ... (the) current status of the 
campaign promises, and ... more recent education issues 
demanding attention."3^ She also asked Eizenstat that As 
soon as possible, I would like guidance on which, if any, 
promises are of lesser importance for the immediate 
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future."J' 
The political operation of the White House was 
sensitive to the campaign promise by Carter of creating 
a Department of Education, particularly with the powerful 
teachers organization the NEA weeks away from a meeting 
with the President dominantly on that issue. As the White 
House domestic staff began to substantively look at 
the issue inclusive of input from various educational 
constituencie; the President received a memorandum from 
Secretary Califano that recognized the Office of 
Education with "... a plan to streamline the structure, 
strengthen the management, and minimize adverse personnel 
O Q 
impact." The architect of the plan was Office of 
Education Commissioner Ernest Boyer, the former Chancellor 
of the New York State University System for eleven years. 
Boyer reported directly to Califano but had no or the most 
minimal communication with the White House at Califano's 
direction.^ This Califano memorandum told Carter that 
a press conference had been called for forty-eight hours 
after he received it to announce it as they (Califano and 
staff) had already "Talked to relevant OE personnel, 
Congressional staff, and key educators ... and that when 
implemented, (the) plan (would) create the most effective 
structure in OE's history."40 Carter, regardless of the 
political implications of a reborn vibrant OE within HEW 
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and what it might mean in a potential struggle to create 
a separate department simply responded on the memo by 
writing "Good J".41 Giving support to Carter's decision 
to sign-off on the internal reorganization at HEW was an 
analysis by his OMB and reorganization director Bert Lance 
that it did not unduly prejudice the case for a new 
Department of Education ... (and although) procedurally, 
we (OMB) ought to have had an opportunity to review the 
reorganization in advance ... (and that) it is important 
to note that some large problems in the education area 
remain unaffected by this reorganization ... we (OMB) are 
proceeding to analyze the possibility of creating a new 
Department of Education ... (and) this internal 
reorganization (at HEW) does not conflict with that 
project.Already it was becoming difficult to slow 
down Secretary Califano's desire to control education, in 
the most positive sense he was establishing a record of 
accomplishments that he hoped would preclude a need for a 
separate department. 
It was difficult for a White House Domestic Policy 
staff to keep up with a Cabinet Secretary determined to 
keep several steps ahead of them. In the second week of 
April a memorandum to Stuart Eizenstat from his staff 
associate Beth Abramowitz expressed concern over the 
speed at which Califano/Boyer were reorganizing the 
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of Education. This memo focused on the creation 
of an affirmative action office and the lack of input 
from "... external review ... neither anti- nor pro¬ 
affirmative action, civil rights, or minority education 
groups have been contacted to review the plan ... (so 
therefore) my recommendation is to halt the plan until 
the necessary review and evaluation have taken place."44 
Eizenstat received this memorandum along with with a note 
attached to it from Bert Carp his aide who reviewed the 
document. Carp suggested that "... given our relations 
w/HEW I don't think we shd try to 'halt' the plan if they 
don't take (Beth's) suggestion. I think this is basically 
their mistake to make."45 Eizenstat concurred with Carp's 
comment and wrote "Agree" upon it.46 He did so on April 
18 when he received it, along with another aides' note 
that gave the irony of the situation regardless of what 
Eizenstat or his staff did. The note from David 
Rubenstein said cryptly, "Carter has signed off on the 
reorg".47 The President therefore agreed to a plan that 
eventually competed with his own desire administratively 
and did so in such a way as to leave out input from his 
own Domestic Affairs staff. 
On April 14 Abramowitz sent a mailing under her 
signature to educational organizations throughout the 
country asking them for ”... a brief summary of the formal 
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or informal positions of (their) reorganization in 
(several) areas. The areas ranged from aid to 
desegregated schools to education for the gifted but no 
inquiry was made directly on their attitude toward a 
separate Federal DOE. On April 25 Secretary Califano sent 
a memorandum to Carter on his reasoning against a separate 
Department of Education. With Carter's meeting the NEA 
only two days away, Califano wrote that the principal 
reasons for opposing a new DOE were that "... a President 
should have fewer, rather than more people reporting 
directly to him; that the NEA would quickly exercise 
control over it, a special-interest department would be 
less responsive to Presidential leadership, and the 
interest of children are not always congruent with the 
interest of teachers." Making a conclusive suggestion 
he said that Carter could buy time by asking OMB and HEW 
to review all options including what might be the middle 
ground, "... a department ... analogous to the Defense 
model, with a Department of Human Resources including 
Departments of Education, Health, and Income Security ... 
(whereas) a separate Department would make ... synergism 
much more difficult to achieve ... (when) we need less, 
not more fragmentation of related programs." Circu¬ 
lating at this same time through the White House were 
the negative views towards a separate DOE expressed in a 
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letter from Albert Shanker the President of the American 
Federation of Teachers. The argument focused on the 
need not to develop educational policy in isolation from 
that of health and welfare programs. He stressed the 
time consumption of establishing such a Department 
legislatively at the risk of urgent funding concerns 
and that it would stimulate those who want separate 
departments for consumer affairs, culture and other areas 
making it more difficult to gain agreement on approaches 
affecting more than one area. This would lead to much 
administration becoming fragmented because of program 
overlap. Finally, in the real world of Washington "... 
the merits of consolidation have been recognized by 
Congress in its committee structure which acknowledges 
the importance of relating programs and exercising broad 
authority ... (and) because some Congressional decisions 
will still be made in consolidated form it makes little 
sense to detach the administration of education programs 
from the logic of the Congressional pattern." In 
response Hamilton Jordan assured Shanker, "... that your 
views will be brought to the attention of appropriate 
members of the President’s staff."52 The views of the 
AFL-CIO would be distributed to the staff. Those of the 
politically supportive NEA would be brought into the Oval 
Office the same day. Stuart Eizenstat substantively 
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briefed Carter with a memorandum that began, "(The) 
National Education Association has more than 1.8 million 
members and gave its first endorsement of a presidential 
candidate to you in the past election."55 Eizenstat 
continued in the memo to distill the major concerns of 
the NEA, including the "Creation of a cabinet-level 
Department of Education ... opposed by the AFT and most 
higher education associations."54 Eizenstat in the memo 
related to the President a meeting he had several weeks 
previously with James Green of the NEA and representa¬ 
tives of allied educational organizations. The group 
had two requests; that the President either endorse 
the Ribicoff bill in Congress that creates such a new 
Department, or that he establish a working advisory 
group to plan one. Their major reason for endorsing the 
Ribicoff Bill Eizenstat wrote, was "... the major 
concerns ... that a Department of Education will not be 
created by the Administration (Carter). Eizenstat 
concluded with a recommendation that Carter should state 
that this "... subject will receive (Carter's) immediate 
personal attention ... and ... that a working group might 
be formed, consisting of the Vice-President, Secretary 
Califano, Bert Lance and (Eizenstat) to report to 
(Carter) ... with recommendations."56 He again emphasized 
the political overtones when he stated "As you know both you 
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and the Vice-President made strong personal commitments to 
the creation of a cabinet-level Department of Education 
during the campaign (1976 Presidential).57 President 
Carter took Eizenstat's advise and the result of the April 
27 meeting was the designation of Mondale to coordinate 
a study group and report back to Carter.58 
The Domestic Policy staff under Eizenstat were not 
the only White House employees involved in education. On 
May first, Greg Schneiders a special assistant to Chief 
of Staff Jordan wrote a direct memorandum to Secretary 
Califano concerning the possibility of appointing a 
National Commission on Education which would hold a 
"White House conference (to be) convened ... to 
summarize ... views ... and see if some agreement could be 
C Q 
reached ... There were no copies of the memo to any 
other staff member at the White House. This was a few 
days before Fran Voorde the Carter Director of Scheduling 
regretted (without copying anyone else and not including 
an alternate plan) a request by the Chief State School 
Officers meeting in Washington to see the President and 
discuss the "Creation of a separate Department of 
Education."60 Despite the hope expressed for perhaps 
another date if that was not possible the Voorde letter 
simply concluded that the President "... convey(s) his 
appreciation to you for your interest and willingness to 
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share with him."61 
Sensing the need to focus on the direction the adminis¬ 
tration should be going was the thrust behind a concept put 
forth in May by Eizenstat aide Beth Abramowitz. Warning 
Eizenstat that without action possibly "... no significant 
impact on education (would be made) until after the next 
presidential election (1980),"62 she suggested the need 
for "A task force to develop comprehensive educational 
policy ..." Eizenstat's associate on the staff, Bert 
Carp warned that "Something along these general lines 
(was needed). However, shipping this in (sending to 
President) w/o prior consultation wd be a terrific slap 
at Joe (Secretary Califano). Also the VP (Mondale) is 
interested + there is a tie-in w/the Cab. Dep't. (separate 
DOE) issue .. probably we need a sit-down w/Califano."64 
He attached this in a note to Eizenstat affixed to 
Abramowitz memorandum and added in writing directly on her 
memo, "Stu - See note. We need to discuss - + talk 
w/Califano + VP - before taking action. Also need to co¬ 
ordinate w/Dept. of Ed."65 Three weeks later on June 1, 
Eizenstat sent the memorandum from Abramowitz back to her 
with a desire "... to meet w/vou + Bert C. (Carp) on this 
asap."66 In addition Eizenstat returned to her a 
memorandum drafted by her for them both to sign and send 
to the President recommending "... a cabinet-level task 
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force be appointed ... to shape our educational goals and 
policies ..."67, and wrote on it "Hold."68 a full five 
months into the Carter Administration had passed without 
the formalization of a process to screen concepts, develop 
policy, elicit support within and outside Washington, and 
prioritize the importance of issues related to education 
and in specific a cabinet—level Department of Education. 
During a Presidential trip in May, 1977 to California 
Beth Abramowitz thought it would be an opportune time to 
"As a part of the speech to be delivered. ... (to) state 
the goals and aims of the administration ... (on) 
education ... (as) to date no formal statement on educa¬ 
tion (had) been made.Eizenstat responded, "I don't 
think the opportunity will arise due to limited speaking 
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engagement." A few days later Vice-President Mondale 
wrote the President that since the April 27 meeting with 
the NEA he had at Carter's request "... been looking into 
the alternatives on education reorganization (cabinet-level 
department and other options) ... (and that) Joe Califano, 
Bert Lance, Stu Eizenstat and I will meet immediately on 
my return from Europe and I will report to you on our 
recommendations at that time."7'*" In that same memo 
Mondale recommended Carter attend the NEA national 
convention in July, 1977 to be held in the Vice- 
President's home state of Minnesota. Carter replied, 
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"Probably no."72 Although the President at the end of 
May had not yet made public a statement on his educational 
goals and agenda, his need to be perceived as interested 
in education persisted at the White House. Stuart 
Eizenstat suggested to several staff members who were 
responsible for scheduling that a September, 1977 
potential town meeting with Carter, "... coincides with 
the beginning of the fall semester, (in schools and) a 
visit to a local school board or PTA meeting ... would 
give ... (Carter) his first opportunity since the campaign 
to address exclusively educational issues and to talk 
directly with parents about schools ... (which) would 
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underscore (Carter's) commitment ... to education." 
Also in May, the Presidents Reorganization Project 
which was passed by the Congress at the beginning of 
the administration, produced the strategy for implementa¬ 
tion of the reorganization effort. Taking into 
account "... structural organization, cost control, 
productivity, budgetary control, personnel policies and 
intergovernment relations ... the reorganization goals 
will emphasize program consolidation and realignment."74 
The project suggested that it would "... follow a step-by 
step incremental approach ... with initial targets for 
reorganization ... chosen from policy areas in which the 
President expects to make major initiatives this year ... 
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(with it being) essential that the officials charged with 
implementation ... be involved in their development ... 
(with) their comments on draft recommendations before 
they are finalized ... (and the overall) commitment to 
establish ... a close working relationship with the 
Congress . . . and include a strong public awareness com¬ 
ponent to involve, inform and win the support of important 
groups and the public generally."7^ The Feorganization 
Project administratively was placed under the adminis¬ 
tration as well as the political analysis of OMB; 
Director Bert Lance who would have as a top priority the 
study of a cabinet-level Department of Education. 
Although the NEA was the dominant proponent for a DOE 
its rival organization the AFT continued to state its 
opposition. The AFT President Albert Shanker in a letter 
to Carter reminded him, "... (that) when we met during 
your campaign (1976) you suggested that the leadership of 
the AFT should establish continuing relations with you 
during your administration."76 He then requested a 
meeting to discuss issues that affected education in urban 
areas such as welfare reform, privitization of public 
education and civil rights enforcement, all underlining 
the AFT argument of the need for a synergy they feared 
would be lost with a separate DOE. 
The enormity of the educational bureaucracy and the 
65 
difficulty in an administration of getting it under 
control were obvious in a memo sent from the White House 
(In response to a request from Senator James Sasser of 
Tennessee listing seven separate national councils (in 
HEW) on various education matters, all of whom had highly 
paid Executive Directors and all of whom were appointed 
during the administrations of Presidents Ford and Nixon.77 
A memo from Carter aide James King suggests "Carter 
appointees should be moved into each of these councils"7®, 
and has a handwritten note on it from King to one of his 
aides asking if "anyone on our (political) priority list 
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that might fit in?" , made at the suggestion of Carter 
labor relations aide, Landon Eutler. 
The end of June brought the recommendation Carter 
requested in April from his top-level advisors on how to 
proceed with the DOE concept. On June 22 the President 
received three separate memoranda from Mondale, Califano 
and a joint document sent by Mondale, Califano, Lance, 
Harrison Wellford (who was responsible for the reorganiza¬ 
tion research) and Eizenstat. 
It was at this moment that the President received the 
clearest arguments on both sides of the issue as well as 
the middle-ground available to study the issue further. 
On one side the Vice-President argued that he was prepared 
to recommend a separate education department for the 
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following reasons: "... the NEA and other 'Big Six'"®^ 
education groups (but not the AFT) are convinced that a 
separate department is the best way to elevate the federal 
priority for education; that (Carter/Mondale campaign) 
specifically supported that position and, in part on that 
basis, received the first NEA (Presidential) endorsement 
ever given ...; (that) a separate department is strongly 
supported by Senator Ribicoff ... and Senator Pell ... 
(that) substantial work has gone into their bill, which 
has near majority cosponsorship in the Senate; an 
extensive administration review of other options will be 
seen as a major retreat from our campaign pledge. It will 
create a serious problem for the NEA leadership who con¬ 
vinced their members to work for us during the campaign; 
because of budget restraints, there may not be much we can 
offer education and its advocates, except fulfillment of 
our campaign pledge for a separate department." Mondale 
demurred however in pressing that point in deference to 
Secretary Califano and the OMB reorganization project. 
Califano at the same time clearly staked out the substan¬ 
tive bureaucratic and policy reasons to oppose a separate 
department in contrast to Mondale's more political agenda. 
Califano stated that a separate DOE "makes little sense 
for presidential government now or in the future; the 
President needs fewer, not more people reporting to him ... 
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fewer, not more, constituency oriented departments ... 
the NEA and teacher interests would likely control a 
Department of Education (... why the American Federation 
of Teachers and virtually all college and university 
presidents oppose such a department) ... Fragmented 
organizations (splitting of HEW) will enhance Congres¬ 
sional control ... If reorganization along these lines 
takes Place> virtually every significant domestic social 
policy decision would require a cabinet-level committee or 
meeting of some kind."82 Califano's political strategy in 
the memo are variations on the same theme, namely to kill 
the idea. On one hand Califano says, "Since the problem 
is not going to get any easier, it makes sense, therefore, 
to get an adverse decision about a separate Department out 
of the way ... therefore, a quick study of the Education 
Department concept ... would make certain you understand 
the pros and cons, substantive and political ... (and if) 
you decide to reject it - - as I think everyone in the 
government will - - then we can make that fact known 
promptly."83 Califano continued, "If we do not dispose of 
the ... idea ... (then) we will have serious organization 
and management problems for an extended period of time 
84 (during) the long run kind of study needed ... 
Both Califano's and Mondale's arguments were synthe¬ 
sized and presented with a recommendation to the President 
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agreed to by both of them and as well as Lance and 
Eizenstat. The consensus view was "the best way to avoid 
mounting constituency and Congressional pressure - - 
which would tend to narrow and limit the Administration's 
freedom of decision - - ... (was for) a five-week study of 
overall organizational options for HEW ... at the end of 
this ... a preliminary round of decisions would be made, 
including a decision on whether to proceed with a separate 
Department of Education ... (resulting in a) 6-month 
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study." It was this recommendation that Carter agreed 
to as opposed to either an initial 6-month study or the 
commitment right then to a separate cabinet-level Depart¬ 
ment of Education. The answer as to whether to continue 
or not with a study of a DOE would fully be three fourths 
of the way through the first year of Carter's term. The 
main play was thrust into the hands of OMB and in 
particular, Pat Gwaltney who would head up the DOE study 
for the Reorganization. In order to make sure input from 
the White House was heard, Eizenstat aide Carp jotted a 
memo to Beth Abramowitz along with a copy of the agreed 
to Presidential memorandum, that said, This is where the 
honchos appear to be coming out ... we (you and I) should 
be involved ... since all of HEW is concerned ... (and) 
sit down with Gwaltney."85 Carp got the copy of the 
confidential memorandum that he sent to Abramowitz not 
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from Eizenstat for whom they worked, but from Jack Watson 
the Presidential Secretary to the Cabinet who was copied 
it along with Hamilton Jordan by the Presidents' Adminis¬ 
trative Secretary, Rick Hutcheson the same night the 
President received it. Carp acknowledged the tip with a 
short note to Watson, "Thanks a million". 
The NEA continued to take every opportunity to keep 
the White House aware of their interest. A letter sent 
to Vice-President Mondale by DOE Senate supporters Warren 
Magnuson (D-Washington), Abraham Ribicoff (D-Connecticut) 
and Clairborn Pell (D-Rhode Island) dated June 14, 1977 
and emphasizing strong support among their colleagues for 
a DOE was copied to Hamilton Jordan by the NEA. Jordan 
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responded that he "appreciated seeing it." 
A memo to President Carter from his chief 
Congressional Aide Frank Moore outlining talking points 
for a congressional liaison meeting to be held at the end 
of June indicates the large number and variety of concerns 
the President faced. Moore suggested to Carter that he 
"... compliment everyone on the significant recent prog¬ 
ress (at this meeting) ... as a whole and the successes 
we have had ... (and) mention the work Interior did on 
water projects ... the State Department on human rights ... 
Treasury's job on counter cyclical ... Commerce's work on 
the Arab boycott ... and everyone's joint cooperation on 
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energy. (As well as) a couple of things that are coining 
up that you hope they will work very hard for, such as 
voter registration, breeder reactor, (and the) pending 
treaties with Panama and Salt."89 As the second-half of 
the first year of his Administration began, a new cabinet 
position for a Department of Education was only one of 
many areas that had not yet even surfaced as being of 
critical import. 
The NEA National Convention in July brought the 
rallying cry to those delegates from across the country 
in attendance. Terry Herndon, the NEA Executive Director 
said in a July 4 speech, "We have commitments from Mr. 
Carter on the cabinet-level Department of Education . . . 
to achieve we must organize. We must mobilize to provide 
a 96th Congress which is not only cordial, but actively 
committed to (our) programs. In 1976 we endorsed and 
assisted 271 winners. This is a majority of the House of 
Representatives. Obviously, if we do not see considerable 
progress on our agenda, then we made some mistakes and it 
would be unthinkable to endorse the same majority for re- 
election. We need to be more aggressive but also more 
discriminating ••• we have much work to do; but that, 
while there is no easy solution, we are equal to the task 
if we can organize and mobilize two million teachers to 
carry the fight into every community, every political 
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campaign, every party meeting, every legislative session, 
and every school board meeting ... there is only us; a 
united teaching profession, decisive and strong. NEA. 
There is no other. Only us!"90 
The day the NEA meeting was concluding in early July, 
back in Washington the White House was preparing for their 
first Presidential meeting with a delegation from the 
American Federation of Teachers AFL-CIO. The briefing 
memorandum for the President on this meeting dealt with 
several issues of concern to the AFT including the cabinet- 
level DOE, to which, "they oppose creation ... (feeling) 
that primary attention should be on increased spending and 
improved operation of educational programs ... (and that) 
creating a Department of Education would deflect attention 
and needed resources ..."91 The recommended response 
for Carter if the subject was raised by Albert Shanker of 
the AFTE or others was that "Education reorganization is 
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currently under study by OMB." 
Several days later Beth Abramowitz proposed again the 
President make a major speech on education, "... on what 
we are doing and where we want to go ... Eizenstat 
agreed in concept but wanted to "... defer setting precise 
date until we know our legislative package and our re¬ 
organization posture."94 He was advised on this by aide 
Carp who recommended "... no commitment on timing until we 
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know when we will have our leg. proposals + reorg. Then 
we should try a major speech."95 This was complemented 
by a wry comment from Eizenstat's Deputy David Rubenstein, 
who agreed with Carp, "... though I don't know how major a 
speech I'd recommend if we don't have a sep. Dept."96 
Representing Eizenstat at the AFT meeting with the 
President were Carp and Abramowitz. Abramowitz reported 
that the follow-up included a probable "... analysis of 
the impact of the major domestic policies on the fiscal 
condition of large urban centers . . . (and) a small effort 
... to examine additional use of school facilities in non- 
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school hours ..." Insofar as other as other items 
discussed Abramowitz said "... no action on our part seems 
QO , 
necessary ... (or) is needed ..." This included the 
cabinet-level DOE, which she said the "AFT reiterated its 
opposition to ... (Carter) said that he was aware of 
their concerns and was sensitive to the objections they 
raised ... and that (the White House) would go slowly in 
n 99 
analyzing this reorganization matter." 
That very day Califano had on the President's desk 
a memorandum accompanied by a draft Executive Order to 
upgrade the Federal Interagency Committee on Education 
(FICE) which was established, in 1964 by former President 
Lyndon Johnson to improve administrative and policy inter¬ 
action and cooperation. Califano was calling for it to 
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be upgraded with the Chairman to be the Secretary of HEW 
(Califano) as opposed to an Assistant Secretary, and the 
"... Stipulation that participating agencies should be 
represented by policy level officers."100 Working on 
concerns such as regulation reduction, youth assistance 
programs, student financial aid and education consumers, 
Califano suggested it would now be prepared "... to 
study and advise on other matters of importance to the 
Administration’s education and research relations and 
priorities."101 Califano concluded that, "... this will 
in no way preclude any options with respect to ultimate 
decisions on reorganization of education in the government 
and will be regarded by educational interests as improving 
the situation m education." Carter demurred issuing 
an Executive Order that gave Califano the opening to 
"Exercise leadership in seeking timely resolution of 
differences of opinion concerning policies or administra¬ 
tive practices with respect to Federal educational 
ii 103 
activities affecting educational institutions. 
Therefore at the precise time the President 
authorized a 6-week study to see if the pursuit of a 
separate - DOE was advantageous he was being lobbied by 
Califano who opposed the new Cabinet position to give 
the perception of those who Califano would talk with, 
which included both the Congress and the media, that he 
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spoke for the President. 
As the time drew closer for the draft report from OMB 
on reorganization of Education the NEA was relentlessly 
pursuing their goal. Reported Abramowitz from her 
attendance in Utah on July 19 at the NEA State President's 
meeting, it was "Decided to plan a letter writing campaign 
(to Carter) to press for creation of a Department of 
Education.”104 
The consensus to first look at whether to proceed 
with a comprehensive plan for a separate DOE began to be 
shaped in August when the initial draft of the design for 
that possible study was completed within OMB. 
The "... overarching purpose of this study (draft 
form) ... (was) to identify the organizational and 
administrative structure that (would) maximize the Federal 
Government's contribution to ... education ... (and) focus 
on the desirability of restructuring existing programs and 
activities . .."105 This study involved the solicitation 
of views by over 100 outside groups and individuals and a 
preliminary survey of 250 education and related programs 
that were being administered at the Federal level in 25 
separate departments representing approximately $26 
billion in Federal Spending.106 This report was to comply 
with the thrust of the June 22, 1977 consensus recommenda¬ 
tion to Carter to study all of this as Phase I as the DOE 
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question "To provide the President with the information 
necessary to decide whether he should announce his support 
for a cabinet-level Department of Education."107 The 
report stated clearly that the argument for such a 
Department, "rests fundamentally on the assertion that ... 
(the) status ... in itself, would significantly increase 
the priority and attention given by the Federal Government 
to the country's perceived educational needs."100 This 
general position had several components including the 
"notion ... (of status) ... (would) facilitate."100 
The case for the retention of the Office of Education 
within HEW was based on "... the desirability on reducing 
rather than increasing the number of agencies that report 
directly to the President and speak for the Administration 
on policy matters ... and ... the importance of better 
coordination and integration of domestic policy."110 This 
general position yielded several propositions that 1 ... 
appear to apply to the various forms that reorganization 
ofthe Education Division (within HEW) might take ...1,111 
A critical factor that would become dominant later in 
the process was touched on by this study when it discussed 
the scope of a new Department. It was stated "... the 
merits of the case for a Department would seem to increase 
as the number of functions and activities that might be 
encompassed by such an agency increases. Further, the 
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larger and more diverse a new Department of Education is, 
the less weight there would be to the arguments for main¬ 
taining education within HEW ... it would seem that a case 
(for a new department) would be substantially stronger if 
a radical recomposition of the Cabinet becomes a desirable 
and viable reorganization option (e.g., if the functions 
of HEW and Labor were to be recombined into two cabinet- 
level departments).' The parameters of study for Phase 
I were set. The President would be presented in timely 
fashion a thorough analysis of whether a Department of 
Education made enough substantive, practical sense to 
pursue to a final plan for submission for legislative 
review and approval by the Congress. The divisions were 
clear both in lead personal advisors and in facts that 
were beginning to evidence themselves. On one side was 
Walter Mondale and Hamilton Jordan with the political 
argument to keep a campaign promise to the NEA who wanted 
a separate Department because they believed it visibly 
translated into more and better education. On the other 
side Joseph Califano and the AFT felt that historical 
and societal ties had brought forth a worthy system perhaps 
needing streamlining and more effective management but not 
one where education would be isolated to the detriment 
of itself as well as related issues. The competitiveness 
of the NEA and the AFT as well as simple power politics 
I 
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between an inexperienced White House political and 
Congressional operation pitted against a savvy, Washington 
wise Cabinet official. In the middle were Carter’s 
Domestic Policy staff and his Office of Management and 
Budget both trying to search for reasons that might sup¬ 
port either argument, and assist the President in making 
up his mind. 
Beth Abramowitz assured her boss, Stu Eizenstat that 
she was in touch with "Over 100 education associations 
... to discuss a wide-range of educational issues."11^ 
Eizenstat wanted to know that his staff had an outside 
pulse as time drew closer for a decision. Eizenstat knew 
full well that "A separate Department of Education (was) 
a question on which the education community (was) 
divided."114 
The White House was beginning to gear up for possible 
action. Their Congressional liaison staff was beginning 
to alert 0MB that reorganization legislation needed to be 
assumed so a framework could be made for scheduling. The 
staff projected that since 1978 would be "an election year 
(and assuming a lame-duck session will be scheduled ...) 
... one can project there might be 175-180 days of actual 
session .. . given that we can have three plans pending 
at once and that, conservatively, each would take 60 
"Legislative Days", we can expect to have slots for at 
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least 12 (reorganization) plans."115 With the realiza¬ 
tion of having to keep Congressman Jack Brooks and Senator 
Abraham Ribicoff (the key Congressional reorganization 
Chairmen) apprised it was essential to get direction from 
the President. At this time OMB was actively looking 
at Educational reorganization but also had. under study in 
six major areas, 28 reports ranging from reorganizing the 
United States Information Agency and the Cultural Affairs 
Office in the Department of State to the Peace Corps to 
combining the Commerce Department's National Technical 
Information Service with the Smithsonian Scientific 
Information Exchange.116 
In September the White House priority was outside the 
sphere of education. The major thrust of the Administra¬ 
tion was the Panama Canal Treaties, and Hamilton Jordan 
was exercising the power of the Administration to focus 
on that issue alone. He personally took over the 
political operation and briefed the President that he 
was inviting to the White House for Carter to influence 
one of the most powerful array of American individuals to 
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ever sit together with a President on a single issue. 
Also in September, Stuart Eizenstat established 
his authority in the leadership of Domestic Issues, 
superceding Cabinet Secretaries and Agency heads. 
Recommended by OMB to "ensure that the full resources 
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of government are bought to bear on particular domestic 
issues in a timely manner ... (and to) encourage advance 
planning and priority setting,"118 a Presidential Domestic 
Policy Review System was established, "... (with) the 
intent of the System ... to establish early and extensive 
involvement between the Domestic Policy Staff and the 
affected agencies . .."110 A White House of unclear policy 
authority was becoming clarified.120 
Eizenstat realized as Fall approached that Carter 
took political advice privately from Hamilton Jordan and 
that OMB were fact brokers. The substantive policy 
considerations were looked by the President to come from 
Mondale, Califano and Eizenstat. Eizenstat focused 
in on his own DOE beliefs as he received a staff memo 
that analyzed the draft OMB - Reorganization look at the 
DOE problem. It was Beth Abramowitz's view that "The 
paper prepared by the Reorganization team ... is strongest 
in its reasons against creation of a Department of 
Education ... (but also) the ... paper (does not) make a 
good enough case for (the status quo strengthening within 
HEW) to spend the amount of political capital it would 
122 
take when President Carter's credibility is attacked." 
149 
Due to Carter's promise of a new Department to the NEA 
Abramowitz felt that a separate DOE with only minor 
bureaucratic additions was open to the President's concern 
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that " the agency (could) be the captive of any one 
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group." She favored a Department of Human Development 
and Education which would be "... a broad based agency 
composed of all federal agencies in human resource 
development ... (an option) HEW does not endorse . . . (and) 
the Vice-President's position is unclear."124 
Abramowitz at the end of September urged Eizenstat 
to involve key Congressional Education leaders at a break¬ 
fast in the White House. Her concern was "I have in all 
instances let HEW "take the lead" in administration 
concerns about education. Fortunately, the Congressional 
staff persons I have talked to feel they have a good 
working relationship with HEW. Unfortunately, they do not 
feel that they have one with the White House. The problem. 
125 is one of communication." 
As momentum built for the conclusion of many of the 
OMB-Reorganization studies aside from a DOE a White House 
briefing was scheduled for October 12 so the Cabinet and 
Senior Carter aides could get a grasp on the scope of 
the work being conducted and conceptualize the potential 
problems stemming from the efforts to effectuate them 
into law. Among those who made presentations was Pat 
Caddell the President's pollster. He reported that 54% 
of Americans were aware of Carter's commitment to re¬ 
organization, that 65% rated reorganization as important 
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or very important, but only 22% felt be would succeed 
because fully half those asked felt Congress would oppose 
him. The poll showed that 57% felt governments 
problems were caused by poorly organized agencies and the 
chief program to be reorganized was social services to 
the poor. Education ranked in the middle with 35% want- 
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mg change. Caddell reported the poll reflected an 
attitude exemplified by the maxim, "If it ain't broke, 
don't fix it." The briefing was thorough on many 
different areas and presented startling statistical 
evidence of overlap with information such as that "114 
different Federal agencies were involved with law- 
1 9ft 
enforcement." 
During the briefing Harrison Welford the overall 
head of Reorganization for the President under OMB, 
expressed concern about the reorganization output being 
matched to a legislative agenda. Bert Carp answered him 
on behalf of Stu Eizenstat, that "... the Domestic Policy 
staff has sought recommendations ... (all) have not been 
received ... and we can't precisely foresee which projects 
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will require what degree of coordination ..." 
Understanding the role Carter aide Jack Watson had in 
liaison with the nation's mayors and governors, Secretary 
Califano sent him a briefing memorandum in late October on 
the status of a Cities in Schools Project. It was clearly 
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the work of an efficient bureaucrat and it received an 
appropriate response from Watson; "Thanks for your help - 
it's nice to be associated with such a "can-do" guy as 
you." A friendly relationship with a Senior White 
House aide based on professional rapport could not hurt 
as Califano awaited the coming report on whether his 
Department might be split-up. 
In November a request came from the National Student 
Lobby, a coalition of college and university groups that 
represented eleven million members to, meet with the 
President and discuss several issues including the 
creation of a separate Department of Education. In 
expressing their desire to speak with Carter, they quoted 
from his HEW Secretary, Joseph A. Califano, Jr., who in 
his 1970 book "The Student Revolution; a Global 
Confrontation", said "Students should have a voice at 
the highest level of the Federal Government which sets 
educational policy."132 
With the 0MB Education Reorganization study due 
within weeks, Dr. Harold Howe a former Commissioner of 
Education sent the White House remarks that generated 
an official reply from Beth Abramowitz that she "... 
agreed ... (that) a new entity (DOE) should be as 
broad-based as is realistically and politically possible. 
Upgrading the Education Division would in reality be a 
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substitute not a first step toward a Department of 
Education."133 
More comments were arriving at the White House daily 
concerning a DOE. The then Attorney General of Arkansas, 
Bill Clinton, suggested that a new Department include 
the National Endowments on both Arts and Humanities, 
bringing the ambivalent response from Hamilton Jordan 
that, "We have not yet taken a position on the bill as the 
Reorganization Project's study of alternatives for the 
creation of a Department of Education is not completed."134 
At the same time the National Catholic Educational 
Association was making sure that President Carter under¬ 
stood that Federal Educational employees need to be 
reminded that they are "to serve all American children, 
not just those in the public schools ... (and) this 
commitment can best be evidenced and achieved by the 
establishment of two positions: Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Non-public Education within HEW and Deputy Commissioner 
for Non-public Education with OE."13^ All of this accrued 
during a period when reorganization was not the major 
educational issue before Congress. Of most immediate 
interest was legislation offered by Sen. William Roth (R- 
Delaware) to give tuition tax-credits to parents whose 
children went to private schools and a debate led by 
Senator S.I. Hayakawa (R-California) over remarks by 
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Secretary Califano in which he voiced "strong opposition 
to the idea of even voluntary national scholastic 
standards and tests of competency in reading, writing, and 
mathematics." This issue provoked a handwritten let¬ 
ter to Califano from Carter which stated the President's 
position as believing "we need some national standard 
education achievement tests - to be used only optionally 
when states and/or local school systems want them. How 
do you suggest we do this - through HEW, or National 
Science Foundation?" This letter elicited a detailed 
four-page response from Califano to the President that 
thoroughly explained the historical arguments for and 
against standardized testing and explaining to Carter 
it was being carefully studied by "a Task Force on Basic 
Skills which, in collaboration with the National Academy 
of Education, is seeking new ways to improve achievement 
in fundamental areas."138 Carter responded, again with a 
handwritten letter to Califano, stating, "Your memo on 
testing does not answer the question. What can we do 
(without deliberate evasion or delay) to provide local and 
state governments with funds and satisfactory tests, and 
to encourage - not require - their use? Just a brief (one 
page) answer - "139 That same day came back a one-page 
memorandum to the President from Califano which said 
"We will develop a bank of in response to your note, 
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achievement tests and test questions ... provide funds for 
testing programs ... organize local or regional training 
workshops and conferences, to encourage the use of tests, 
provide technical assistance to states and localities ... 
Pu^licize successful testing programs . . . (and) announce 
within sixty days a major new Department initiative along 
these lines, and will promptly convene a conference ... 
(of) education officials to inform them of all the ways .. . 
HEW ... can assist. Ill4° Carter sent the memo back to 
Califano with the comment "Thanks", and sent a letter 
to Senator Hayakawa agreeing with the concept of testing, 
mindful that it be used, "... (to) encourage performance 
and not as an excuse to limit the opportunities of less 
advantaged children ... (and that) we will act within 
sixty days The power of the Presidency, when 
directly exercised showed its effectiveness against the 
toughest operative Carter had; who gave it his best 
effort but complied when ordered to do so. 
During the last part of November the substantive 
arguments concerning a separate DOE were presented within 
CMB. In an administratively confidential memorandum to 
her superiors at OMB copied only to White House 
Congressional liaison aide Terry Straub who followed 
educational issues, Pat Gwaltney wrote that she felt that 
material she presented was sensitive and, "as a general 
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caution, we must present our options noting that the 
President has not yet chosen (an option on a DOE) and we 
are seeking political and policy input. Our credibility 
cepends on straightforwardness as well as a demonstration 
of substantive competence ..."143 Gwaltney sent the 
memo as the Phase I. This was originally desired five 
weeks from the June 22 meeting but was only now being 
completed because of exhaustive research into education 
program relationships, and identification of key problems 
in education in general. Gwaltney defined the three basic 
options that were under evaluation as 1) a narrowly 
based Department of Education, with the present "HEW’s 
Education Division (forming) the base ... (perhaps) en¬ 
compassing some other programs closely associated . ..”144, 
2) a broadly based department that "would be created that 
included education and human service programs ... (with) 
emphasis focused on ... a comprehensive state and local 
service network involving families, schools, and other 
public and private community organizations" , and 
3) the strengthening of education within HEW looking 
to achieve a better "organizational structure for . . . 
programs ... and (confirming) the importance of the 
potential linkages among education, services, income, and 
health programs."146 She identified various pro and con 
arguments for each of the options, to be considered in OMB 
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Director McIntyre's final presentation to the President. 
The McIntyre memo on reorganization of Education was 
sent to the President on November 28. It was in final 
form of 104 pages a document inclusive of detailed adden¬ 
dums that Carter received, as well as separate comment by 
key staff aides. Well researched and substantiated it 
analyzed the three options within the context of back¬ 
ground of educational reform, the present concerns of 
academic achievement among primary and secondary school 
students, the budget of estimating the cost of each 
proposal, as well as a discussion on what programs 
presently concerning education in the federal department 
would be prime candidates for inclusion in each option. 
All of this information was utilized in the final 
evaluation of each of the three as to their specific 
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advantages and disadvantages. 
After setting forth the arguments, McIntyre, on behalf 
of the Reorganization Study drew overall conclusions for 
the President. A narrowly based Department of Education, 
he reasoned, "Would be substantially less likely than the 
other alternatives to foster a comprehensive approach ... 
i 148 
increase coordination, ... or to induce changes ..." 
McIntyre continued that the two strongest arguments for a 
narrow—based Department were that ••• it would increase 
the visibility and clarity of issues that educators see as 
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important ... and (secondly) ... it has the enthusiastic 
support of the NEA, other elementary and secondary interest 
groups, and a number of Members of Congress, most of whom 
see this option as a fulfillment of your campaign 
pledge."149 "in fact however," McIntyre wrote, "your 
campaign statements indicate support for the creation of 
a broadly based department that would include education, 
training, child development and a number of related 
programs."159 A second option, where the Education 
Division within HEW would be restructured, McIntyre argued 
should occur regardless, "as a single point of leadership 
and direction would improve the coherence and delivery of 
Federal education programs ... (but) the transfer of many 
programs from other departments may prove too burdensome 
for effective leadership ... (and) the education groups 
would view this as a further submerging of education 
programs from public visibility and attention."151 The 
option McIntyre and OMB clearly favored was that of a 
broadly based department including education and several 
other human development activities, because "... not only 
would it increase the visibility and priority given to 
education and human development issues ... but ... would 
provide a context for linkages between these program - no 
one constituency ... would dominate ... (and) is also most 
responsive to your campaign pledge."152 However Mclntrye 
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warned the President, that a "legislative proposal to 
create a broadly based department would enlist little 
support and much opposition now, and there is no guarantee 
this situation will be different even after many months 
of consultation and redesign."155 With it previously 
stated that HEW should strengthen the present delivery of 
education programs anyway, McIntyre concluded that the 
narrow-based Department is "least attractive"154 but 
recommended Carter "defer a final decision on the three 
structural options but note that the broad department 
seems very promising in view of the challenges associated 
with education, and direct the fuller development of the 
options with the benefits of a full public and congres¬ 
sional debate."155 
Secretary Califano responded to the McIntyre document 
in three days with a 33-page analysis of his own to be 
read by the President, based on OMB's recommendations. 
He extensively outlined a proposal upgrading an education 
department within HEW and spoke to the political 
considerations suggesting it would be "warmly received by 
those who are neutral or antagonistic toward a separate 
Department of Education - - the higher education community, 
the AFT, many prominent members of the black community and 
other civil rights groups ... it will be favorably received 
by those who advocate creation of a separate Department 
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but without great intensity — local and State school 
administrators, parents groups, etc., ... and it holds out 
significant gains for the NEA."156 Califano pointed out 
those gains would include an upgraded Education Division 
by the spring of 1978, "... a number of new Presidential 
appointments in education, a special Teachers' Bureau ... 
new programmatic incentives for teachers, and a sensible 
budgetary commitment. 
Califano was particularly hard on the narrow based 
Department proposal, suggesting that all of his "... 
experience in government - - both as personal staff to a 
former President and as a Cabinet Secretary ... leads me 
to urge, in the most forceful way I can, that you reject 
(it) on the merits as inimical to the President's policy- 
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making, managerial, and budgetary interests." 
Califano recommended that Carter take a modified 
approach to the one suggested by Mclntrye. He agreed with 
McIntyre that further study was needed of consolidation 
alternatives but felt Carter should have "no public ... 
preference for any particular consolidation ... (and 
should) express rejection ..."159 of a narrow Department 
of Education outright. The President also had the benefit 
of v/ritten comment by White House aide Richard Pettigrew a 
former Speaker of the House in the Florida legislature who 
functioned as a public liaison for all Reorganization, as 
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well as, the President's Chairman of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, Charles Schultze. They both considered 
the narrow department as a substantively weak and 
unatractive alternative. Pettigrew however felt that the 
broad based Department was viable and wanted Carter to 
"signal publicly that a narrow Department (was) un¬ 
acceptable ... (or there) is no incentive for the NEA ... 
to negotiate with us."160 The NEA, Pettigrew said needs 
to be convinced "if they do not cooperate in shaping and 
working for a broad Department, they will be left with 
the status quo." Schultze suggested though that unless 
a broad based Department included the "training programs 
of the Department of Labor ... this option has no readily 
apparent advantages over ... the strengthening of the 
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Education Division within DHEW." 
All of this set the stage for an Education 
Reorganization meeting held with the President in the 
163 Cabinet Room on November 28, 1977 
Stuart Eizenstat (who was unable to attend) 
addressed the President as to his best sense of direction 
on Educational reorganization several days after this 
meeting. He told Carter, "... that I (favor) a separate 
Department due to your repeated campaign commitments, but 
(remain) open on what should be included within such a 
"164 Eizenstat said that "Califano makes a Department. 
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strong case against a separate Department of Education . . . 
(and) ... if we had no campaign commitments, these argu¬ 
ments would deserve considerable weight. However, no 
commitment we made was clearer."165 Eizenstat also felt 
strongly about Mondale's argument as well as Carter's 
that "... under the present structure, education has no 
advocate in the upper policy levels of the Executive 
Branch."166 Thus Eizenstat, the President's Chief 
Domestic Policy Advisor came down on the side of a new DOE 
based on political realities. 
OMB Director McIntyre memoed the President on what 
direction Carter wished them to take. Summarizing the 
conclusions of the November 28 meeting McIntyre reminded 
the President that Carter said he wanted a broad-based new 
Department, not able to be controlled by a single group, 
that it should be pursued in development closely with 
Senator Ribicoff, that HEW should as an interim step be 
restructuring internally and that the President would 
reaffirm publicly his commitment to the new cabinet-level 
Department. When asked how all that should be done, from 
the State of the Union speech to an informal comment, 
Carter chose an informal response and wrote "VP Statement 
also OK."162 Carter also commented to "Be general - not 
specific"168 when advised to "state your preference for 
a broad department including education and related human 
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development programs ... (and) indicate that you favor a 
department which views education in the context of the 
family and related community institutions."169 There 
was no query on whether at this time to rule out a narrow 
Department as had been advised by Califano, Shultze and 
White House aide Jack Watson. Eizenstat and Jordan held 
the day with advice to simply "Re-affirm your campaign 
commitment to a new department without stating a 
preference that it be broad."170 
The White House was preoccupied with education as it 
related to reorganization at this time but HEW was in full 
bloom as to other substantive concerns. During that same 
first week in December, Califano sent to the President a 
43-page memorandum "to elicit your tentative views .. . 
(on) quality in elementary and secondary education ... 
(and) ... the relationship of the school to the family, 
the job, and the community." In two days Eizenstat and 
Carp produced an overview that suffered from a difficulty 
to deal with such complexity in the two days they had to 
review it, and it might therefore "reflect some misunder¬ 
standings" 172 but hoped the President when he met with 
Califano on it would "... not grant ... approval ... (and) 
instead ask the Secretary to go over these proposals with 
17 3 Jim (McIntyre) and (Eizenstat) ..." 
As 1977 came to an end the White House Congressional 
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staff began to be channeled on a DOE by Les Francis' 
towards a "thorough discussion of the various plans and 
that we begin to give considerable thought to timing, 
tactics, etc. ..."174 Those aides were going to have to 
lobby a Congress for as yet an unspecified educational 
reorganizational agenda. Wrote Chief House liaison Bill 
Cable, "There is only superficial support among the 
traditional education supporters in the House. They feel 
NEA's pressure. On the other hand only the broad-based 
option makes any sense - if we are going to propose a 
cabinet-level Dept, it should begin with a format that has 
a chance of success. The narrow Dept, would be viewed as 
1 7 c 
purely a sap to NEA. Added Chief Senate liaison 
Dan Tate, the "Broadly-based Department very popular in 
Senate ... Note, however, that creation of such a depart¬ 
ment would strip HEW of those programs with which it makes 
positive political points with the Hill, leaving only 
unpopular programs (mainly Welfare) in Califano's 
bailiwick. 176 
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Chapter 4 
History of Effort for a Department of Education 1978 
The beginning of 1978 brought an immediate reguest 
from the NEA for the President to meet with their 160 
member Board of Directors, "to share views and discuss 
mutual concerns about education ... (and) ... that such 
a meeting (with) these teacher-leaders from all over the 
country would have great significance for our organiza¬ 
tion ..."^. Both Eizenstat and Carp strongly felt it 
best to schedule the meeting after the State of the Union 
address (late January) and the budget message for Fiscal 
1979 went out making "their (NEA) suggested dates of 
February 10 or 11 ... appropriate." The importance of 
such a meeting was not lost on Hamilton Jordan who was 
already looking towards the 1980 election. 
Eizenstat was now assuming responsibility for the 
4 
moving ahead with a theme of a separate DOE. He memoed 
both Jordan and McIntyre at 0MB sharing the Presidents 
comment made to Walter Mondale to "Endorse Ribicoff 
approach - - broad Department."5 The Vice-Presidents 
impression, based on a personal talk with Carter, that 
the President (wanted) to "step back after the initial 
endorsement and not become too deeply involved, or have 
the Administration become too deeply involved in thrashing 
out the details of the Department in Congress." 
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Eizenstat favored a detached Carter on a DOE, avoiding a 
rejection of a narrow department for fear "education 
groups .. . (would) ... say we are trying to insist on a 
new department (broad) so controversial that it cannot 
(be enacted into law)"^ to a concern that an internal HEW 
"reorganization not detract from our proposal for a new 
department ... (and) ... Califano should be allowed to 
proceed (only) if he can obtain the (approval) of the NEA 
and other key education groups."® 
At this same time Eizenstat briefed Carter on his 
remarks for a dinner he was hosting at the White House in 
honor of the superintendents and commissioners of state 
q 
education. He recommended that Carter include his 
intention "to keep the commitment he made during the 
campaign to establish a new department which would bring 
together a broad range of education related programs from 
across the Federal Government ... (and that) ... "your 
remarks reflect Joe's (Califano) undiminished role as your 
chief advisor and spokesman on education issues (so they) 
understand that you have strong and unequivocal support 
for Joe's leadership ...1,1(1. 
Jim McIntyre was now increasingly involved as the 0MB 
Deputy Director because of the political entanglements of 
Bert Lance.11 In a memorandum concerning the appropria¬ 
tions process McIntyre voiced his concern to the President 
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that was general in scope. He said, "Last year, we were 
inadequately organized ... too frequently we were caught 
by surprise and confronted with the need to manufacture 
hasty compromises ... we should organize working groups ... 
not (however) to substitute for the leadership we need 
from the Cabinet Secretaries."12 
At the end of January the President received a 19 
page summary of first-year activities at HEW from Secretary 
Califano. Detailing initial problems he encountered and 
initiatives that were taken, Califano described HEW as a 
"More accessible, less burdensome bureaucracy ... (with) 
a department-wide program to reduce fraud, abuse and error 
in programs ... (where) we have tried to marry authority 
to responsibility ... making (us) the symbol of ... 
manageability .... At no time did Califano refer to 
a potential separate Department of Education, instead 
focusing on how better managed the affairs of education 
were, in his opinion, now conducted. Several days later 
Eizenstat, Jordan and Watson all received copies of the 
memorandum along with a duplicate of Carter's handwritten 
note to Califano that he was, "proud of your excellent 
record during 1977. The report was gratifying.1,14 
The public campaign for a new Department was being 
particularly pressed by Senator Abraham Ribicoff. Arguing 
that the "federal (education) effort is scattered ... 
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(with) ... nearly 40 different federal agencies (that) 
handle 300 programs, 200 of them outside the Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare ... (with) ... state and 
local education administrators (going) from agency to 
agency ... (answering) ... the same questions over and 
over for different offices."15 Reasoned Ribicoff, 
"Organization is both symbol and reality. Symbolically, 
organization tells us how important something is. Urban 
America became important in the mid-1960's; thus we have 
a Department of Housing and Urban Development. Energy 
matters, so we created a Department of Energy. What does 
I fi 
this tell us about how education is viewed." Concluded 
Ribicoff, "We cannot continue to waste both in overlapping 
and undirected programs. We need a Department which can 
work effectively with the states and cities. We need a 
Secretary who can operate from strength, within a 
17 
reasonable structure." 
The President's Reorganization Project was preparing 
to go before Senator Ribicoff's Committee to testify on 
behalf of the Administration. At the beginning of February 
Pat Gwaltney in a memo to Harrison Wellford and Peter 
Szanton of 0MB indicated that McIntyre needed to get the 
President's guidance on two key questions. They were, 
"is the enactment of legislation to create an Education 
Department a top priority for this year in light of other 
Ill 
domestic priorities (e.g.. National Health Insurance)?"18 
And secondly, "If (OMB1s) political consultations indicate 
that few or no programs outside HEW's Education Division 
can be consolidated into a new department, (does the 
President) still support a separate DOE ... (and) if so, 
how strongly."1^ ^0 
Gwaltney then followed with a lengthy memorandum 
outlining the political strategy she believed needed to 
be effective if the education reorganization legislation 
was to be enacted. As an election year, the legislative 
session would be shorter than usual. Therefore, she 
pointed out that "legislation creating a department 
should be enacted this year (1978), but reluctance to deal 
with controversy before elections ... and other major 
issues ... (e.g., Panama, energy, taxes) compound possible 
congressional reluctance to move that fast."^x Gwaltney 
then outlined a blueprint of action to fulfill the desire 
for a new DOE,22 and emphasized in it that it "may be seen 
by many as a political response to NEA for its campaign 
support, not as an initiative advanced primarily because of 
its merits .. . (and) ... (with) some (who) will think that 
administration support for the department is divided ... 
(because) ... Secretary Califano's role in this process 
is quiet, (and) he will be thought by some to be opposing 
the initiative ... (and) ... (therefore) he should be 
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deeply involved in promoting the new department ... in 
speeches and congressional testimony."^3 Bert Carp after 
meeting with Gwaltney suggested to OMB Reorganization Head 
Wellford, that she "... and her troops ... have made 
terrific progress ... and I (Carp) think we are going to 
be in fine shape for the Ribicoff hearings (mid-March)."3^ 
However the politically experienced Carter aide Richard 
Pettigrew who as Speaker guided the Florida legislature 
through government reorganization in the early 1970's, 
pointed out to Wellford that the division of human 
development and social service offices between HEW and 
a new DOE could substantively "be bad for both of the 
departments ... (and) ... it seems ... if we cannot create 
the Department of Education and Human Development . . . (we 
might) move instead to inclusion of only educational 
2 5 functions in the broadest feasible way ..." This 
significant interpretation of what a broad department 
could be is not shown to have been communicated directly 
to the President at this time, but was debated within 
OMB. 
The President was scheduled to deliver an Education 
Message publicly on February 28, and the White House 
was feeling the intense pressure. Stuart Eizenstat on 
February 21 responded to an AFL-CIO's resolution opposing 
a separate Department of Education, with the general 
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statement that the President "had decided that the strong 
reasons supporting such a department outweigh those 
•I 2 6 
against it ... . At the same time Congressional liaison 
Frank Moore received a joint letter from 37 members of 
Congress who wanted to "reaffirm (their) support for the 
creation of a separate (DOE)."2^ 
The public announcement Carter made on February 28 
was accompanied by a formalized Message to Congress. It 
included several proposals in Education ranging from 
bilingual education to basic skills funding. As to a new 
DOE, Carter stated that he has, "... instructed the Office 
of Management and Budget and the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare to work with Congress on legislation 
needed to establish a Department of Education ..." . His 
hand written notes on the text of the message are also of 
interest. In the remarks prepared for him by his speech¬ 
writing office, on the subject of the creation of a 
DOE, they wrote "... as I promised I would during my 
campaign . ,."29 Carter crossed out several words so it 
read, "... as promised during my campaign ..." Was this 
evidence of a President who wanted to separate himself 
from political overtones of a direct quid-pro-quo or was 
he stating for the record that he himself was unclear 
exactly what was committed to. Secondly, Carter revised 
the statement "We must pull our programs together under 
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one roof if we are to assure them of the full attention 
they deserve"31 by rewriting it to read "We must pull our 
education programs together if we are to assure them of 
the full attention they deserve."32 Was this a thought 
by Carter that substance was what he wanted to achieve 
whether it was conducted "under one roof" or not and he 
had deep but obvious reservations about a new Department 
and in reality perhaps thought Califano's internal 
reorganization might be fine? 
In the beginning of March, Pettigrew began to 
accelerate his agenda to build support for government 
reorganization in general. His specific involvement was 
in over twenty reorganization projects including Education 
that were underway at this time. Pettigrew's office 
interacted with interest groups of every kind and had 
enlisted "40 people - - drawn primarily from business and 
academic institutions - - (to participate) in this program 
(reorganization)."33 He wrote to the President that in 
addition to building general reorganization support among 
Congress, the media, and interest groups he intended .•• 
to shift attention ... to developing concrete political 
support for specific ... initiatives."3^ At this same 
time, others within the White House felt an urging to ex¬ 
pedite the DOE situation. Congressional aide Les Francis 
a former NEA employee, was deeply distressed by the delays. 
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He reminded Frank Moore that with testimony due on a new 
DOE in a matter of weeks before the Ribicoff Committee, 
everyone needed to understand "(we cannot) get away with 
generalities ... Failure on our part to be specific will 
be very embarrassing to the President, especially in view 
of his public commitment to push for the creation of a 
cabinet-level Department of Education. In addition, 
failure to be specific will antagonize Senator Ribicoff, 
not something we want to do at a time when his committee 
is considering civil rights reorganization and Civil 
Service reform." Francis went on to say "However, in 
order to provide specific testimony, we must get the issue 
on a much faster track ... We can delay (the testimony) 
until April if we promise to be specific. If we refuse 
to be specific, and thus are forced to testify in 
generalities on March 20, we invite disaster. Another 
statement of commitment to the concept (a) won't fly; and 
(b) will open the door to congressional determination of 
M 3 6 
what is or is not included in a new department." 
Concluded Francis, "... (this) requires quick action 
internally, now; ... the Vice-President, 0MB, and White 
House Staff must reach an internal consensus on the basic 
outline of an education department and all must agree to 
defend that consensus elsewhere in the administration . . . 
the basic outline must be reviewed by - - and agreed 
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to - - by affected Cabinet secretaries and agency 
heads ... (and) the (decision) memo (for testimony) must 
be written and submitted (to the President) ... the 
President may want to meet to discuss the proposal and/or 
options ... realizing that he must sign-off on this (prior 
to his departure March 28 on an international trip).37 
What Francis was pressing for was a final absolutely 
agreed to Administration position in two weeks when none 
had existed for 15 months. The memorandum was not shown 
to be copied to anyone in Eizenstat's office, and seeminly 
was only circulated within the Congressional liaisons 
office, with the exception of OMB's Gwaltney. This memo¬ 
randum caused a White House reaction that resulted in the 
delay of the March Ribicoff Governmental Affairs Committee 
hearing which was then rescheduled to be "reconvened on 
April 14 to hear Administration testimony." The 
decision memorandum was prepared and presented to the 
President on April 12, after his return from Africa. 
On April 14, Jim McIntyre now Director of OMB 
testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental 
Affairs. Advocating a new and separate DOE, he pledged 
to work "... closely with (the Committee) in the coming 
months to achieve your and the President's goal - - giving 
the Federal Government's chief spokesperson for Education 
a chair and a voice at the cabinet-level."39 McIntyre did 
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not testify on an Administration initiative but rather 
"... to present the Administration's position on S.991, 
the Department of Education act of 1977 (Ribicoff Bill) ... 
cosponsored by 56 Senators ... (with) wide bipartisan 
support. ^ McIntyre said that the Administration shared 
with Senator Ribicoff "... a common view of the essential 
components of the Department ... (including); ... the 
entire $12 billion education division of the present 
HEW, . .. all 130 programs of the Office of Education, the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Education, and the 
National Institute of Education."41 In addition, McIntyre 
stated that the Administration also agreed with program 
inclusion of: "... certain science education programs of 
National Science Foundation (opposed by Carter's 
Director of the NSF, Richard Atkinson because of no "... 
discernible rationale ..."43), ... HUD's College 
Housing Program ("... wholeheartedly ..." supported by 
HUD Cabinet Secretary Patricia Harris43), ... the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture Graduate School and child 
nutrition programs (the Graduate School inclusion ... 
not opposed ..."44 but the nutrition program shift not 
concurred with by Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland for 
it would cripple "... (the) vital link between research 
and nutrition education ... (with attempts to) resolve .. 
conflicts (being) time consuming and uncertain of 
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success; 5, ... education related activities of HEW's 
Office for Civil Fights (opposed by HEW Secretary 
Califano "... (for) the real danger that civil rights 
needs will be subordinated to bureaucratic educational 
pressures . ..”46), HEW's Project Head Start (opposed by 
Califano, because he believes, "... advocates of 
children's needs ... (want) ... parental involvement and 
flexible options ... jeopardized ... (with) a Department 
organized to advance and protect the needs of Education 
(i.e., ... institutions ... interest groups ... 
personnel ..."4^)f ... the Department of Interior's Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (opposed by Interior Secretary Cecil 
Andrus whose Department just concluded a Task Force 
Study "... recommending against transfer of Indian educa- 
tion programs ... an extremely sensitive area ..." ), ... 
and the new Department of Education to oversight the 
Department of Defense's Overseas Dependents Schools 
(opposed by Deputy Defense Secretary Charles Duncan who 
felt "The best way to continue to provide (this) quality 
education ... is to continue (the) operation ... by the 
49 
Department of Defense.") 
In this testimony,50 McIntyre differed with S.991 in 
only two significant ways. They were, the Administrations 
position against placing of the National Endowment of Arts 
and of the Humanities in a new DOE, as well as the 
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Training and Youth Services programs of the Department of 
Labor. 
McIntyre's detailed testimony was given two days 
after the President received his 36 page decision 
memorandum. The Vice-President and the Congressional 
Liaison Office of Frank Moore had "... no comment ... 
on the memo ..." The agency and department heads had 
two weekdays to react to copies of the memo. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Duncan stated his objection "to 
the procedure ... it was in preparation by PRP (the 
President's Reorganization Project under OMB) for months. 
My office received it late Thursday afternoon, and work 
began preparing a response Friday morning. We have 
complied (said Duncan) with that request; but I believe 
that such unreasonable and unnecessary deadlines operate 
5 2 
to the detriment of sound planning." 
Carter had signed off on the memorandum, agreeing 
with Richard Pettigrew's assessment that they should be 
concerned about creating a department that "... is 
embarrassingly narrow in scope."53 Pettigrew advocated 
and Carter agreed, that the oversight of DOD overseas 
schools and the inclusion of Head Start in a new DOE, 
should be done, regarding "... fears and the opposition 
of the affected constituencies as an insufficient basis 
for deferring an obviously appropriate realignment of 
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educational functions ... it would be unduly cautious to 
omit them." Carter thereby confronted "... divisive 
political opposition from constituent groups (e.g., labor 
and ... Head Start) ... (who feared) domination by the 
interests of teachers and school administrators."^ 
His support of including these programs in a DOE 
accomplished the avoidance of being accused of acting "... 
politically expedient, particularly by some Members of 
Congress who (favored) a broader and more diverse group 
of programs and competing interests. (There (was) 
however, little agreement on the specific elements of 
that broad construction. ) 
Carter, in the late spring of 1978, by publicly 
supporting almost all aspects of S.991 sponsored by Senator 
Pibicoff and the majority of his colleagues had put him¬ 
self at odds with some major components of his political 
party such as the AFL-CIO and many Civil Rights activists. 
Other, more conservative opponents didn't like a DOE 
because "... they (believed) it (would) increase the 
Federal Government's role in local educational 
policy . .."^7, or feel as did the United States Catholic 
Conference that it would "... be even less responsive than 
5 8 
HEW (was at present) to the needs of private education." 
In the rush to meet the deadline of the Congressional 
had endorsed a policy towards hearing, the administration 
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a new DOE that had been prodded by the NEA, and was 
supported by the Senate, but the House of Representatives 
was, ... (still) uncertain ... not enthusiastic ... (and 
concerned over) the controversy that may be aroused ..."59 
President Carter was now on the record in support of 
the transfer of specific programs into a new DOE. He 
indicated his desire to "... favor some flexibility in 
date of xsfer of some functions, but the proposal should 
be similar to Ribicoff Bill in final stages."60 
In a memorandum sent to Carter from McIntyre the very 
afternoon after the OMB Director had testified before 
the Ribicoff's Committee on behalf of the Administration, 
he suggested Carter, "... call Marian Edelman, Executive 
Director of the Childrens' Defense Fund, and Coretta King 
(widow of slain civil rights martyr Martin Luther King, 
Jr.) today to discuss the inclusion of Head Start in the 
Department of Education ... Ms. Edelman has said that the 
inclusion of Head Start ... would be a betrayal of its 
roots in the antipoverty and civil rights movements . . . 
(because) of a department dominated by traditional 
education interests ..."61. McIntyre suggested that 
Stu Eizenstat agreed with this and attached a telegram 
6 2 
signed by twelve of the major Black leaders in America. 
It was addressed to Pat Gwaltney at OMB's Reorganization 
Department. It was dated three weeks before Carter's 
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approval of Head Start inclusion, and there is no 
indication he had known of its existence. 
In May the controversy surrounding the need for a DOE 
was the subject of the lead editorial in Change Magazine. 
It argued that "... these new initiatives amount to mighty 
labors to bring forth a mouse. And we doubt that this new 
mouse could roar loudly enough to carry education above 
some pro-forma high-level posturing ... very well 
(carrying) new symbolic intimation of high federal 
urgency, but the more substantive advantages seem rather 
less in evidence. Beth Abramowitz responded to this 
editorial that also suggested that a "... new Department 
of Education is an attractive placebo ...",64 by 
countering, "... that when one speaks of a comprehensive 
federal education policy, one must first address the basic 
diffusion of the education function across many (Federal) 
agencies ... (A new DOE makes) it possible to address the 
emerging issues in education in more than the current 
C. C. 
piecemeal manner." 
She was also concerned with the lack of organized 
effort within the administration. In a Confidential 
Memorandum to Bert Carp, Abramowitz urged that "... Stu 
speak to Jim McIntyre to get PRP (Presidents' 
Reorganization Project) to hire a strong person to lead 
the education reorganization effort." "The whole thing 
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is a mess", she stated, "which will be politically damag¬ 
ing if it continues much longer."66 She pressed her 
opinion that an Administration bill should be introduced 
in the House and Jack Brooks (D-Texas) would need to be 
urged to hold hearings as the concern for other major 
bills was formidable, but she felt that the DOE will "Be 
harder to get next year, because more Republicans (might) 
be elected)."67 Abramowitz felt that the PRP with "... 
many warm bodies to invest, should be actively involved ... 
at this time ... and (stop) dancing around ... (not 
wanting) to take the lead ... in anything. The PRP seems 
unable to act, and reluctant in the extreme to take the 
lead." Carp agreed with her, and communicated that it 
6 9 
was a "Good memo ... I'm working on this." 
A week later Abramowitz was again sounding the alarm. 
She was concerned about testimony to be given on May 16 
before Senator Ribicoff's Committee. In the discussion 
of transferring the Bureau of Indian Affairs Schools, the 
representative from the Interior Department was scheduled 
to be Jim Joseph, the Undersecretary of Interior and one 
of the highest ranking Blacks in the Administration. 
Abramowitz asserted that despite the efforts of several 
OMB staff-members to get Interior to cooperate and send 
the Commissioner of Education for the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, Dr. Bill Demerett; they were getting nowhere. 
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Said Abramowitz, "PRP wants and needs an Indian to testify 
with Jim Joseph. Race relations between Blacks and 
Indians is very delicate. it is highly questionable 
whether sending a Black man unfamiliar with the 
intricasies of the BIA schools to explain how the BIA 
transfer will not adversely affect Indians is a wise 
move." 
Administration testimony at these Ribicoff hearings 
continued to be complicated. "Secretary Califano and 
HEW's (Congressional Liaison) office (felt) that an 
appearance by the Secretary would be unwise; it is their 
conviction that Mr. Califano's earlier objections to a 
separate Department, which he has articulated in articles 
and books, will be used by the Republicans to embarrass 
the Secretary and the Administration." It was stated 
that this concern was shared by Stu Eizenstat and that a 
compromise if acceptable to the Ribicoff Committee was 
either for Kale Champion (Undersecretary of HEW) or Ernest 
Boyer (Commissioner of Education within HEW) might testify 
instead. Frank Moore and Les Francis however, agreed with 
Jim McIntyre's concern, that "... Califano's absence would 
be just as embarrassing, that our political opponents will 
make at least as much capital out of a non-appearance as 
thev would should he testify ... (and) ... if -‘"'-e v.a^i_anc' 
does not appear, it might send an erroneous signal to our 
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allies on this issue that we are not totally committed to 
the proposition."72 Carter sided with Califano and 
Eizenstat, against the advice of the staff-members who had 
the direct responsibility to get Congress to approve the 
DOE. Said Carter, "Call Ribicoff ... Joe (Califano) (to 
submit) statement ... Hale (Champion) - testify."73 
This was decided the day before the hearings reopened. 
At these May Ribicoff Hearings, McIntyre testified to 
"... the need to improve and strengthen the intergovern¬ 
mental system for developing and carrying out educational 
policies ... (as well as) our concept of how the department 
should be (internally) organized (as to structure)."74 
In his testimony McIntyre underlined the desire for Head 
Start to be in a new DOE. He stressed that its Director 
would report directly to the Secretary of Education and 
restated a firm commitment to continue its community-based 
delivery system. This, McIntyre said was superior to the 
the present arrangement where the Head Start Director was 
5 reporting layers away from the Secretary of HEW. This 
same level of reporting was assigned by McIntyre for the 
proposed new DOE Director of Indian Education Programs. 
Assurances were given that the transfer of BIA schools 
and programs would be phased "... into the new Department 
over time ... (so there would be) well informed judge¬ 
ments ... in order to avoid disrupting or confusing ... 
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operations."75 Substantively, McIntyre presented nothing 
new to his testimony of the previous month, except now 
it was being phrased in ways designed to allay the fears 
and concerns of those constituent groups directly 
sffscted; both within and outside government. 
At the half-way point of 1978 the strategy of what to 
do during the summer and fall began to take shape in the 
White House. An internal OMB staff memo (written by Tom 
Belford) focused on two of the most vexing problems a new 
DOE was facing. They were "(1) achieving the two most 
troublesome program transfers - Head Start and Child 
Nutrition, and (2) the overall viability of the Department 
concept." On Head Start, "... the (Administration has) 
absolutely no legislative advocates in the Senate and slim 
pickings in the House ... if we ... try to muster a fight 
... would we lose anyway?" On Child Nutrition "... the 
nutrition groups, the commodity and farm groups ... (all) 
see this transfer ... (threatening) ... to (the) USDA ... 
(and its) unclear as to whether we have any legislative 
advocate (for this) ...n78. Belford continued that as the 
DOE legislation came closer to Congressional consideration 
organized efforts on both sides of the issue became more 
defined. The "... Citizens Committee for a Department of 
Education ... a paper coalition ... (with) ... represen¬ 
tation from (some) civil rights groups, non-education 
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labor unions, state officials ... and legislative 
advocates ...”79, bolstered by the power of the NEA and 
the influence of the White House, formed the proponents. 
The opposition who joined those in the bureaucracies 
("Program losers") and their constituents who feared any 
change, were most importantly focused on the "... 
conservatives1 line of attack ... painting (the idea) ... 
(as) the big government crowd."80 Others who would share 
that feeling sensed it would become a "Ministry of 
Education ... (with) more Federal control of education, 
intrusion into state (and) local perogatives and diminish- 
ing parental involvement." They were joined by a 
second category of opponents who could be called "... the 
skeptics - those who argue that a cabinet-level department 
is not essential to improving the quality of education ... 
(including) ... the AFT, the AFL-CIO, the Catholic Church, 
Q O 
and perhaps some of the higher education community." 
Belford called for "... ways to energize (and) broaden 
the constituency beyond the teachers and the education 
establishment, whose involvement can be portrayed as self- 
serving ... (and) ... to begin developing advocacy 
materials ... (as we have) nothing to provide other than 
our basic testimony ... (and) ... (that) testimony is not 
oriented toward making the basic case for the Department 
since it was delivered to a favorably inclined audience 
128 
in the first place."83 
Meanwhile the Congress was not heeding the 
Presidents' wishes on appropriation matters, as the White 
House desire to amend legislation and cut back in the HEW 
and Labor budgets was unsuccessful. A memorandum to the 
President from Bill Cable of Frank Moore's office said 
that he tried to get a consensus and find a sponsor for 
the White House proposal, but "In short, when we failed 
to work out a deal, the Speaker decided to keep us from 
offering our amendment ... by (technically) putting us 
in a position of needing unanimous consent to offer our 
amendments (which we will not obtain) ... (leaving us to 
be) had on a procedural ploy ..." . It was clear that 
regardless that a Democratic President was for the first 
time serving with a Democratic Speaker in almost ten 
years, the substantive relationship was not automatic. 
The White House would have to work with its own party 
majority for support, as well as with the Republicans. 
This was compounded by not having the entire adminis¬ 
tration in step on issues as was apparent at the weekly 
"Wednesday Group" meeting of the Congressional liaison 
office. In several agencies and departments, "... (their) 
CL (congressional liaison) people ... seem subservient to 
the career people in the agencies."®^ The need for the 
White House to have the support of agency CL personnel 
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was particularly important in light of the cut-backs in 
personnel Carter made in the White House when he was 
inaugurated." 
Black College Presidents, concerned over what they 
felt was a breakdown in "... communication between 
themselves and HEW officials, especially Secretary 
Califano ..." , asked to visit with the President, 
through the Executive Director of the United Negro College 
Fund, Christopher Edley. Regardless of the long-time 
relationship with this constituency, (Carter served as 
Honorary Chairman of the United Negro College Fund), it 
took a letter to the President from three of his most 
nationally powerful Atlanta black political supporters, 
including Dr. Martin Luther King, Sr." to get the White 
House bureaucracy to prioritize and schedule an appoint¬ 
ment for the Black College Presidents. 
Realizing that it was important to get commitments on 
the record, Jim McIntyre in mid-summer, reminded Carter 
that while on a trip to Texas he would be in the company 
of Congressman Jack Brooks (D-Texas). Brooks as Chairman 
of the House Governmental Affairs Committee and Ribicoff’s 
counterpart in the House, had agreed to introduce DOE 
legislation in the House, absent Head Start, and try to 
get it to the floor for a vote before the year ended. 
Carter was urged while they were together in Beaumont, 
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Texas to publicly"... thank ... Brooks ... for his help 
in getting a bill enacted this year ... and emphasize the 
priority ... of a Cabinet Department of Education."®9 
Another issue affecting the now proposed DOE 
structure that was becoming controversial was that of the 
transfer of Vocational Rehabilitation Programs from the 
present HEW. It was approved by the Ribicoff Committee 
and Richard Pettigrew hoped the White House would side 
with Secretary Califano on this subject and "... encourage 
introduction (on the) Senate floor ... that would 
delete ... (and) write Jack Brooks and ask him to take on 
this fight ... to prevent the transfer."99 
In addition, Head Start continued to be an area of 
particular concern. Congressman Parren Mitchell (D- 
Maryland) pressed the White House for their agreement to 
remove it from the proposed DOE and not place it within 
"... narrow, educational (confines) ... (contradicting) 
the very approach Head Start fought to develop and 
implement ... the total community . Stu Eizenstat 
answered Mitchell that regardless where Head Start was 
located "We shall preserve (its) integrity and growth 
,.."92. Also on Eizenstat's mind was how broad a 
Department would result, (based on Carter's concern not to 
support a narrow one for fear of it being dominated by one 
another), if Head Start, Vocational interest group or 
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Rehabilitation, Child—Nutrition, Defense department 
overseas schools, and others were stripped from the 
proposed legislation.^ This would leave Carter with 
the concept he promised but with the lack of substance 
he had expressed concern over. 
White House attention, primarily through OMB and 
Congressional liaison offices, was now firmly focused on 
the DOE legislation. Jim McIntyre was able in late July 
to report to the President, that "... it is possible that 
you will be signing a bill before Congress adjourns this 
year (1978)."9^ During the final Ribicoff Committee 
deliberations, McIntyre reported to Carter that the 
Administration "... did quite well. Amendments to drop 
Indian education and child nutrition programs ... were 
defeated . .."9^. McIntyre however went on to explain to 
Carter, that the child nutrition program was defeated 
because it was an 8-8 tie, that Head Start unanimously 
was dropped and inclusion of vocational rehabilitation 
it 96 programs "... passed overwhelmingly." 
In addition he said that Senate floor amendments 
were likely to come up to delete "... science education 
(Kennedy), and perhaps to attach an anti-busing provision 
(Roth) ... as well as the need for a "concerted effort to 
defeat the Talmadge amendment ... to drop child nutrition 
programs.1,97 McIntyre told Carter that the House 
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Government Operations Committee would begin in earnest to 
examine the bill and make changes in August with child 
nutrition and Indian education being the most contro¬ 
versial. Also, the expectation that "... Congressman 
Brademas (D-Indiana) will request that the vocational 
rehabilitation program be added to the department (DOE) 
since all the major groups representing the handicapped 
favor the move."^ 
However just several weeks later on August 14, the 
draft of a memo to update Carter on the DOE legislation 
was prepared but not sent by McIntyre. It stated that 
now "Without greater intervention ... we will probably be 
unable to get the bill reported ... from (Brooks') 
• Q Q 
committee ... to permit House consideration this year." 
The Senate was about to consider the DOE bill (with 61 
co-sponsors), but the House Brooks' Subcommittee was being 
"... threatened by a Republican strategy ... to prolong 
the markup to kill the Bill ... (and) ... in order to get 
the Bill reported (sent to the House floor) before ... 
recess ... Frank (Moore) should be authorized to call, (on 
Carter's behalf), Representative John Brademas ... (urging) 
his assistance in expediting ... and tell him the Adminis¬ 
tration will not oppose transfer of the vocational 
rehabilitation program to the department (DOE) from 
HEW.Carter was told that in reality this transfer 
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"... will pass regardless of our position ... (and) ... 
Handicapped groups representing more than seven million 
members unanimously support the transfer ... (also) ... 
their active support will help to counter allegations that 
the NEA is the only group that wants the new depart¬ 
ment. "101 was SUggested that because some Members of 
Congress did not believe that a DOE was a high Adminis¬ 
tration priority, that "Frank (Moore) tell the Speaker of 
(Carters) hope to get a Department of Education this 
year . .. 
Several days later on August 15, the House Government 
Operations Committee, chaired by Jack Brooks, reported out 
the DOE Bill by a 27-15 margin, with "Congressman Horton 
(R-N.J.) the ranking Republican ... especially help¬ 
ful ..."103 Because of this development, McIntyre's 
draft memo to Carter was updated and revised. It 
suggested that Brademas be urged to assist with passage 
while being assured that the administration would not 
oppose the transfer of vocational rehabilitation programs 
into DOE remained. Carter agreed by saying, OK - but I 
don't support this move . and indicated he agreed 
to back off Administration opposition to the transfer it 
Brademas "... plus others ..."105 will agree to support 
the DOE Bill actively. Carter wrote, "... do not indicate 
support ...n106* A major difference between the draft 
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August 14 memo and the one Carter received on August 17, 
was the deletion of the request for the President to 
authorize Frank Moore to call Speaker O'Neill and stress 
Carter's personal priority for a new DOE. 
In September, with the Senate vote now only weeks 
away, Vice-President Mondale (who served in the United 
States Senate from Minnesota for twelve years prior to his 
election as Carter's running-mate), sent a letter to his 
former colleagues, urging them "... to take an historic 
first step toward improving the quality and management 
of federal education programs ... and (adopt) this major 
reorganization effort (S.991 DOE - Ribicoff Bill)."107 
The Senate continued its debate and with a large majority 
passed the legislation in late September. There were only 
minor delaying tactics from Republican Senators and the 
Minority Leader, Howard Baker of Tennessee supported it. 
The real hurdle lay in passage of the Bill in the 
House. The Rules Committee met on September 14 to 
consider (among others petitions) one from Congressman 
Brooks asking that a "rule" be granted108 to allow his DOE 
Bill to come to the Floor. This was necessary because the 
time had passed by several weeks for normal consideration 
of such legislation. After much discussion as to whether 
or not it was an "emergency," the Rules Committee on a 
narrow 9-6 vote defeated an amendment to postpone the 
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granting of the "rule" by Congressman Bolling the Chairman 
of the Rules Committee. The division among the membership 
was along the lines of who favored the legislation not the 
technical concern of "emergency rules" procedures. The 
negative comments of two key members of congress one 
from each party, were of interest. The first came from 
Representative Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) who stated, "I 
think it would be an injustice to push this thing through. 
We know why the bill is here. The President made a 
campaign pledge. He has two more years before he is up to 
reelection. He can bring it up at a later time."109 The 
other from Representative Joseph Moakley (D-Massachusetts) 
(a member closely associated with Speaker O'Neill), who in 
dialogue with witness Brooks said, "Jack, you probably 
have seen the tentative listing of next weeks legislation 
(for Floor debate). They have the sugar act but they do 
not have the Department of Education listed. We have 25 
suspensions on Monday (to allow certain bills to be 
debated), seven bills on Tuesday (to vote upon), 10 con¬ 
ference committee reports (to concur with and or not), 
and we do not have the Department of Education listed 
Brooks replied, "We did not have a rule yet."111 Said 
Moakley, "The Sugar Bill does not have a rule but it is 
listed tentatively."112 Countered Brooks, "I did not 
make up that list, you know."113 Answered Moakley, "I 
„110 
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think it is some indication that the leadership is not 
scheduling it."11^ Concluded Brooks, "I think the 
Speaker has every intention of bringing it up. I do not 
know when he is planning to schedule it, but I certainly 
feel he does intend to do it."115 
On September 21, McIntyre notified Frank Moore that 
in a meeting with Speaker O'Neill, Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd. (D-West Virginia) had told O'Neill that the 
Senate would indeed pass the bill. Said McIntyre, "Tip 
now understands the ball is in his court."116 McIntyre 
urged Moore to "... contact Speaker O'Neill ... (and) 
reaffirm the Administration's interest ... and to find 
time for bill on the House floor ... (in time) for 
passage ... with enough time left for conference (to 
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mediate House and Senate Bill differences) ..." 
That same week Carter was notified by McIntyre and 
Moore of the conveyance to the House of the Administration 
position of not actively opposing the transfer of the 
Vocational Rehabilitation program from HEW to a DOE. In 
addition, the work of Jack Brooks, the White House and the 
NEA had resulted in the bill being reported out and the 
decision of the House Rules Committee granting the rule 
for the bill. They told Carter that the "... (Republicans) 
threatened delaying tactics on the (House) floor; (that 
now) substantial opposition by the AFL-CIO; (and) the 
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absence of strong advocates for the bill among influential 
House Democrats .were all leading to great concern 
over the timing. Politically troublesome was the opinion 
that "The AFL-CIO position (was) the outgrowth of union 
politics involving the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT) jurisdictional battle with the NEA, and ... (it) 
cannot be changed by White House pressure ... (and that) 
opposition is even more significant at this time in the 
session because it may result in the bill pitting 
Democrats against one another - - an anathema to the House 
leadership in an election year." McIntyre and Moore 
went on to describe that the entire hierarchy of the NEA, 
approximately 400 members, were due in Washington in a few 
days and could be "... expected to mount a vigorous effort 
in the House, which will undoubtedly include leverage 
n 120 
through campaign activities this fall." 
Carter, they concluded, needed to understand the 
increase of momentum that the White House was generating 
now, because "... obstacles in our path this year (may) be 
formidable ... (but) for next year may be worse ... (as) we 
cannot be certain Jack Brooks will be willing to undertake 
this project (DOE) next year (1979) ... (and) with the 1980 
elections approaching, Senate Republicans can be expected 
to become increasingly partisan and, as a result, it may 
sources next year to pass the take even greater re 
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Regardless, of all this activity, and the 
importance of the House leadership’s role in putting the 
Brooks bill on the floor for debate and a vote, McIntyre 
and Moore told Carter that "We recommend ... you not 
become directly involved at this time."122 
Organized labor officials now focused in on the urban 
members of Congress who were siding with the AFT argument 
of not wanting to change the historical relationships 
within HEW and Congress as to education and social 
programs. The 2,000 member National Alliance of Black 
School Educators, in a telegram to Representative Shirley 
Chisholm (D-New York), expressed their "... unqualified 
support for (a) cabinet-level position for Education ... 
and anything less ... is not in the best interest ... of 
12 3 
the students we serve." In addition Beth Abramowitz of 
Eizenstat's staff and Crystal Kuykendall, the Director of 
Constituency Coordination for the National School Board 
Association were working to encourage telegrams, letters 
and mailgrams from a coalition of Black Education 
Associations including the National Urban League, the 
National Urban Coalition, and the United Negro College 
Fund. At the same time Richard Pettigrew was calling for 
support of another piece of legislation (that had already 
passed in the House) concerning the ability of Indian 
tribes to assume local control of the Community Colleges 
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that were administered from Washington. Pettigrew stated 
that "Indian leaders are very anxious that it be approved 
... (and felt) our reorganization proposals ... can be 
better advanced if the President quickly signs this 
measure."124 
On October 9, the President was told that he was now 
needed to help in the fight for the DOE to pass in 1978. 
The need focused around the "... NEA's strong feeling that 
the Speaker had promised them a vote on the bill this year 
(1978).1,126 The Senior Congressional liaison staff 
doubted that this was the case, but regardless, "... the 
NEA met ... with supporters of the bill ... (and) talk of 
slowing down the legislative schedule until the bill is 
brought up by the Speaker ...1,126 ensued. Carter was told 
that his staff "... (told the NEA) the Administration 
could not be party to this inasmuch as we have several 
other pieces of priority legislation this week." The 
Staff told Carter that the Vice-President would be used 
with the leadership, and they now wanted the President to 
send a letter to Speaker O'Neill urging "... the bringing 
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up (of) the bill ... and complete action (on it) ..." 
They also requested him to make "... a few Congressional 
(phone) calls to the more obstructionist Members. These 
would include Representatives Bolling, Obey, Ryan and 
other Democrats who are orchestrating the opposition in 
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concert with Republicans Erlenborn (Illinois), Walker 
(Pennsylvania), and others.1'129 Carter signed the draft 
letter to O'Neill and suggested to Frank Moore to "Do what 
you wish with (it) ..."13°. As for the phone calls the 
President said the "VP (should) do this."131 After 20 
months of deliberation, research, debate, organization, 
compromise, internal dissension and external confrontation 
when Carter was finally asked by his staff to come direct¬ 
ly into the fight, he did not choose to play a major role 
overtly. Supporters of the DOE in the Senate, even wrote 
asking Carter "... to do whatever necessary to assure 
final House action on the legislation this Congress."132 
However, the legislation never came to the floor for 
debate, and the session ended on October 15 with a flurry 
of activity on other matters of import to the Administra¬ 
tion. The Department of Education would have to await 
1979, where support would exist in the Senate, which 
planned "... similar legislation immediately upon the 
beginning of the 96th Congress and to work for prompt 
_ _ ii 13 3 pa. s sag© • 
After the session concluded, 0MB developed a strategy 
to increase support for the Department of Education and 
assure its final passage in 1979. A working 0MB paper 
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outlined the five major objectives. 
1. Direct contacts with coalition of supporters. 
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2. Increased communication and establishing direct 
contacts with individuals and associations 
representing higher education. 
3. Establish improved lines of communication with 
general government representatives. 
4. Design an outreach effort using press, media and 
higher Administration officials. 
5. Enlist support from prominent national figures 
not directly tied to the educational 
establishment. 
The three major opponents of the legislation were 
expected to be the AFL-CIO, Catholic educators and some 
Civil Rights advocates. Also only passive support, at 
best was expected from the higher education community. A 
plan was formed to match White House staff members to 
specific interest group and to target organizations 
I O C 
already recorded in support of DOE, including the 
•I O (L 
reticent higher education community. Advocating the 
establishment of a broad-based Citizens' Committee, the 
paper discussed the need "From early February until the 
Department bill is passed, (for) Terry Straub and Pat 
Gwaltney (to) conduct periodic meetings - - initially 
weekly, later daily, for groups supporting the Department 
proposal."1^9 Many of these organizations had met after 
Congress adjourned in Reston, Virginia to discuss their 
strategy for 1979.140 
Beth Abramowitz stressed to Stu Eizenstat the 
need "... (in the) House ... to pinpoint the lobbying m 
142 
order to influence the decision of specific members."141 
It was also suggested that they should encourage state 
officials to lobby their Federal representatives, after it 
was "... reviewed ... and reaffirmed that the President's 
commitment ... (to the DOE "142 was strong. Further, a 
meeting that was proposed that would be primarily composed 
of "... state legislators ... most of whom chair or serve 
on education committees or subcommittees in their state 
legislatures ..."14^. 
As 1978 ended the White House staff was organizing 
in tandem with its outside allies for the 1979 passage 
of a DOE as never before. Precise planning, disciplined 
procedures, and clear strategy were needed. If it was to 
happen it would be the product of tremendous leveraged 
influence by external lobbying groups to individual 
Members of Congress, orchestrated by the NEA and counseled 
and. abetted by the Administration. The DOE that had 
evolved by the end of 1978 was not however the broad-based 
Department Carter had originally wished. 
It allowed an interpretation that if the NEA wanted 
a DOE, the President would not object, based on 1976 
campaign promises and 1980 political realities: the lead 
however perhaps coming from the NEA and an Ad-Hoc 
Coalition rather than the White House. 
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Chapter 5 
History of Effort for a Department of Education 1979 
As 1979 began, the White House staff was in full 
swing organizing external support for the DOE. Outside 
groups were being organized to begin direct solicitation 
in February at various meetings and conventions across 
the country. Beth Abramowitz was working on her goal 
to involve "... representatives from the general state 
government associations ...1 and was helping to 
coordinate the effort to have several representatives 
• . . . 9 from each organization of state education officials , 
come together with Carter "... (underlining) the 
President's recognition that the federal governments 
relationship with the states should be far broader ..." , 
in a White House meeting. 
One of those states groups, the Council of Chief 
State School Officers, had at their annual convention in 
November, 1978 "... reaffirmed and strengthened ..."4 their 
commitment to a new Department and in addition directea 
"... the Council staff ... to cooperate with (Carter) and 
(his) staff to insure passage of the important proposal 
early in the 96th Congress. 
A decision memorandum from Jim McIntyre to the 
President requesting specific decisions from Carter as to 
how he wanted to proceed was being prepared for the end of 
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January. Moore and Straub requested that after Carter had 
signed off on that McIntyre memorandum they needed an Oval 
Office appointment for the President with Congressman Jack 
Brooks who "... needs reassurance on the Department of 
Education bill."^ At the same meeting there was also to 
be discussion of two other possible new departments, "... 
of Development Assistance and ... Natural Pesources ... 
(in addition to Education) ... (because) ... as Chairman 
of the Rouse Committee on Government Operations, Brooks 
will play a crucial role in passage of ... reorganization 
7 
proposals." 
Within the White House an Education Task Force was 
formed and operating under the direction of Moore 
associate Terry Straub. A subcommittee of that task force 
had to do with Public Outreach. On Friday January 19, 
the subcommittee met and identified seven specific major 
interest groups; Civil Rights, Science community. Higher 
Education community, Catholics, Elementary and Secondary 
educators, elected officials, and business leaaers. 
These groups would have senior White House staff members 
like Anne Wexler® call upon them to organize, and stress 
to their associates that a DOE is an Administration 
priority, and recruit them as ostensibly as lobbyists. 
The consensus at the meeting was "In almost every case 
Hill (Congressional) opposition can be traced to either 
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(a) the AFT or (b) conservatives ... (and they see) early 
action and White House organizing (this time)."^ It was 
pointed out at this meeting that a favorable point in 1979 
was that a higher-education authorization was the only 
other major education bill outside of the DOE, but that 
education groups in general "... don't feel indebted due 
to restoration fy80 budget cuts This subcommittees 
meeting was a part of the "Wednesday Group" that Straub 
was now running until a DOE legislative conclusion. On 
January 24 a meeting was held that included over 100 out¬ 
side participants with President Carter, that formed 
themselves into an "Ad Hoc Committee for a Department of 
Education.m11 
This "Wednesday Group" produced a list of phone calls 
for White House staff to make to members of the National 
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities, to 
try and dissuade them from resolving to "... implore the 
Congress ... to ... as an alternative ... reorganize ... 
HEW .. . "12. 
On January 18 Secretary Califano sent a direct 
request to the President again urging the rejection of the 
"... transfer of the Rehabilitation Services Administra- 
tion (RSA) to be a ... (in a new) DOE."13 This Vocational 
Rehabilitation controversy Califano suggested has the 
support of handicapped interest groups for status and 
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visibility reasons ... (but) ... it will not in any way 
improve program administration ..."14. in fact Califano 
said, "... if one pierced the veneer of the Washington 
lobbies and interest groups, and asked handicapped people 
what would serve their needs best - - . . . the transfer would 
not be so enthusiastically supported.""^ Besides, Califano 
concluded, "I ... believe the political support for 
establishing the new department has grown considerably - - 
making those interest groups which support the VR transfer 
less critical to the successful enactment of your (DOE) 
1 6 proposal." 
Terry Straub immediately notified Frank Moore that 
f 
Califano might try and raise the VR issue with Carter 
personally on January 17 when they were scheduled to meet 
to discuss National Health Insurance. Straub urged Moore 
to have the President beg the question for a few days 
until after he had reviewed the entire McIntyre memorandum 
as "The VR transfer is likely to pass (again) whether we 
support it or not ... (and) Congressman Brademas strongly 
supports the inclusion of VR as (does) Senator Ribicoff 
,..16* The following day, Ribicoff introduced to the 
Senate a bill S.210 establishing a Department of Education 
with 42 co-sponsors.18 In introducing the legislation, 
Ribicoff noted "The bill is similar to the bill passed 
overwhelmingly by the Senate by a vote of 72-11 last year 
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(1978) ... (it was) considered for over two years by the 
Governmental Affairs Committee ... held ten days of 
hearings on bill and heard from over 100 witnesses ... it 
has wide support . ..”19. The bill included the transfer 
of Vocational Rehabilitation out of HEW to the proposed 
DOE. 
The Department of Education Bill received a great deal 
more attention when Carter was convinced by his staff to 
include in his State of the Union address that he believed 
"Education issues deserve far more attention than they 
can receive in a department as large and complex as HEW. 
The Department of Education will provide a cabinet- 
level official devoting full time to education reporting 
directly to me. It will also enable the federal 
government to be a more responsive and reliable partner 
with States, localities and private institutions which 
i 20 
have primary responsibility for education." 
A week later the National Association of Colleges 
and Independent Universities expressed the concern that 
a separate Department of Education "... (might) lead 
to centralized planning and control of American 
, . . ,i 21 
education ... 
A parallel argument that was being made against a 
new DOE was that it wasn’t just a concept for improved 
bureaucratic efficiency but rather "... would give the 
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federal government - and those who could reasonably expect 
to influence the new department - a handle on educational 
policy. "22 
The McIntyre memorandum requesting the President's 
decisions on programmatic content for a DOE finally went 
to Carter on January 30. Realizing the tremendous effort 
that would be needed to sway the Congress and the American 
people the memorandum was sent to Carter aide and long 
time associate Jerry Rafshoon, who served as Director of 
Communications. He suggested that two of the themes 
brought forward by McIntyre, improving education 
management and promoting effective partnerships among the 
various levels of governments, not be stressed. Instead 
only two purposes for a DOE "... should be the basis on 
which we sell the plan; ensuring equal educational 
opportunity for every American and to promote improvements 
to the quality and utility of education available for 
every American."22 Concluded Rafshoon, the theme is "... 
(Jimmy Carter) is proposing a separate DOE because he 
24 
cares about education." 
Carter received the 0MB memorandum without any 
comment by his Senior aides Wexler and Moore, and with 
concurrence by Eizenstat for the Domestic Policy staff for 
the recommendations that McIntyre set forth. 
McIntyre suggested that the Senate bill and the House 
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version in 1978 were "... considerably leaner ... (with), 
Head Start, child nutrition and the Indian Education 
deleted ... (as well as) the National Science 
Foundation science education programs."^ McIntyre 
suggested that, "In order to gain passage (in 1979), we 
believe that we must modify our proposal to resemble the 
(1978) Senate-passed Department of Education bill."2^ 
He added that he Mondale, Eizenstat and Moore agreed with 
Senator Ribicoff that "... we should create the Department 
with a core of education programs largely from HEW and 
bring in other related programs ... later." In response 
to this memorandum Carter agreed to support transfer of 
the NSF Science Programs to a new DOE, to not include 
Indian Education programs but publicly decide after 
consultation with Indian tribes and organizations, to not 
pursue inclusion of child nutrition feeding programs 
from the Department of Agriculture, and leave open the 
Administration position to effect negotiation with 
Congressman Brademas and others. The Administration was 
now organized to fight for a bill that the President had 
said from the beginning should reflect Ribicoff's 
legislation and for a narrow department he said from the 
beginning he wanted to avoid. 
The same day the McIntyre memorandum reached the 
President Carter, also received a briefing paper on his 
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scheduled meeting with Jack Brooks. On the agenda in 
addition to a DOE, were two other organization topics of 
some controversy. They were a Department of Development 
Assistance/Economic Development that would either 
compliment the existent Commerce Department or broaden it 
into a Department of Commerce and Economic Development and 
a Department of Natural Resources that would necessitate 
the transfer of both the Forest Service and the Corp of 
Engineers , two of the most entrenched bureaucracies in 
Washington. In regards to the Department of Education, 
Carter was told that he needed to solicit and request 
Brooks to again sponsor a DOE, "... (as) Brooks seems 
willing, though not eager, to take on the Education bill 
again ... (after last years) ... considerable acrimony and 
intense debate ..."29. Brooks did agree to sponsor the 
bill, after meeting with Carter, which was critical. 
Senator Pibicoff was moving quickly, making his 
DOE bill "... the first order of business for the 
Governmental Affairs Committee (he) chaired and he 
scheduled hearings ... (and) expects to hear (testimony) 
from the Administration on the 8th (February) ... (and) 
hopes to have a bill on the Senate floor sometime in 
March.Others outside the Administration were also 
being invited to testify, and Beth Abramowitz advised Stu 
Eizenstat to stress the importance of the legislation to a 
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February 1 meeting with the Association of American 
Universities (AAU) at the White House. The higher 
education community she said "... is aggressively neutral 
on the (DOE) issue ... however, the (staffs) of the 
AAU ... want them ... to adopt resolutions against the 
department"31 
The "Wednesday Group" headed by Straub was 
particularly concerned about the Press as they began to 
focus in on Congress and interest groups. There was 
concern that the "Editorials in January have all been 
negative: (Wall Street Journal) - 1/3; NYT (New York 
Times) - 1/16; Post, (Washington), Raspberry - 1/26; and 
Star, (Washington), Kilpatrick - 1/30)".32 The countering 
included "James Farmer responded to the Times piece with a 
letter to the editor, 1/27. Ribicoff, McDonough (Xerox), 
Vernon Jordan, and Maynard Jackson are being approached 
for Op Ed pieces."33 
Realizing that the news media throughout the country 
would begin to focus on a DOE as the White House became 
directly and actively involved, in February there began 
a series of news "backgrounders." These were used to 
succinctly provide information on the history of the DOE 
effort from the turn of the century, its legacy the first 
two years of the Carter Administration, its substantive 
and several Presidential quotes. A draft make-up 
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circulated through the White House asking for "... changes 
and corrections ... so when the time comes we are ready to 
move quickly with a mailout (to the media)."34 
This task force was now making advances into pockets 
of resistance including the effort "... to keep the AFL- 
CIO passive by developing support among other (other than 
the AFT) of its member unions (e.g., AFSCME, Communication 
Workers, Machinists ...) ... (working) with NEA ..."35. 
The task force was also being advised that 
Senator Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) although supportive 
of the creation of a DOE, was raising some technical 
considerations about Science Education programs in the 
Natural Science Foundation. His staff was questioning 
the political wisdom and the necessity for providing in 
the draft legislation that programs be transferred and 
designating them. There are no functions being transfer¬ 
red so legislation is this area is not needed ... (it) 
needlessly raises complications at a delicate point in 
the legislative process ... (and) upon creation of the 
Department, programs can be shifted ..." . It was 
pointed out, however, that Kennedy chaired the sub¬ 
committee in the Senate which had authorization over 
the NSF, "... (and) there may be difficulty in achieving 
an understanding (when) the transfers are (then) 
3 7 proposed." 
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In the first week of February the Vice-President 
submitted a request to Carter suggesting that prior to 
McIntyre's testimony to the Ribicoff Committee that the 
President reinforce his interest by making a public 
statement. Mondale, said that this was the recommendation 
of the "... White House Task Force established to oversee 
legislative and public outreach strategy unanimously ... 
(and regardless that) . . . Jerry Pafshoon has expressed 
reservations about your participation ... on grounds that 
your public statements should insofar as possible be 
limited should be limited to inflation/budget and SALT ... 
(which I share) ... I ... strongly urge your participation 
... (to show) ... the depth of the Administration's com¬ 
mitment to enactment of the bill."2® Mondale concluded, 
that his position was one where "Stu, Fran, Jim, Anne and 
Hamilton agree.Since the options to check off either 
approve or not, Carter marked disapprove and wrote, "VP 
3o _ "40. 0n t-^e Mondale memorandum coversheet, Carter 
. „ 41 
signed, "Fritz - you do it, J . 
The day before Carter declined to personally become 
highly visible on the DOE, he had been notified by his 
Congressional Liaison staff of their concern about 
Secretary Califano (as in 1978) not testifying at the 
Ribicoff hearings. An administratively confidential memo, 
stated that "His silence could be damaging"42 , and that 
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the White House had a "... need to get Secretary Califano 
A O O 
on board ..." . Concern was heightened 24-hours later 
when Carter was told by Frank Moore of a Califano letter 
McIntyre had just received. It decimated the DOE concept 
as presently constituted. Particular concern was expres¬ 
sed by Califano because of the narrowness of the proposed 
DOE programmatically and the likelihood it could "... be 
dominated by special interest groups ... slight the 
legitimate interests of higher education and private 
schools ... (and) ... fragment the Federal government's 
efforts when we should be moving to consolidate and 
strengthen them."^ Moore wrote to Carter about this 
letter saying, "In view of its contents, I feel that it 
is extremely important that you call Califano as soon as 
possible. Carter responded "Fritz (Mondale) did so."^ 
The next day, February 7, one day before McIntyre 
testified, Mondale was notified by Califano that he had 
sent a letter to Ribicoff. In it Califano stated for the 
record his "Support for President Carter's recommendation 
for a cabinet-level Department of Education ... (That 
will) give cabinet-level status to education ... fresh 
impetus for our shared hope that every child will realize 
his or her native abilities to the fullest measure . . . 
(and provides for states and localities) to work with the 
more fruitful and less burdensome Federal government in a 
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partnership for education."47 
The Ribicoff hearings opened in February 6 for three 
days of testimony on the S.210, The Department of 
Education Reorganization Act of 1979. 
Testimony the first day was all positive towards a 
DOE. It was from special interest groups and individuals, 
that included the National Association of State Boards of 
Education, who felt that a DOE "... provides a base for 
national leadership ... (and) ... increase the visibility 
and attention which must be given to educational concerns 
and needs at the Federal level ... (that would lead) 
toward the integration of national, state and local 
AQ 
concerns .... Reverend Jesse L. Jackson commended, 
"President Carter for strongly supporting a separate 
Department of Education. After more than a century of 
struggle around this issue he has promised to give it his 
strong support ..to mayor Richard Fulton of Nashville, 
Tennessee who said, "... education is lost inside the maze 
of HEW ... only two governmental budgets in the world are 
larger than HEW's - the total budget for the United State 
and that of the Soviet Union."50 
The following day's hearing revealed the negative 
undertones for a DOE. Among those who testified were 
the United States Catholic Conference which suggested 
ented the interests of 3.5 million it directly repres 
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elementary and secondary students enrolled in parochial 
schools. Father Wilfrid H. Paradis, said that they, 
" ... have seen no ... evidence ... that the creation of 
a separate Department is justified."51 Paradis, continued 
that there were several major problems with the potential 
cabinet-level position; that there is "... good reason to 
fear that a (new DOE) will further increase federal inter¬ 
ference of both public and private education in areas that 
• ^ o 
rightfully belong to parents and the local community." 
In addition Paradis said it "... runs counter to the 
nation's traditional acceptance of a respect for pluralism 
in education ... the decision to establish (the DOE) in 
itself is a policy decision which apparently has been made 
. . . • 53 
merely to make good on a political campaign promise ... 
Complimenting that testimony was that of the AFL-CIO. 
Walter Davis, Director of the AFL-CIO Department of 
Education, reminded the Senators that his organization 
in 1977 convention, had adopted a resolution categorically 
against a separate Department of Education. Davis spoke 
to the issue of whether the DOE would improve the educa¬ 
tional system. He said the proponents speak of "status" 
and a desire for "visibility" and other issues that have 
nothing to do with education."54 The AFL-CIO believes, 
he said, that "... there is a natural and inherent 
relationship among the missions assigned to Health, 
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Education and Welfare programs at the federal level, 
and ... the present structure maintaining a coordinated 
approach is ... relevant."55 
On the last day of the hearings the Administration 
presented its point of view. Although not being able to 
persuade Carter that Califano should appear personally, 
Jim McIntyre did have testify several of his associates, 
such as Assistant Secretary of HEW for Education, Mary 
Berry. 
McIntyre repeated the litany of programs and of the 
merit of increased coordination for them that a new DOE 
could bring. In his summary, he emphasized that, "In 
the long run we expect additional savings through 
improved financial management systems geared specifically 
to education programs and more efficient program 
57 
administration." 
That same day the Media Liaison office sent out the 
final version of a DOE Background Report to 6,000 news 
directors from publications and organizations across the 
country. The three page document included answers to the 
questions the Administration felt needed to be publicly 
addressed in order to clarify public perception. 
Addressing the concerns about a President who campaigned 
to streamline the government and now is creating another 
bureaucracy, it was suggested that “Taking the 'E' out of 
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HEW is a serious attempt to break HEW down to manageable 
• R ft 
proportions." For those who were anxious about possible 
federal interference in education, the response was "The 
system of state-local-parental control of education is 
institutionalized ... a tradition, deeply rooted ... (and 
the) legislation is written specifically so this system 
is honored. For some who were fearful of a DOE 
dominated by elementary and secondary interests to the 
detriment of higher education the answer was "Structural¬ 
ly the legislation goes into detail to balance all . . . 
interest ... (and) from the budget standpoint, the 
proposal splits funds nearly half-and-half between 
elementary/secondary and post secondary.Finally to 
skeptics the White House suggested "... that a (DOE) is 
not a panacea. However ... removing (education) from a 
virtual burial ground ... (and) giving education ... more 
visibility and accountability, will provide an important 
first step ... increase ... efficient management . . . and 
61 
better use of the taxpayer's dollar." 
Also that day, McIntyre and the Vice-President held 
a White House Press briefing where Mondale stated "This 
Department, when established, will mean a three-fold 
victorv: a victory for education, a victory for human 
6 2 
needs, and a victory for good government." 
The general concern about a DOE, was stated by the 
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New York Times as being an "illusion of reform ... 
(supported by) President Carter only to fulfill a campaign 
pledge to the NEA. ^ This was answered the next day 
by Stu Eizenstat that, "with all deference ... Education 
is a major societal function which needs a separate voice 
at the highest levels of government. 
Thus the White House had with public focus entered 
the fray by the first week of February and meant to pass a 
DOE with the best structure attainable in Congress in 
1979; but to have one nevertheless. Carter on February 9 
at a private Question and Answer session with Editors and 
News Directors, said "I believe it'll be a much cleaner 
relationship in eliminating confusion and overlapping and 
red tape and the duplication of reports ... I think it 
would be a step in the right direction ... (and) as you 
know, the NEA, the largest organization of teachers, think 
it'd be very good. And although Joe Califano has not been 
an enthusiastic supporter of it, he agrees with my 
decision (audience laughter).At this same session 
Carter also talked about many of the other areas he was 
involved in at that time as President. These including 
going two days later to Mexico to meet with President 
Lopez-Portillo, continuing negotiations on SALT talks with 
the Soviet Union, inviting the Foreign Ministers of Egypt 
and Israel to meet in Washington with Secretary Vance, the 
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recent successful visit of Vice Premier DungXIaoping of 
China, as well as a stand he took opposing any form of 
legalized gambling especially a specific kind of national 
gaming policy. 
The Straub "Wednesday Group" summarized the activities 
of the first week in February as "... successful"66, and 
pointed out a Washington Star newspaper article by 
Fred Barnes describing "... the priority of the issue 
(DOE) as evidenced by the task force being established to 
see the legislation through."6^ 
With all the positive outward signs for the DOE 
legislation, of some concern were rumors circulating 
Washington that Secretary Califano and Mr. Anthony 
Cardenale the Director of Overseas Schools for the Defense 
Department were undercutting the Administration's posi¬ 
tion. Peth Abramowitz alerted Eizenstat that it was being 
alleged, that "Governor Graham (D-Florida) withdrew from 
testifying in favor of the Department of Education after 
the Governor was called by Joe Califano ... (and) ... Mr. 
Cardenale, ... is calling base commanders urging them to 
call the Armed Services Committee to oppose the transfer 
of DOD schools. The Generals are (then) calling the Hill 
to oppose the Department."68 Eizenstat asked Abramowitz 
to "... please try to get more info on activities of 
Califano and Cardenale so they can be dressed-down if 
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these rumors are accurate."69 
Abramowtiz that same day was briefing Bert Carp for 
the February 14 meeting with the executive board of the 
National Association of State and Land-Grant Colleges and 
Universities. The memo reflected the Chairing of that 
meeting by Anne Wexler. Wexler who joined the White House 
staff from her former position as Deputy Undersecretary 
of Commerce, was using her office as liaison with Public 
Groups as a leverage on Congress for the White House to 
promote Administration programs and legislation. 
At this time, Wexler's specific charge among 
various priorities was the passage of the Department of 
Education. On February 13, Carter submitted a message to 
Congress accompanying "A draft of Proposed Legislation to 
establish a Department of Education, and for other 
purposes. House Document No. 96-52." In this message, the 
President urged the Congress, "... to act promptly on this 
70 important proposal." 
The Washington Post on February 14 published a lead 
editorial, declaring "Never underestimate the power of a 
bad idea to generate bad arguments ... A Department of 
Education, if such unfortunately is enacted into law, will 
become a gigantic single-minded lobbying outfit. It will 
be the NEA writ large ... (and) evidently the administra¬ 
tion ... has carved up the turf in a new ... way ... so 
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that the (DOE) proposal is likely to have a smoother time 
this year. 1 This editorial was duplicated and mailed 
to all Members of Congress by DOE opponents Congressman 
Benjamin S. Rosenthal (D-New York) and John N. Erlenborn 
(R-Illinois) . Joining the Washington Post and the New York 
Times that week was the Philadelphia Inquirer, which said 
"If a separate, independent Department of Education is so 
desirable, why leave so many educational programs out of 
it? ... (because) ... in the real world, they couldn't get 
them through the Senate ... the result would appear 
to demolish the claims for ... vaunted coordination (of 
programs)."73 The Wall Street Journal, stated, "If the 
new department stays small it will mostly be a colossal 
waste of money ... if it grows ... it will only waste more 
•.74 
money .... 
The Straub "Wednesday Group" at their 5th meeting 
noted that the "NEA is sending two of their representa¬ 
tives from each congressional district out to Washington to 
lobby their Congressman. These persons will show grass¬ 
roots support; they will bring petitions from community 
residents with them ... (and) by May 15 - each member of 
the House ... will be visited."75 In addition, further 
liaisons were established with both positive and opposing 
interest groups by this task force. Administration 
personnel such as Father Geno Baroni, a Catholic priest 
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and high ranking Carter appointment at the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, was enlisted to lobby with 
the United States Catholic Conference. 
Continuing to reach out, the Task Force in the last 
week of February set up meetings between Mondale, McIntyre, 
Eizenstat, Pettigrew, Watson and Watson's deputy Gene 
Eidenberg with the National Governor's Association, 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Chief State 
School Officers, Education Commission of the States, 
National Association of School Boards, and the National 
Association of State Boards of Education.0 
Administration representatives were scheduled to 
attend 28 National education organization conferences and 
conventions in all parts of the country over the next 
several months in order to organize on behalf of the 
. 77 Department of Education. 
These efforts were helping to lay the groundwork 
for Jack Brooks to introduce the Administration's DOE 
bill, "Presently with 56 co-sponsors and (anticipating) 
Brooks ... "A highly skilled legislative tactician 
who supports party loyalty ... (was facing) widespread 
79 but thin support for the bill ..." '• 
The opposition was also active. The Education 
Coalition, a 10-year old group of non-profit advocacy 
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organizations deeply involved in Civil Rights, Children's 
Welfare and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, expressed their 
concern. In a statement from Marion Wright Edelman that 
was sent to all Members of Congress as well as special 
interest groups, she argued on behalf of the coalition 
that "... the Department (DOE) has been proposed for so 
long and has failed to gain broad-based support ... (It 
seems) that the case is not made (for it) Edelman 
also focused on a major argument that was of concern for 
House Democrats. "Part of the historic success in 
sustaining federal funding for education had been through 
the combined efforts of teachers, administrators, unions, 
81 parents' organizations and child advocates." Asked 
Edelman, "Would not a separate Department of Education 
threaten this coalition and isolate educational interests 
8 2 from their historic, broad-based constituency?" 
To address the growing momentum generated by the 
White House Task Force and the NEA's Educational ad hoc 
committee and various allied groups, the AFT began 
distributing their own summary briefing to Congress, the 
media and interest groups. Called "Deficiencies in 
Federal Department of Education Legislation - A non¬ 
solution to the problems of education on the national 
level", it was prepared by the AFT Department of 
March, 1979. Focusing on the AFT position Legislation in 
179 
that the proposed legislation is at best, symbolic, and 
at worst, a danger.1,83, they stated that the case for 
alleged consolidation and coordination was a myth and a 
new DOE simply "... (was) another agency for schools and 
colleges to deal with."84 The AFT pointed out that 
initial proposals to streamline education included 
programs from forty different federal agencies, and the 
President at first proposed a DOE including Head Start 
(HEW), Child Feeding and Nutrition programs (Agriculture), 
the schools of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Interior), 
and the Overseas Dependent School system (Defense). This 
the AFT reminded excluded consolidation of the "... truly 
enormous programs such as the education benefits in the 
Veterans Administration (the largest federal student aid 
program). ... (and) ... Youth Employment and Training, 
currently part of CETA in the Department of Labor." The 
AFT briefinq paper continued "... it became increasingly 
clear that the constituencies surrounding those programs 
marked for transfer to the new department would block the 
education department (with Congress) if their programs 
were not eliminated (from a new DOE)."86 The AFT pointed 
out that since then Head Start, Child Nutrition and the 
Bureau of Indian Schools had all been removed during 
Congressional debate. Also the Defense Schools survived 
by one vote in the House Committee in 1978 after the 
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National Science Foundation educational programs were 
eliminated from transfer. They went on to question what 
was left in a new DOE could in anyway reduce paperwork and 
red tape, guarantee state and local control of education 
or improve management and accountability. Concluded the 
AFT, "No one who witnessed last year's debacle could 
believe that a federal department of education will 
contribute to streamlining education administration."87 
In early March Jack Brooks introduced the 
Administration's Department of Education Bill, H.R.2444 to 
compliment the Senate Ribicoff Bill S.210. The 
legislation had "... about sixty co-sponsors ... (and) ... 
an effort (was) underway to find business leaders and 
distinguished Americans to support the bill and answer un- 
O O 
favorable press." 
The White House, to substantiate the Brooks Bill and 
to counter the AFT fact circular, produced a second 
summary sheet stating that the new DOE, "Would consolidate 
approximately 160 existing programs (vast majority from 
HEW), 24,465 Federal employees ... (with a) budget 
totaling $14.4 billion ...”89. It also included charts of 
organizational structure for the new DOE and a graph 
showing that a DOE would be the eighth largest budget 
Cabinet Secretariat of what would then be thirteen 
departments.90 Even with the AFT arguments that the 
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proposed DOE wasn't large enough, Stanford University 
President, Richard Lyman, thought it too inclusive of 
higher education programs and opposed the DOE because 
"Diversity in education will not flourish under centrali¬ 
zation in Washington. This Administration (Carter) may 
have no such intentions, but a Department of Education 
will outlive this and many succeeding Administrations."^'*' 
The "Wednesday Group" continued to focus on a wide 
range of education groups with White House personnel going 
to ten meetings in the beginning of March alone. Still 
concerned over negative press an "Op-Ed" piece for wide 
distribution was drafted for Jim McIntyre's signature by 
staff, and newspaper editorial boards were solicited 
for the opportunity to make a DOE presentation by the 
White House. The Administration was also active in 
pursuit of members of Congress on the Brooks' Government 
Operations Committee. Staff members would be approached 
by experts in areas of concern to individual Representa¬ 
tives. Meetings to this end in early March, ... were 
being scheduled for the next weeks with Carroll Thornton 
of PRP Congressional Liaison (who would) pay courtesy 
calls, accompanied by a member of Pat Gwaltney's staff and 
others (e.g., Buddy Blakey of HEW for members (of 
Congress) involved in health issues or the Black Caucus, 
and Phil Smith of OSTP (Office of Science Technology 
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Policy), for those interested in the science (education 
programs transfer). Special preparation is being made for 
discussion of costs, DOD schools, etc."93 it was also at 
this time the consensus the "main problem area which must 
be concentrated on is the House Rules Committee."94 
Meanwhile Eizenstat was pressing Carter's scheduling 
office to include for the first time since his 
inauguration a speech to a national education forum. He 
was hoping for a May, White House reception, "... 
observing the 25th anniversary of the Brown (Supreme 
Court) decision which desegregated the nation's public 
9 5 
schools ..." , or a mid-summer appearance in Detroit at 
the NEA Annual Meeting.9^ 
During the second week in March the placement of two 
of the programs that had been debated constantly for the 
past two years, was again being argued; these were 
transfer of science education programs from the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the inclusion in a DOE of the 
Vocational Rehabilitation Program (RSA). Speaking now for 
the President's position. Secretary Califano wrote, "(We) 
oppose combining the broad range of rehabilitation 
services needed by the handicapped with education because 
it would be inconsistent with the creation of a separate 
new Department focused on education." In addition the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment issued their 
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study of the impact of a DOE on NSF programs, and opposing 
the Administration plan, recommended, "that no functions 
... should be transferred from NSF until the proposed 
Department of Education has been established and takes 
definite shape. The wisdom of transfers could then be 
more firmly assessed. The transfer of the National 
Endowment on the Arts and Humanities has been postponed on 
this basis. The argument is equally valid for the NSF 
functions. 
On March 14 the "... Senate Governmental Affairs 
Committee voted out (favorably) the Department of 
Education bill (S.210) by a vote of 12-1."" It included 
the Vocational Rehabilitation programs and the Science 
Education programs. 
The White House briefings to lobbying groups to help 
support the DOE now included lobbyists themselves. Anne 
Wexler's office invited twenty-three Washington repre¬ 
sentatives of large American corporations to be briefed by 
Jim McIntyre, Bert Carp, Terry Straub and Pat Gwaltney on 
the merits of a DOE.100 It was part of Wexler's strategy 
to get assistance from those who regularly asked for help 
from the Administration and now could repay the favor or 
earn the right to ask condiseration in the future on thejj 
priorities. 
The Ad Hoc Coalition for a DOE was approaching even 
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those known to be leading the opposition. Congressman 
John Erlenborn (R-Illinois) was being lobbied by his own 
home state Superintendent of Education. Dr. Joseph Cronin 
who wrote the fiscally conservative Representative that 
"Opponents compile the existing staff and budget for 
education and (then) call these start-up costs. Unfair 1 
The OMB estimates that a new Education Department could. 
eliminate 300 jobs that now overlap because of the current 
structural inadequacies."1®1 
In late March, the House began to take testimony 
before the Brooks Committee on the DOE legislation 
(H.R.2444) . 
Speaking in favor was a diverse group including; Rev. 
Jesse Jackson of Operation PUSH in Chicago, Duke 
University President Terry Sanford, Florida Governor Bob 
Graham, Kenneth Blaylock the President of the American 
Federation of Government Employees, and this time the 
Director of Defense Department Schools, Anthony Cardenale. 
Jim McIntyre appeared before the House Committee "... to 
work with (the Members) toward the enactment of this 
legislation this year ... a very high priority of the 
President ... to separate education programs from the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and combine 
them with programs from five other agencies to form a 
simpler, more a ccountable organization than ... 
1R5 
exists."102 
The "Wednesday Group" in the last half of March was 
now holding bi-weekly meetings. They were now strongly 
facing down substantive challenges from Civil Rights, 
Indian Affairs, Department of Defense and National 
Science Foundation interest groups all concerned about the 
new DOE. Working on House members and the Press, they 
were pushing their outside coalition to apply more and 
more pressure on Congressmen who sat on the Brooks 
Committee. 
At the end of the month, the possible spectre of 
Secretary Califano privately lobbying the Congress against 
the DOE was strongly rumored throughout the Administra¬ 
tion. The situation got so serious that Califano felt 
compelled to defend himself in a memorandum to Jim 
McIntyre with a copy to Vice-President Mondale. At issue 
was his sending to Congressman Jack Brooks, at Brooks 
"... request,"103 a substantial list of achievements that 
HEW had accomplished in the field of education since he 
became Secretary in 1977. McIntyre, furious that it seem¬ 
ingly undercut the need for a DOE was told by Califano, 
"Since the President made his decision to recommend 
creation of a separate Department of Education, we have 
supported it - - even those of us who expressed serious 
misgivings - and will continue to do so. But in order to 
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support a separate department, it is not necessary or 
accurate to play down or demean the many accomplishments 
of the past two years - - nor is it fair to the people who 
have achieved them. There are arguments for a Department 
of Education. But I do not believe that a lack of 
accomplishment in education over the past two years - - or 
a lack of attention to it - - can be fairly said to be one 
of them."10^ The same time Califano memoed Jack Watson to 
support his contention that he had sent letters of support 
to the Congress on a DOE and "... if you check the record 
of last year and this year you will find that the most 
persuasive testimony in favor of the Department of 
Education was given by Hale Champion (for HEW) last year 
before the Ribicoff Committee."xw The situation had by 
this time reached the President, who hand wrote a note to 
Califano, that said, "I want your active support in the 
1106 Congress for the Department of Education legislation." 
Califano responded to Carter the next day with a three- 
page "Personal and Confidential"107 memorandum. He stated 
that he had written in support of a DOE on three occasions 
to the Congress, every high-level HEW official had testi¬ 
fied in support and when "... friends like Jesse Jackson 
and Vernon Jordan108 have privately and off-the-record 
asked me whether they should testify in favor of a 
n 10 9 
I have urged them to do so." separate department. 
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Califano concluded that he, with Stu Eizenstats' 
concurrence felt that so much historically had been 
said by me against a DOE that it would embarrass the 
Administration if he personally testified, and he 
expressed his own strong disagreement with arguments 
reported in the Washington Post by Jim McIntyre that 
Califano, "... simply can't pay enough attention to educa¬ 
tional matters because 92 percent of his huge $200 billion 
department budget is for welfare and health matters which 
dominate the Secretary's attention." 
Said Califano to Carter, "... (that) belittles the 
attention that has been paid to education by me and my 
colleagues and the achievements in education over the past 
two years.Regardless of the praise that McIntyre had 
always publicly given Califano with statements such as "I 
don't know anyone who has done a better job than Joe 
Califano,"^^ even the smallest slight, in what was the 
hometown paper for this Washington experienced Carter 
appointee would not be pridefully tolerated by him. 
With the vote expected on the DOE in the Senate in a 
few weeks, the task force continued in April to try to 
resolve the Science Education transfer from NSF to the 
DOE. Phil Smith of OSTP continued to meet and work with 
Mondale, Eizenstat, Presidential Science Advisor Frank 
Press, OMB, NSF, and Members of Congress "... to improve 
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the (legislation) to transfer the ... programs and to 
provide a sound rationale for the action."113 
Beth Abramowitz alerted Eizenstat to the potential 
for concern about the DOE legislation if there was a 
"withdrawal of support for the bill by the National School 
Board Association at its annual meeting . .., rejection 
of a department by the NAACP Board in May ..., (or) ... if 
(Sen. Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina)) prayer in school 
amendment (can't) be defeated ..."114. None of these 
contemplated problems occurred. 
Endorsements from leaders in the education community 
were elicited and disseminated to Congress by the White 
House. They included, Terrence Bell, Utah Commissioner 
of Higher Education and a former U.S. Commissioner of 
Education under the Republican administration from 1974- 
76 and Glenn Terrell the President of Washington State 
University. Others were expressing the opposite point 
of view. The heads of the Five-College area in western 
Massachusetts composed of Smith College, Mt. Holyoke, 
Amherst, Hampshire and the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst, jointly urged opposition to the DOE suggesting 
that "education is not a single constituency in this 
country. In its diversity is its strength. To force it 
now (with a DOE) into a single stance would be to create 
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a straitjacket for the next generation. 
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Richard Pettigrew at this time received the approval 
of the Straub Task Force to mail a letter to "approximate¬ 
ly 300 college and university presidents from institutions 
located in congressional districts represented on the 
Government Operations and Rules Committee. n11^ Pettigrew 
wrote that the DOE, "Can and should be an effective 
advocate on matters of great concern to the higher education 
community;" he enclosed a copy of the Administrations 
bill, H.R.2444 introduced by Congressman Brooks, and 
solicited their views. That same day, Anne Wexler 
coordinated a White House briefing, for over sixty 
representatives of the State Higher Education Executive 
Officers (SHEEO). They were thanked for supporting the 
DOE and brought up-to-date on other concerns such as 
SALT talks and inflation. The reception was held in the 
Presidential family theater in the east wing as opposed 
to normal briefing rooms located in the Executive Office 
building which is separate from the White House. The 
object was to make those present lobbyists for the DOE. 
This group had been suggested to Wexler by Washington 
lobbyist J.D. Williams who was a personal friend of 
Oklahoma Chancellor of Regents for Higher Education, 
Dr. E.T. Dunlap.126 
During the last days of April there was intensity in 
1 Members, particularly on the lobbying of Congressiona 
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House Government Operations Committee, where Jack Brooks 
needed to get a vote to pass the DOE bill on to the Rules 
Committee. Cognizant of the extent the White House was 
now actively involved in this effort, the NEA wrote Carter 
that "on behalf of the 1.8 million members of NEA, ... 
(we) ... want to thank you and to assure you of our 
commitment to continue our efforts to secure a Department 
of Education."119 
The Task Force expressed concern that if "the DOD 
schools are not included ... 60 percent of the proposed 
staff and the only major program now outside of HEW (in 
the DOE) will be lost."1^9 
Heightening the fear was a straw poll at the European 
PTA conference in Germany two weeks before that "showed 
(by a vote of 67-51) members favored keeping the overseas 
schools within the Department of Defense (DOD) rather than 
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the proposed Department of Education." A letter was 
received by the Task Force that had been sent to the 
President from Cdr. Mike Austin (USN) the Legislative 
Chairman of the European PTA. It stated that before this 
vote Dr. Anthony Cardenale, the DODDS director in 
Washington came to Berchtesgaden, Germany and "... 
consistently gave (the convention) a very negative 
impression regarding this legislation ... and structured 
his (answers) in such a way that the listener had to 
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conclude that the Secretary of Defense was begrudgingly 
supporting the President • • • and ... in private ... 
(gave his personal views against) to any who were 
interested."122 
On April 30, the Senate passed the Department of 
Education Bill "... by a vote of 72 to 21.1,122 Included 
wd.s the transfer of the Vocational P.ehabilitation programs 
from HEW against the wishes of the President and Califano. 
On Wednesday, May 2, the Brooks' House Government 
Operations Committee reported the DOE Bill out favorably 
20-19, with "Chairman Brooks, Congressman Elliot 
(Levitas) (D-Georgia) and (Congressman Dante) Fascell (D- 
194 Florida) ... (being) ... especially helpful .... 
The legislation stripped, "... amendments which would have 
deleted DOD Overseas Schools, added school lunch programs 
and required a study on the feasibility of prayer in 
12 5 
schools ... (all) were defeated," 
The Working Group was at this time helping to plan a 
"NEA Lobbyists Briefing,"126 which was to be "a reception 
for approximately 250 NEA teachers who (would) be in 
Washington (at the White House) ... the Vice-President ... 
(attending)."1^ 
The response to the White House initiatives for 
Higher Education support began to show success by the 
beginning of May when endorsements began to come in in 
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favor of a DOE from a wide-geographic area. Included 
were the Presidents of North Carolina Agricultural and 
Technical State University, 128 the University of 
Pittsburgh,129 Bentley College130 (Massachusetts) and the 
Northwest Technical College in Archbold, Ohio.131 This 
was supplemented by a mailing from the Ohio Conference of 
the American Association of University Professors, who ex¬ 
pressed hope its membership would write Ohio Congressman 
urging their vote for a DOE, and possibly to "meet with 
their Members of Congress on weekends ... to impress upon 
them the support of faculty for this Bill."132 
The Task Force now in May was preoccupied with DOE 
legislation strategy on Vocational Rehabilitation (to get 
it out). Bureau of Indian Schools (to get it in) and DOD 
schools (to keep them in) and their request to "... DOD 
to temporarily reassign Commander Austin (to Washington) 
133 
in the near future ..." 
The House Rules Committee which received from the 
Brooks Committee, H.R.2444 postponed consideration of the 
DOE until June. Members all received a letter from Frank 
Moore enclosing descriptive materials "... which highlight 
the management improvements that can be made in a separate 
Department of Education ... (and) ... to call Terry Straub 
... (with) ... questions."134 
A U.S. News and World Report, article that presented 
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an interview debate on the pro and con for a new DOE was 
receiving wide circulation on the Hill. Daniel B. Taylor, 
West Virginia Superintendent of Schools who was for the 
DOE, and Albert Shanker, President of the American 
Federation of Teachers who was against. Said Taylor, 
From the point of view of the state and local school- 
board member or education official, one has to be 
a t,ureauci’3tic tactician or a genius in order to keep 
abreast ... a separate (DOE) would give all of us an 
opportunity to hold a single agency accountable."^^ 
Countered Shanker, "The creation of a (DOE) ... would 
most likely result in the splitting up of the education 
and labor committees in both houses of Congress. Here are 
two unique committees that are very pro-labor, pro-Social 
Security, pro-health, pro-education. If they are broken 
up, you may very well get committees that are more hostile 
to both labor and education than the current committees 
are."136 
The American Association of University Professors 
(AAUP) now joined their Ohio branch, by nationally issuing 
a letter to all Congressmen in support of H.R.2444. The 
AAUP stated they had joined "... the 35 higher education 
organizations in the Higher Education Coalition, represent¬ 
ing faculty, students and administrators ... (that) has 
concluded that (this) legislation provides a well-balanced 
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set of educational programs over which the new Department 
will have jurisdiction. "1^7 
With the House Rules Committee set to vote the next 
day and the full House possibly on June 6, this "Higher 
Education Coalition in support of the (new) Depart¬ 
ment . . . (a) sent a letter to all House members over Terry 
Sanford's (President of Duke University) signature plus 
200 others, (b) contacted all undecided Members in their 
home districts, and (c) reminded freshman Congressman of 
their pro-Department campaign pledges."10® The Ad Hoc 
Committee, composed of over 100 elementary and secondary 
school educational groups, were prepared to "... work 
the Hill Wednesday (day of possible full House vote), 
beginning at 8:30 a.m. The opponents to the DOE, led 
by the AFT had "successfully forced the New York City 
School Board to come out against the Department . . . 
(perhaps costing) 5 to 10 undecided votes."140 
The Rules Committee meeting on June 5 resulted in a 
"... 1 to 5 vote majority for the bill (to be reported 
out to the full House)."141 It passed by a vote of 
That same day in anticipation of a new Department, 
Carter political aide Tim Kraft and Patronage aide Arnie 
Miller wrote the President concerning their desire to 
start a task-force to begin to search for candidates for 
the new DOE Secretary and senior officials based on them 
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being, "... generalists, who are not 'captive' to any 
education group ... experienced managers ... a track record 
in civil rights ... (and) devoted to excellence . .."142 
Carter returned the memo, now stamped Administratively 
Confidential, with the comment, "If the new dep't is 
"captured" by any special interest group(s) we will have 
created a monster . 
The House delayed by a day their debate and vote on 
the DOE to June 7. Frank Moore asked Carter to make 
phone calls the morning of the vote to Speaker O'Neill (to 
get his help with the Massachusetts delegation) and to 
Congressman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Illinois) (to help with 
those in the Chicago delegation). Carter wrote back to 
Moore that the Speaker "Will help" ... (and) Danny 
(Rostenkowski) not for it ... will (though) support and 
+ help -,"144 
The debate in the House that day continued so long 
that it was continued until, Monday, June 11. Carter was 
told by Moore and Straub that "... support for the bill 
is soft and victory is not assured. The (latest) vote 
count ... was; Yes and leaning Yes - 221 (182D and 39R) , 
Undecided - 32 (18D and 14R), (and) No and leaning No - 
182 (80D and 102R)."145 Wanting to shore up their 
support Moore and Straub drafted a letter for Carter to 
send to all Democrats they listed as Yes, leaning Yes and 
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Undecided, for its M . . . direct impact ... (and) visible 
evidence of your continued and strong support for the 
bill ... (so) no one can claim that we did not expend 
possible effort."146 
The letter was sent out on June 8th, with the 
President emphasizing all the general themes and 
specifically stating the the DOE would "... reduce 450 
positions and save $19 Million by eliminating bureaucratic 
layers."147 
The public visibility of Carter continued to increase 
with a photo opportunity that Friday, June 8th., with the 
Executive Committee of the National School Board 
Association in the oval office. In his remarks to them he 
emphasized "Education (as) the key to the future stability 
and prosperity of our country."148 
When the debate re-opened on Monday the 11th, amend¬ 
ments were offered and accepted onto the DOE bill for 
• ■ • • . * 
school prayer, anti-busing and anti-affirmative action. 
The Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) wrote to the 
Members of Congress and said they continued to support 
H.R.2444 but "deplored (these) action(s) of the House ... 
and will work hard to defeat these amendments in a con¬ 
ference committee."148 These amendments threatened to 
kill the legislation by having Congressmen for a DOE put 
in the untenable situation of having to vote for what 
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they considered onerous amendments. Civil Rights 
groups appealed to President Carter, that although they 
supported an "... independent Department of Education ... 
we are absolutely opposed to any final legislation ... 
which includes amendments crippling Civil Rights and 
Affirmative Action."150. Perspective was placed on the 
situation by James Farmer, the Executive Director of 
the Coalition of American Public Employees who wrote 
Congressman Jack Brooks, that he realized Brooks was "... 
being subjected to last-minute pressure to vote against a 
separate Department of Education because of various anti- 
Civil Rights and anti-affirmative action amendments. 
(While) I deplore this strategy (of DOE opponents) of 
attempting to divide us against ourselves ... I believe 
these efforts to weaken a separate Department of Education 
can and will be defeated in conference and in any final 
legislation ... (so) ... I urge you to (vote) for H.R.2444 
(as amended)."151 Farmer and DOE proponents looked at 
this as a last-gasp attempt to kill the bill, for if 
it passed he felt that the Conference Committee (where 
Senators and Congressmen would work out differences in 
S.210 and H.R.2444), would remove these amendments. 
But, the opponents of the DOE, pleased at the circumstances 
these amendments brought to bear, sought to end it all with 
a defeat for H.R.2444, and so said in a letter to Congress 
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signed by liberal activists and some Civil Rights leaders. 
They included Clarence Mitchell and Joseph Rauh; as well as 
organizations influenced by Marian Edelman who urged the 
Congress to vote down the bill because of it ability now 
as constituted to "undermine the enforcement of existing 
civil rights statutes."152 
In the midst of this increasingly difficult DOE 
fight. Carter was trying to control political problems 
nationally with speculation of a primary fight for the 
nomination of the Democratic Party in 1980 from Senator 
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts),155 a third-party 
candidacy of Representative John Anderson (R-Illinois) if 
he failed in his bid to succeed in receiving the 
Republican nomination for President, and continued 
• • • • 1 5 S 
national criticism by Mayor Jane Byrne of Chicago, 
labor leaders in general,1*^ and some Jewish organiza- 
tions, all major components of his political Party. 
Carter made headlines just before the DOE vote when in 
response to the first possibility suggesting that if 
I CO 
Kennedy did run he'd "whip his ass", the political 
concern in the White House, was this vote on DOE was now 
not one to lose. 
The day before the proposed final House action on, 
June 19, the Republican members were all sent mailgrams 
from the White House by former President Gerald Ford's 
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Education Commissioner Terrence Bell, that was paid for by 
the National Education Association.16^* 
On June 19th, every House Member got a DOE supportive 
telegram from Kenneth Blaylock, President of the "... 
300,000 Members of the American Federation of Government 
Employees ..." , a union member of the AFL-CIO, giving 
those under pressure from the AFL-CIO on behalf of the AFT 
a place to rationalize their vote. 
Due to delays in the House on tactics and procedures 
the vote was scheduled now for June 30. Lobbying was now 
at such a continuous peak level that in the House of 
Representatives things became so seriously polarized that 
ten more days were now allowed by the leadership, which 
would bring the vote to after the July 4 holiday recess. 
After more than 30 hours debate that had stalled H.R.2444, 
the bill was now scheduled as the third item of business 
on July 10th. 
Immediately the Task Force and its outside alliance 
of Education coalitions fixed their eyes towards 
"Working" every Congressman personally by their own con¬ 
stituents, "As virtually every member will be in his home 
district"161 over July 4. 
Now in early July, the most critical time of the DOE 
fight in Congress, the President was immersed in inter¬ 
national affairs and a domestic political crisis. 
200 
Having left for Tokyo, Japan on June 23 to attend an 
Economic Summit with the Western Allies162 Carter 
returned the next week to Washington after cancelling a 
vacation in Hawaii. He was faced with a reality that his 
Presidency as analyzed by his pollster, Patrick Caddell, 
had fallen to a public disapproval that was disconcert¬ 
ing. He was scheduled to address the nation on July 3 
on the continuing seriousness of the Energy Crisis. 
The President decided to not give the speech, because he 
felt he "couldn't deliver it, that I had already made four 
speeches to the nation on energy, and that they had been 
increasingly ignored ... I had to do something to get the 
attention of the news media and the public." He 
decided to have a domestic summit at the Presidential 
retreat Camp David in Maryland, where he would invite 
representatives from all areas of American life who would 
serve him as key advisers in small group sessions. The 
eyes of the median focused that long July 4 weekend on 
Camp David where these discussions were occurring. 
Lasting for over a week the virtual parade of "advisors 
coming and going to Camp David gave many in the country a 
daily impression of crisis discussions on the state of the 
nation. 
Because of the absence of the President from the 
White House on July 3, and ostensibly from June 23, Terry 
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Straub, Vice-President Mondale and Anne Wexler along with 
the staffs of Frank Moore and Jim McIntyre were now press¬ 
ing even harder themselves along with the allied interest 
group coalitions. 
Mondale was briefed by Straub on July 3 of a number 
of activities the Task Force had scheduled for the 
following week; they included a leadership breakfast with 
the Speaker O'Neill and others on the 10th where it had 
been hoped Carter could lobby them strongly to become 
actively involved, a Carter meeting with undecided members 
at the White House, the first Cabinet Meeting, after July 
4 where the President would urge "Cabinet officers ... to 
make several Congressional contacts (on DOE) the 
lobbying of Governors by the President when he attended 
that week their National Conference in Louisville, 
Kentucky, and telephone calls from Carter to Doug Fraser 
(President of the United Auto Workers Union-UAW) and 
Cardinal John Cody (the Catholic leader of Chicago). All 
of this, was completed at levels of Senior Staff members 
of the White House. Carter was able to place a call to 
O'Neill on July 10 to urge him to "Solidify support for 
the (DOE) bill ... it (was) the Speaker to whom many 
Democrats (were looking) for leadership and commitment on 
this issue. 
On July 11 with the DOE opponents "working" the 
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House, Jim McIntyre wrote to Jack Brooks assuring him that 
the new structure reflected an "Office of Private 
Education at the highest level in the Department, to 
deflect pointed criticism from a last-minute National 
Catholic Educational Association press release the same 
day suggesting that Carter may have "created a new Depart¬ 
ment of Public Education (DOPE) ... (and) ... this (DOE) 
is a major fulfillment of ... (his) promise to the 
(NEA) ... (it is questionable) if it will be sensitive and 
helpful to the needs of private as well as public school 
students."167 
The vote on the House Department of Education 
Organization Act of 1979 (H.R.24-44) finalized on July 11, 
1979, at 1:57 p.m.^6® It passed by a vote of 210 to 206 
with 18 members not present to vote. The bill prevailed 
with 175 Democrats and 35 Republicans in the affirmative 
. • 169 
and 117 Republicans and 89 Democrats in the negative. 
The Conference Committee with the Senate (S.210) was 
now going to try and mediate concerns between it and 
H.R.2444. Congressman Brooks suggested to the Ad Hoc 
Coalition 170 that "Nobody ever said it would be easy, 
and it wasn't. But we won, and it never could have been 
accomplished without the long, hard work of all • • • I 
don't have to tell you how much hard work still lies 
ahead. But we did it before and we can do it again with 
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the kind of dedicated support I know we can count on from 
you all."17-1- 
Coming down after the Camp David meetings Carter made 
public visits to private homes near Pittsburgh, Pennsyl¬ 
vania and Martinsburg, West Virginia where he spent time 
with community individuals, and then addressed the nation 
on Sunday, July 15. In those remarks Carter suggested 
that the American people "... had lost confidence in our 
government but that it was time for us to work together to 
realize the potential greatness of America." At no 
time did he suggest failure on his part, but rather a 
resolve that "Everyone could help." At the conclusion 
of his speech he talked substantially about Energy not 
Education as he did in speeches in Kansas City and Detroit 
the next day. These speeches became known as Carter's 
concern over "malaise" in America. 
At Camp David he had heard many complaints about 
various members of his cabinet including that "Joe 
Califano ... was not loyal ... and was almost completely 
ineffective ... on Capital Hill."174 Several days later 
he asked for the resignations of all his Cabinet members 
in writing, and decided to accept those of Califano, Mike 
Blumenthal of Treasury and the long-tendered one from 
James Schlesinger at Energy. With DOE legislation in the 
midst of going to Conference he fired Califano which 
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Carter in reflection suggested that the way he did so as a 
process allowed the situation to be "portrayed as a great 
governmental crisis and negated some of the progress .•. 
made during (those) past two weeks in reestablishing 
better relations with the public."175 The President 
obviously distracted personally and looked upon by the 
public and Congress as in political suspension, heightened 
the difficulty for the White House "Task Force" to effect 
a rapid and positive closure to the DOE legislation as 
it approached compromises between the House and Senate 
versions. 
As pointed out by Dr. Allen Cohen of the Ad Hoc 
Committee for a Cabinet Department of Education, the new 
Department was still "being constructed in a context of 
avid opposition by some important sectors of American 
opinion — - the national media and elements of organized 
labor ... said Cohen we still have a ways to goi Our 
opposition shows every indication of continuing the fight 
1V 6 
through (the) conference ..." 
While the momentum was being regenerated among the 
forces who were for the DOE, in the White House lobbying 
was beginning on candidates for who the first Secretary of 
Education would be. Beth Abramowitz agreeing with valid 
arguments for a non-educator nevertheless felt a "national 
ly respected education administrator is a better way to 
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gain respect for the new Department ... and ... from 
within the Administration ... (recommended) Dr. Mary Berry 
(Assistant HEW Secretary for Education) ... and ... from 
outside ... Dr. Terry Sanford (President of Duke 
University), Hon. Jerry Apodaca (former Governor of New 
Mexico) She sent her comments through Bert Carp to 
Stu Elzenstat. Carp wrote on the Abramowitz memo, "I do 
not agree w/these recommendations."178 Eizenstat, 
concurred by writing, "Agree".179 
The Department of Education Conference Committee was 
appointed by Speaker O'Neill and Senate Majority Leader 
Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia). The fourteen member 
Committee, that would meet and work out differences on 
H.R.2444 and S.210, and return final versions to both 
bodies, was composed of five Senators all of whom 
voted for S.210 (Ribicoff, John Glenn of Ohio, Carl Levin 
of Michigan, Charles Percy of Illinois and Jacob Javits of 
New York). The House members included 5 who voted for 
H.R.2444 (Brooks, Fuqua D of Florida, St. Germain D of 
Rhode Island, Levitas D of Georgia, Horton R of New 
Jersey); and 4 who voted against H.R.2444, (Moorhead R 
of California, Franzel R of Minnesota, Erlenborn R of 
Illinois and Strangeland R of Minnesota). 
Procedurally the Brooks Committee on Government 
Operation first had voted, 20-17 on July 17 to call for 
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the conference, which they did and then the full House 
passed the bill 264-156. Technically, since the House had 
first called for the conference after the compromises 
therefore the full Senate would vote first on the 
Conference Report, and after passing it would thereby 
— gSOlVe the Conference. At that point the House member¬ 
ship could not indefinitely stall by trying to send the 
legislation back to conference, which no longer existed 
but would have to vote H.R.2444 up or down. The House and 
Senate versions differed in that the House Bill contained 
both the Bureau of Indian Affairs Education programs and 
the Department of Defenses' Overseas Dependent's Schools 
and the Senate had neither. They also differed slightly 
in specific programs to be transferred from the National 
Science Foundation to the DOE. The personnel numbers and 
budget differences were reflective of those three program 
differences. The only other concern was the House gave a 
new Secretary of Education "free range of authority (to 
reorganize their new department) ... (while) ... the 
Senate modified this control, requiring (the Secretary) to 
notify the appropriate committees before making any 
organizational changes." On the surface therefore, 
the DOE seemed to have more than a reasonable chance to 
find common ground to support it in the Conference 
Committee. The difficulty lay in the extraordinary number 
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of amendments the House added to H.R.2444 before it's 
210-206 passage on July 11, some of them extremely con¬ 
troversial. As Abramowitz wrote to Eizenstat discussing 
the status of the legislation, the amendments adopted,1^1 
(with asterisk indicating the most controversial) and the 
Congressional sponsors names underlined were; 
* Walker - instructs the Department to allow daily 
opportunity for prayer in elementary and secondary 
schools (225-122). 
* Ashbrook - prohibits withholding federal funds due 
to a school's refusal to bus students or teachers 
(227-126). 
* Walker - prohibits use of affirmative action ratios 
to deny admittance (227-126). 
Ashbrook - prohibits Federal control over content and 
selection of teaching materials. 
Skelton - prohibits withholding funds from institu¬ 
tions which do not comply with regulations governing 
curriculum, teaching programs, administration, 
personnel, or the choice of instructional materials. 
LaFalce - assigns major responsibility for education 
to parents and instructs states and private institu¬ 
tions to support the parents' position. 
Ashbrook - Modifies Federal control of education to 
only apply when "specifically authorized by Federal 
statute" (as opposed to "Federal Law", the old work¬ 
ing); department regulations will not be statutes, 
in this case. 
Marlenee - requires the Assistant Secretary for 
Vocational and Adult Education to insure an organized 
system of rural family education (403-3). 
Grasslev - assigns a principal officer to coordinate 
programs of rural education assistance. 
Simon - encourages the Department to strengthen 
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programs of foreign languages and international 
studies at all school levels. 
Garcia - creates an Office of Bilingual Education 
and Minority Languages. 
Erlenborn - permits the Assistant Secretary for 
Civil Rights to carry out compliance and enforcement 
actions through contracts with private organizations 
and individuals. 
Waxman - eliminates the transfer of health manpower 
programs from HEW (243-169). 
Ford - postpones the transfer of two Department of 
Labor migrant education programs until an office is 
established to coordinate all such programs. 
Kildee - eliminates the transfer of the BIA's Indian 
Education programs (235-120). 
McCloskey - insures that the Secretary will work with 
Indian tribes and organizations regarding programs 
transferred from the Interior Department's Office of 
Indian Education. 
Fascell - permits an eight-month grace period, during 
which the Federal law requiring a single state agency 
to handle vocational rehabilitation funds is 
inapplicable (362-36). 
* Levitas - brings all rules and regulations regarding 
education before Congressional review. 
Brooks - defines the Secretary's authority to enter 
into contracts or use funds as that explained in 
previous Appropriation Acts. 
Quayle - increases the number of full-time personnel 
to be eliminated in the first year from 450 to 800; 
stipulates that all consultants and experts be con¬ 
sidered full-time; rejects a plan to allow an 
increase of 50 full-time positions per year (263- 
143) . 
★ Ashbrook - forbids providing employees with services 
and supplies for abortions, except when the life of 
the mother is in danger. 
209 
* Ashbrook - bars institutions which fund abortions 
with mandatory student fees from using Department 
facilities, unless the life of the mother is in 
danger (257-149). 
Brooks - establishes February 1 as opposed to 
January 1 as the due date for the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services' annual report to the Education 
Secretary on Title I eligibility of States. 
Brooks ~ designates October 1, 1979 as the earliest 
date for the bill to become effective. 
The problem in the Conference Committee that House 
member Brooks faced was "... an obvious (one) in trying 
to delete or substantively modify the Anti-Civil rights 
amendments because each of them passed by a margin of over 
1 OO 
100 votes." While the delegation from the House to the 
Conference Committee provided Brooks a 5-4 margin in favor 
of the bill, the make-up of those members caused "him 
problems on other issues - particularly quotas and 
abortion ... (and) ... only Brooks ... consistently 
TOO 
opposed the anti-civil rights amendments." As to those 
amendments and the outcry to delete them from Civil Rights 
groups, "... the removal of those amendments (was) not 
1 04 
necessarily a risk-free enterprise." This was because 
"... a large number of conservative House members voted 
for the (DOE) bill. With rare exceptions these members 
voted in favor of the amendments which added prayer, 
busing, quotas and abortion provisions to the bill ... 
(although) ... it (being) true that many of these members 
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were committed to the NEA before these amendments were 
added ..." This was exacerbated because on "the 
other side ... there (were) at least 20 liberal Democrats 
who (would) vote against the conference report if the 
offensive amendments (were) not removed or substantively 
modified ... (putting the White House) between a rock 
and a hard place .... if (they went) too far (they) 
lose some conservative support; if ... not ... far 
enough, the liberals (would) certainly fall off ... (and) 
with a margin of only four votes (they didn't) have much 
latitude."186 
The first meeting of the joint House-Senate 
Conference Committee met organizationally on August 1, 
"mainly to give Committee staffers directions during the 
upcoming recess (August 3 - September 4). Congress (would) 
be reconvened on September 4, and during the week of August 
10, the Conference Committee (would) meet again .... 
Looking ahead to September other education bills of import 
to the Administration would also come before Congress for 
hearings; a major focus in two bills on the public scrutiny 
of standardized tests, putting the NEA and Ralph Nader on 
the side of "consumers" in favor of the legislation and the 
testing groups feeling it limited the re—use of exams and 
would eventually be more costly. Eizenstat told Bert Carp, 
"lets stay out of this for now. ■I 188 
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Conference Committee staff working its way 
through August the Committee met several times and 
scheduled September 12 to deal with the amendments as well 
as the programmatic differences. 
The task force geared up once again in tandem with 
the Ad Hoc Coalition Committee for a final targeting of 
Conference members, particularly to persuade them of the 
Administration's firm position that seven amendments must 
be taken off the bill. They were: 
Anti-Quota — Walker 
Prohibits the use of quotas in evaluating compliance 
with equal educational opportunity. 
Voluntary Prayer — Walker 
Establishes as a purpose of the department to permit 
voluntary prayer or meditation in all public schools. 
Prohibition ... Regulations — Ashbrook 
Narrows the "Prohibition Against Federal Control" 
Exception to areas "specifically authorized by Federal 
statute" and further explicitly excludes regulations from 
being such authorizations. 
Fund Termination -- Skelton 
Supplements the previous Ashbrook amendment with an 
additional prohibition against the Secretary suspending, 
terminating or otherwise withholding funds unless 
specifically authorized by law. 
Anti-busing — Ashbrook 
Prohibits the Secretary from requiring any 
transportation of students or teachers to achieve racial 
balance or to carry out desegregation. 
212 
Abortion (Facilities at remote locations) — Ashbrook 
Restricts emergency medical services provided by the 
Department at remote locations except where the life of 
the mother would be endangered. 
Abortion (use of mandatory student fees) — Ashbrook 
Prohibits those higher education institutions which 
use mandatory student fees from paying for abortions 
except where the life of the mother would be endangered. 
Included in the Task Force was the new Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare appointed by Carter. 
Patricia Roberts Harris, the former Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development, and the Administration's highest 
ranking black appointee, was asked to make telephone 
calls "to civil rights leaders to enlist their help with 
conferees (Congressmen) in securing enough votes to delete 
the controversial anti-civil rights amendments from the 
. . 190 legislation. 
Three days later, the "House - Senate Conference 
completed its work on the Department of Education bill . . . 
the controversial busing, anti-affirmative action, prayer 
and abortion amendments were removed ... and . . . the 
report ... (would be) voted on in the Senate and House 
within ... two weeks . ^ 
On September 24, the United States Senate approved 
the Department of Education Conference Report 69-22. 
The last great hurdle was the House of Representatives 
for a final vote on the Conference Report. 
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On September 25, Terry Straub and the Task Force's 
most recent vote count (was) 214—214 with 7 undecideds ... 
we re pulling out all stops ... and ... all Democrats ... 
whether or not they are opposed to the bill they could give 
one to the President."192 In addition a letter sent to 
Carter from Congressman Frank Guarini (D-New Jersey) an 
influential Catholic member of the House endorsing the DOE 
emphasizing its "Assistant Secretary for an Office of 
Private Education (Non-Public) ... for parents to have a 
viable alternative - a viable option to our public school 
system," was distributed to Congressmen on September 
26 by the Task Force. The same day Carter placed personal 
calls to six Congressmen with what he called "Good 
Results,"19'1 and hosted a small reception for Congressmen 
at the White House "with 15 to 20 Members of Congress who 
(were) undecided about whether they (would) support (the) 
195 
Department of Education legislation." 
On September 27 the House of Representatives approved 
the Department of Education Conference Report 215-201, and 
sent it to President Carter for signature. 
After this vote a memorandum to Frank Moore from his 
staff said "The general consensus on the calls made by 
Cabinet Members on ... the Department of Education is 
that the calls were both productive and useful ... 
hplned imoress the fact that the Administration (and) elpe i press 
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was serious about the issues at hand and that we were 
working together."196 This memorandum was seen by 
Hamilton Jordan who sent it to the President, "FYI".197 
The President returned it to Moore and wrote on it, "Good - 
Use them (the Cabinet) strongly when necessary."19® 
During the second week of October Carter wrote letters 
of appreciation to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee for 
the Department of Education, thanking them for the DOE 
legislation, that, "... has been one of the top priorities 
of my Administration."199 
On October 15, The White House scheduled a reception 
at the White House for the American Federation of Teachers 
and its President Albert Shanker for later in the month. 
Said Carter's labor aide Landon Butler to Appointments 
Secretary Phil Wise, "Shanker readily acknowledges that 
the Carter Administration is excellent on most education 
issues, and, further, he is a hard-liner on foreign policy 
and human rights questions."290 
On October 17, 1979, in the Rose Garden of the White 
House, Jimmy Carter signed into law the new Department of 
Education. Thanking "Jack Brooks, who has worked so hard 
in the House ... and ... Abe Ribicoff who made it look 
easy in the Senate -',201 Carter said, "I remain 
convinced that education is one of the noblest enterprises 
a person - or a society - can undertake 
,,202 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis of Executive Branch Public Policy 1977-1979 
The establishment of a Department of Education is 
a portrayal of the exercise of public policy in the 
Executive Branch of the Federal Government during the 
period 1977-1979. Specifically it is a demonstration of 
the style of leadership as exercised by President Jimmy 
Carter during this time. 
The chronology of events relates what happened and 
when; but it is also important to gain understanding of 
the functions of the Carter White House and to see this 
process through the eyes of some of the major 
participants. 
Former White House aide Les Francis said the 
difficulty with public policy in the Carter White House 
was that the President was always "... trying consciously 
to depoliticize the governing process ...”1 He said 
2 Carter "... was logical and not political ..." 
In a confidential memorandum to Carter on the State 
of his Presidency in mid-1978, pollster and advisor Pat 
Caddell wrote that the White House structure as it 
existed "... results in relatively isolated units 
initiating projects and efforts in a vacuum without 
reference to any larger context or greater goals. 
Priorities disintegrate, substantive efforts emerge which 
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are confusing and often contradictory, and political and 
substantive needs are totally separated until they finally 
clash to the detriment of both areas ... This administra¬ 
tion suffers because policy people have no political sense 
and many of the political people have no interest in the 
substantive issues ... The idea in this White House that 
substance and politics ... can be divorced ... leads to 
disaster. Politics without substance is empty and policy 
without politics is irrelevant."3 
Carter, said aide Anne Wexler, wanted to be the "... 
hub of a wheel - a fine concept but it didn't work."4 
Added former Vice President Mondale, the lack of structure 
caused "... pandemonium ... (he) told the Cabinet that 
they don't take orders from the White House staff ... they 
don't speak for me. The result was if you wanted to be 
free - you were free ... any argument that you made that 
an issue was politically good assaulted his Baptist faith 
» .. It was a politicians hell." Asserted President 
Carter himself, "There was a concern from my own sub¬ 
ordinates that we were overloading (the Congress). That 
was the case quite often - Hamilton, Jody, Frank, Rosalyn 
were much more sensitive to political questions that I 
Former OMB Director Jim McIntyre observed, "This 
guy (Carter) was a tough son of a bitch ... (but) because 
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the way the public policy was being made, it made him look 
weak."7 
Concluded Stu Eizenstat, the creation of the DOE was 
in public policy an "... example of (a) heavily 
politically driven decision. (The) President had a lack 
of policy enthusiasm and his ultimate decision to recom¬ 
mend (a DOE) was largely driven by the emphasis the (White 
House) staff gave to his political promise (to the NEA)."8 
Is it therefore accurate to say, that Jimmy Carter 
"... pushed for and got a separate Department of Education 
because he pledged to do so in order to win the support of 
the National Education Association."8 The President 
stated that a DOE becoming law was for him "... never (in) 
any doubt ... it was a matter of when . .."18 Carter also 
said that he historically favored the "... elevation of 
educations status (and his endorsement of a DOE cannot be 
isolated) ... on a spur of the moment (promise) to get 
(the NEA) endorsement."11 However, Stu Eizenstat suggests 
that although Carter "... felt education (was) subsumed 
within HEW" ... that without NEA's insistence (a DOE) 
perhaps would have been a suggestion - not a promise 
(because) it was at odds with the general thrust (of a 
12 
reduced bureaucracy)." 
The Presidential observer, Richard Neustadt, feels 
"viability in policy has three ingredients. First is a 
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purpose that moves with the grain of history, a direction 
consonant with coming needs. Second is an operation that 
proves manageable to the men who must administer it, 
acceptable to those who must support it, tolerable to 
those who must put up with it, in Washington and out. 
Timing can be crucial for support and acquiescence; proper 
timing is the third ingredient. The President who sees 
his power stakes sees something very much like the 
• • • • 1 ^ ingredients that make for viability m policy.' 
Neustadt also wrote that "Deciding what is viable has 
grown more critical and more complex with almost every 
turn of the world events ... (and that) substantive 
appraisals have become so tricky that specialists in 
every sphere dispute among themselves ... the viability 
of policy may be the only ground on which a_ substantive 
decision can be made. 
It seems clear Carter endorsed for political 
realities a Department of Education not to his choosing 
but the only one he could get viable support for. He 
did not substantively commit to the project but rather 
instructed his staff and Vice President Mondale to work 
with Congress and the education coalitions to see it 
accomplished. His original hopes for a broader DOE were 
not attainable and he wished to remain a President "... 
intent on husbanding his influence ... It however 
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allowed a perception that the decision-making process was 
confused and it is obvious from the chronology of events 
that Pat Gwaltney's feeling that the process became a 
"... morass ... a horribly painful (process)was 
accurate. Carter was "not engaged ... (but rather) 
authorized an attempt to get it done (a DOE) ... he was 
(Carter) totally consistent in what he said but (his) deci- 
• 1 7 
sions were counter to everyones advice substantively." 
The President allowed the DOE legislation "... to 
I O 
take on a life of its own . ..", while he personally 
focused on other priorities. He was able to gather 
consensus, closer to his own thoughts, for issues such 
as the Panama Canal Treaties, the Camp David Middle East 
Peace Accords, SALT negotiations, and energy policies for 
example. Jimmy Carter simply did not want to expend 
energy in a way he didn't like anyway to get votes for 
something he thought everyone should be for in the first 
place. As Anne Wexler 
he had to."^ 
said "He couldn't understand why 
It is easy to say that Carter gave the NEA the DOE he 
promised them. It seems however that he rather allowed 
for political realities, a DOE to come into being; not so 
much for what the NEA had done (1976 elections) but what 
they could do in the future (1980 elections). It was an 
exercise in Presidential Power. 
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Let us look at how Carter structured the Executive 
Branch. The White House staff, the Cabinet, and the Vice 
Presidency were all orchestrated by President Carter in 
line with his style of leadership. 
The Staff 
The President organized the White House staff to 
reflect his thoughts just after receiving the Democratic 
nomination for President in July, 1976. He said then that 
he wanted to institute "... a staff with free access to me 
and encouragement of an almost unrestricted debate within 
the White House circles. I think we had this while I was 
governor", Carter said, "I guess there were 200 people in 
the Georgia government who had unimpeded access to me, 
through memoranda or personally."^ Said Carter about 
his staff after his Presidency, "All changes in the basic 
staff were made by me. Same as in the Governor's office. 
I wanted 5, 6, or 7 people to report to me. Hamilton 
(Jordan) was a desirable Chief of Staff because he doesn't 
try to carve away from others but he didn't want to be a 
Boss. I was reluctant because Hamilton was too." The 
result of open access and no Chief of Staff led to a 
situation characterized by 0MB Director McIntyre where 
"Lines of authority were blurred. You never knew how much 
authority you had. No decision was ever final (and there 
was) no one there to relieve him (Carter) of making every 
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decision. It was different in Georgia. Bert (Lance) was 
the one who got things done for Carter with the State 
Legislature - Bert and Charlie Kirbo. I (McIntyre) was 
financial, Jordan was running him for President."22 
Added Stu Eizenstat, "The problem from the outset was 
that I increasingly found it necessary to give political 
advice because the political side was so uninvolved in 
policy or governance."23 Concurred Jack Watson, "We 
had a void in terms of coordinating policy development and 
interacting with Congress ... (the political people) were 
disinterested and detached from the politics of governance 
and of policy."2^ Said Anne Wexler, "It was just one of 
those situations. It was an unturf conscious staff - no 
murderous turf fights - but when I came (April 1978) there 
was terrible disarray. My job was to pull together issues 
and merge them with policy, press, what did Congress want, 
i 2 5 
who were constituencies ...". 
The staff therefore under Carter, regardless of 
capacity, talent, experience (or lack thereof) were bound 
together in a system that was purposefully leaderless and 
resulting in what Jim McIntyre called "... a rudderless 
aspect . . . the President should have said to the staff 
"look your here for a reason - work these issues out ... 
I am going to give this to you and this to you and it if 
fails you suffer the consequences'." 
26 Concluded Pat 
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Gwaltney, there was no "... national decision making 
9 7 process . . . " . 
There is a dominant attitude that among the staff 
that things would have been different if Bert Lance had 
been made Chief of Staff or at least could have remained 
at OMB. Said Jerry Rafshoon "He was the only one who 
transcended his job in relation to the President." 
The Cabinet 
President Carter's attitude on his Cabinet members 
before his election was to have "... an inclination to 
go toward a new generation of leaders ... (with a) strong 
• • n 2 9 
emphasis on executive management ability. In answer 
to the question of would he desire a high degree of 
independence among his Cabinet members, Carter said 
"yes ... I can't imagine a basic strategic difference 
developing between myself and one of my Cabinet members 
if the understanding were that we worked toward the long- 
range goals. 
Carter chose Joseph Califano for HEW because his 
Press Secretary Jody Powell suggests the President was 
"... basically interested in Welfare Reform and wanted a 
131 
savvy inside player who could put package together. 
It is clear from the chronological study that 
Califano was relentless in his pursuit of what he believed 
in this case a strengthened education division within HEW 
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and not a separate Department. There is no one who will 
suggest that Carter made his desire for a DOE part of 
s job description although his "position was 
hardly a secret."32 Said Beth Abramowitz, "Joe's 
(Califano) not crazy. He pursued his line of opposition 
from day 1 to day end. I can't believe he would do so 
without thinking there was some Presidential support."33 
Said McIntyre, "Califano's disloyalty was after the 
decision was made (November 1977) for a separate DOE. 
Until then he dealt in good faith."34 Said Mondale, 
"Joe's very bright - well read - no way he couldn't have 
known that Mondale and Carter weren't committed to 
creation of a Department of Education. Plus we made up a 
book and distributed to all Cabinet Secretaries right at 
the beginning a list of Campaign promises in their 
field."3' The President suggested he did not specifically 
tell Califano about the DOE during the transition. Said 
Carter, "I have no recollection of making any pronounce¬ 
ments. Califano was aware of commitment. He never 
exhibited any enthusiasm. He didn't do anything openly 
but no doubt he was working behind the scenes. Several 
times I told Califano personally to support the DOE. It 
was a betrayal of trust and loyalty. It was never a pro¬ 
forma commitment by me for a DOE (I) never misled Califano 
3 6 
or eauivocated on it." Adds Anne Wexler, ... the 
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political people felt Califano ... was in business for 
himself ... was conducting his own government,11 ^ 
The Vice-President 
President Carter suggests that while a DOE was 
a priority for him, Fritz (Mondale) would know much more 
about this than anyone else. Abramowitz said it was 
Mondale "who worked to keep (a DOE) alive,"39 and Gwaltney 
adds that Mondale "really worked it."40 Terry Straub who 
headed the Task Force that ensured DOE passage says 
Mondale "... was a trooper ... it was Mondale every step 
of the way."41 
Said Greg Humphrey, the lobbyist for the American 
Federation of Teachers (AFT), "it was plainly Mondale's 
A 0 
doing (passage of a DOE by Congress)." 
Said Mondale, "The DOE was central for me but when 
you get into office in the White House the whole world is 
dumped on you, everything is fighting for attention ... a 
little inertia, some uncertainty from the oval office and 
an issue gets stalled out ... I went to Stu and Ham and 
said, God Dammit we have a commitment to the largest 
professional organization in America and we're going to 
Welsh and we'll pay for this double-cross. It's a good 
idea and we need to underscore our commitments."43 
Continued Mondale, "if Carter had doubts on a DOE he 
didn't express them to me ... (He) was mostly trying to 
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decide what kind of "animal" it was. In 1979 we were 
losing politically - Kennedy was jumping us - we needed 
friends - I think that got working in Carter's head - NEA 
was probably threatening. To me they became chilly and 
angry. It was embarrassing to them. Not delivered on 
what we freely promised. But ... politically wasn't where 
I was coming from - I really believed in a DOE - in 1979 
for whatever reason, Carter got personally behind it, it 
got on track, signals were getting out to the Hill, Ducks 
were all in a row ... it became a policy objective, Hill 
was energized, NEA moving and old Mondale was sending the 
signal 'get it done'" 
The Congress 
The DOE legislation never had overwhelming obstacles 
to face in the Senate. Sponsorship by Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff who was joined by bipartisan coalition made it a 
relatively smooth process. 
The House however was much more complicated. 
Representative Jack Brooks (D-Texas), the supportive 
Chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, 
said "O'Neill (The Speaker of the House) didn't like him 
(Carter) - he wasn't his kind of guy - he didn't help 
Carter .. . he didn't go up to the White House and lay it 
..45 
out for him. 
Compounding this was Mondale's assessment that Carter 
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hated to lobby ... didn't want to be asked back (for a 
favor) ... in the mechanics of legislative work, he didn't 
like the reciprocal nature ... he liked to tell you 
what he wanted and hang-up."46 Continued Mondale, 
"Its an equal sharing of power between co-equal 
partners. Pennsylvania Avenue is a two-way street. The 
Congressional Liaison staff in the White House (Frank 
Moore) was better than public reputation ... he was a 
buffer for Carter - a heat shield."47 
The difficulty with the DOE according to former 
Ribicoff aide Bob Heffernan was that "... the very problem 
was the Speaker ... O'Neill was playing both sides of the 
fence, helping the President by bringing the bill up, 
helping the AFL-CIO and Catholic Church by allowing their 
strategy to take hold. He would sit back and see how it 
48 
went; he liked being on the winning side." 
Said Jack Brooks, who carried the legislation, "Look, 
the Speaker knew I was independent ... that I'd fight him 
on the floor. Hey look ... I wasn't hired out (Chairman 
it 4 9 
of Government Operations) to be a dumb bastard. 
Concluded President Carter, "The leadership never 
gave any real support (for a DOE). They never said, Mr. 
President this is our baby, we'll take it - It was a hot 
potatoe, not beneficial politically, so they played it 
cool, and as I recollect we had to get the votes 1 by 1 
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until we got a majority.""^ 
Said Brooks, Everybody worked, the education groups, 
Mondale ... we made decisions on what baggage we had to 
lose ... set it up, made the deals, never cried, never 
complained." x 
Before becoming President, Jimmy Carter stated 
that "... there's no other source of leadership of a 
comprehensive nature than the President. In the absence 
of that leadership, there is no leadership.The 
difficulty Carter had with leadership often resulted from 
the perception of confused signals. A principal cause 
of this was his insistence that as an "... engineer by 
training and in the way he approached problems, ... (he) 
was uncomfortable making decisions without a thorough 
knowledge and understanding of all the details in¬ 
volved."53 In the case of the creation of a Department 
of Education the disagreements between the White House 
and Secretary Califano grew to such proportion as to 
negate the ability for a unified policy to be believed by 
the media, interest groups and the Congress. What they 
all saw as confusion was in reality the openness of an 
Administration truly struggling with the details of a 
policy. 
Said Jim McIntyre, the DOE was "... a typical case 
of the Carter Administration was 
study in the deficiency 
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what Carter exhibited in this effort. He agreed with OMB 
(against a narrow DOE that was politically viable) but 
Mondale and Eizenstat represented ... political arguments 
and Carter made a schizophrenic decision ... . 
"On the merits (Carter) had severe reservations but 
he finally delegated authority to OMB to carry it out 
with Mondale as the political person."54 
It has been said that the Presidency "... like all 
offices of government, is only a paper institution until 
the political process supplies the personality which 
brings it to life. After a short period of time in 
office Carter found that "... the promised harmony (of 
his election) did not ensue, partly because the Democratic 
Party is in many ways several parties in one . . . (and) 
that Carter (was) an activist who wanted to achieve 
countless comprehensive policy and process changes, but 
he had no mandate to do so from either the 1976 or 1978 
elections ... (but) by the middle of his third year in 
office (1979), Carter began to acknowledge some of his 
personal inadequacies as a politician "... (and) time and 
again tried to offer a sense of direction."56 Said Jim 
McIntyre, "I think the world of Carter. Honest, decent 
guy. He had the bully pulpit ... but because of the way 
public policy was being made it made him look weak. He 
tough and he believed in doing what was right on was 
244 
the tough substantive decisions."57 The Department of 
Education in its final form was not the legislation the 
President had wanted, but the administration was finally 
organized for an all out effort based on political 
realities. It is said that the "desire to retain an 
office or to seek personal glory are hardly the worst sins 
of a public official."58 The final decision on the DOE 
public policy laid with Stu Eizenstat. He said he felt 
a personal imperative as Carters' policy advisor in the 
1976 Campaign who had worked with the NEA - drafted our 
position - gotten then Gov. Carter to agree to it - I felt 
my own and his personal credibility was on the line and 
absent overwhelming reasons to change, although not bound 
in concrete on what we promised, the way was so clear and 
CQ 
nothing supervening; had changed it. 
To conclude, it is stated that "like individuals, 
governments are limited by scarce resources and by the 
inability to do everything at once. So policymaking means 
that governments (and Presidents) must make choices - to 
do one thing rather than another or to do a little of this 
and lot of that."68 Carter with the concept of a 
Department of Education wanted a policy of a "lot of that" 
but eventually settled for "a little of this." 
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Appendix A 
1. A Cabinet-level Department of Education (DOE), in 
itself, would increase the visibility of educational 
issues to the President, Conqress and the public. 
Similarly, Cabinet status would be a symbol and 
recognition of the importance of educational problems 
and the existing and future national commitment to 
their resolution. 
2. Separation of education functions from HEW would 
free the education budget from dominance by both the 
large uncontrollable costs of many health and welfare 
programs and the apparent urgency of many health and 
welfare problems. 
3. Education receives insufficient attention from 
the Secretary of HEW and his key staff because 
education is but one of numerous problem areas with 
which the Secretary must deal. Moreover, because 
the Administration's educational policies are made 
by the Secretary of HEW, the relative urgency and 
significance of educational needs are not clearly 
stated, and may be "traded-off" against health and 
welfare issues. 
4. • HEW is so large and programmatically diverse 
that the Secretary and his staff cannot, even when 
they seek to do so, effectively comprehend, inter¬ 
relate, and manage educational programs. 
5. The budgetary and policy processes, especially 
the latter, within HEW put education policy direction 
in the hands of the Secretary and his staff, thus 
undermining the status and authority of the Assistant 
Secretary for Education and the Commissioner. This, 
in turn, contributes to the fragmentation of 
educational policy and makes it difficult for 
education interests to know whom to hold accountable 
and to whom they can and should express their 
concerns. 
6. A Cabinet-level Department of Education would 
facilitate the recruitment of more competent and 
nationally recognized persons to the top positions o 
educational leadership in the administration, there y 
enhancing the likelihood that educational policies 
would be more effectively developed and represented. 
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7. A Cabinet-level Department would facilitate 
consolidation of existing Federal programs related 
to education because (a) it would alleviate some 
concerns among candidates for consolidation that 
their needs would be subverted to health and welfare 
priorities and (b) administrative problems now 
traceable to the size and diversity of HEW would not 
be exacerbated. 
8. A Cabinet-level Department would provide a 
better basis than the existing structure for the 
development of new directions and the successful 
implementation of new programs because of (a) the 
increased visibility of educational leadership, (b) 
the removal of education from direct competition with 
other important policy initiatives, (c) the increased 
vulnerability to top leadership of existing bureau¬ 
cratic impediments to change within the Division of 
Education and (d) the short-run enthusiasm and energy 
that would be generated within the educational 
"community" and certain segments of the Federal 
bureaucracy. 
9. A place in the President's Cabinet would enhance 
the capacity of the nation's chief education officer 
to foster the coordination of education-related 
activities. 
Appendix B 
1* Broadly defined departments reduce the number of 
key policy makers and advisors who have direct access 
to the President and, correspondingly, reduce the 
number of issues that surface at the Presidential 
level. 
2. Establishment of a Department of Education might 
lead to a further proliferation of Cabinet depart¬ 
ments (e.g.. Health, Social Security, Environment, 
etc.) and thus reduce the utility of the Cabinet as 
either an access point or an advisory body to the 
President. This fragmentation would, in turn, 
enhance the influence of the Congress over domestic 
policy at the expense of Presidential direction. 
3. Education is an area of relative program 
stability. It thus demands less attention than some 
other issues, such as energy, at this time. 
4. A Department of Education would imply either or 
both (a) a substantially greater involvement (some 
would say, intrusion) of the Federal Government in 
what should continue to be primarily a state and 
local responsibility and (b) a readiness on the part 
of the administration to undertake important and 
perhaps costly new initiatives to solve educational 
problems. 
5. A Department of Education - because of (a) the 
heavy involvement of the Office of Education in 
elementary and secondary education and (b) the 
interests of the most politically powerful segments 
of the education lobby - might be dominated by people 
with primary interests in elementary and secondary 
education. In this sense, a Department of Education 
would contribute to an imbalance in Federal 
education policy and would be less responsive to the 
broad range of educational issues and constituencies 
than the present structure. 
6. The HEW structure provides a mechanism for co¬ 
ordinating and integrating programs that stretch 
across some of the most important and interrelated 
fields of human services policy. This not only 
fosters more coherent policies, but enhances the 
possibilities of budgetary control over these issues 
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areas by the President. 
7. The breakup of HEW would be disruptive in the 
short run, not only to those with responsibilities 
for educational policies, but for the entire 
Department. 
8. A new Department of Education would increase 
administrative costs and the needs for personnel with 
special and not easily recruited talents because much 
of the HEW staff at the secretarial level (serving 
all HEW agencies) would have to be duplicated in a 
new Department (e.g., to perform the functions of 
legislative liaison, general counsel, comptroller, 
etc. ) 
9. Maintenance of HEW would make it easier to move 
toward a government-wide consolidation of major 
programs if that is one outcome of the President's 
Reorganization Project. 
10. The strengthening of the Division of Education, 
especially in the form of a subcabinet Department of 
Education, would not preclude separating the 
education function from HEW in the future. Such a 
move would be incremental and, perhaps, transitional. 
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Natural Resources 
We foresee the need for these three vehicles: 
1* October 1977—One reorganization plan 
combining National Technical Information Service 
(Commerce) with Smithsonian Scientific Informa¬ 
tion Exchange. 
2. May 1978—One legislative proposal 
(possibly a reorganization plan) to implement 
Natural Resources and Environment 
recommendations. 
3. April May 1978—One reorganization plan 
addressing science and technology (e.g., NSF, 
NASA, NBS). 
Human Resources 
Pat Gwaltney reports: 
1. Early September 1977—ERISA reorganization 
plan. 
2. May 1978—Legislative proposal and at least 
one (possibly three) reorganization plan on 
Human Services earlier or later than May 1978. 
3. January 1978—Possible legislation on 
education or reorganization plan, depending on 
Presidential decision. Could be as early as 
October. 
National Security and International Affairs 
Bill Jones and Eric Hirschorn report: 
1. September 1977—USIA and cultural affairs 
reorganization plan. 
2. Mid-September 1977—NSC will propose 
executive order on Classification Management. 
3. November ( ? ) 1977 —Intelligence—reorcaniza- 
tion plan or legislation. 
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4* April 1978—Peace Corps—plan or 
legislation. 
General Government 
Tread Davis foresees: 
1* October 1977—One reorganization plan 
on Border Management. 
2. February-April 1978—One reorganization 
plan on National Institute of Justice. 
3. March-May 1978—One reorganization plan on 
Law Enforcement—comprehensive. 
\ 
4. June-August 1978—One reorganization plan 
on (Government) Legal Representation. 
5. Jan-June 1978—Possibly three reorganiza¬ 
tion plans addressing small agencies. 
6. Administrative Services—Davis suggests 
this come from Granquist. 
Civil Rights 
Howard Glickstein projects: 
1. November 1977—Executive order on 
employment. 
2. January 1978—Reorganization plan on 
employment. 
3. March 1978—Executive order on federally- 
assisted programs. 
4. March 1978—Legislative proposal on 
federally-assisted programs. 
5. March 1978—Presidential memorandum or OMB 
circular on education. 
6. April 1978—Legislative proposal on fair 
housing. 
7. May 1978—Reorganization plan or 
legislation (at PRP option, makes little 
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difference) on community relation service. 
8. June 1978--Other civil rights areas, 
probably through Presidential memorandum rather 
than reorg. plan, executive order, or 
legislation. 
Economic Development 
Unable to reach Salamon; got this from assorted 
staff: 
1. June 1978—Reorganization plan on Food 
Policy. 
2. March 1978—Legislative Proposal on Local 
and Community Economic Development. 
3. June 1978—Reorganization Plan on Economic 
Policymaking. 
4. April May 1978—OSHA legislative proposal 
and executive orders, probably not a reorganiza- 
tional plan. 
Appendix D 
Lady Bird Johnson 
Prominent Republicans (Melvin Laird, William 
Scranton, Hugh Scott, Peter Petersen, John 
Sherman Cooper, Jack Marsh). 
Leaders of key business groups (Irvin Shapiro, 
Businsss Roundtable; John DeButts, Business 
Council; Dick Lesher, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
Retired Military (two former Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer, General 
Maxwell Taylor, former Chief of Naval Operations 
Elmo Zumwalt, Admiral Rickover. 
Chief Executive Officers of 17 multinational 
corporations doing business in Latin America. 
George Meany, Lane Kirkland and three union 
Presidents (Glenn Watts, C.W.A.; Mary Ward, 
Plumbers, John Lyons, Iron workers. 
Vernon Jordan, Ben Hooks 
Three University Presidents 
Governor Bill Millikin, Mayor Moon Landrieu, 
Averell Harriman and others. 
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Appendix E 
1• A 1 Narrowly Based Department of Education 
Advantages 
• Provides full-time Cabinet—level leadership to 
education and thus increases the likelihood 
that educational issues will become more 
visible and comprehensible to the public, the 
Congress and the President. 
. Responds to your campaign pledge to establish a 
new Department. 
. Satisfies, more indirectly than does any other 
option, the demands of many of the largest 
groups representing elementary and secondary 
education, particularly the NEA. 
. Allows the Secretary of "Health and Welfare" to 
focus somewhat more on policy development and 
coordination of health, income security and 
human development services programs. 
Disadvantages 
. Creates the environment in which (a) present 
educational policies and practices are least 
likely to be questioned, (b) linkages between 
education and other human development services 
are least likely to considered, and (c) incen¬ 
tives for fostering fundamental changes in 
education are lowest. 
. Increases the number of Cabinet-level 
departments and raises expectations of other 
constituencies (e.g., health and environmental 
interests) that constituency-based departments 
are an appropriate direction for reorganiza¬ 
tion to take. 
. Is opposed (though no intensely) by most higher 
education and child advocacy groups, by labor, 
and by some business and civil rights groups. 
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. Reduces opportunities for coordination with 
education-related and social service programs 
outside the Department of Education. 
. Increases the number of issues that would have 
to be resolved at the Presidential level, 
especially those related to demands for sub¬ 
stantially increased funding for existina 
education programs and for general aid to 
public schools. 
2. A Broadly Based Department Including Education and 
Other Human Development Activities 
Advantages 
Improves opportunities for greater coordination 
among education and other human development 
services programs with respect to both policy 
and program implementation. 
Encompasses a broad range of approaches to 
service delivery and of professional and client 
constituencies. Would encourage rethinking of 
current priorities, facilitate interprogram 
comparisons, and promote more flexible and 
comprehensive approaches to meeting educational 
and closely related human needs. 
Permits greater emphasis on preschool, post¬ 
secondary, lifelong and nonschool learning. 
Simplifies the tasks of management and policy 
leadership with respect to both education and 
human development programs on the one hand, 
and those DHEW programs (primarily income 
security and health financing) not included in 
the new department on the other. 
Increases relative to the present situation, 
the visibility of education and social services 
issues . 
Responds more directly than any other 
alternative to your campaign pledge to create 
a new department which "would consolidate the 
grant programs, job training, early childhood 
education, literacy training, and many other 
functions scattered throughout the government. 
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Disadvantaaes 
. Would generate little political backing and 
much opposition at this time. Support for 
this proposal could not be expected until 
after extensive consultations with Members of 
Congress and interest groups and the develop¬ 
ment of a detailed proposal reflecting their 
concerns. Even then, strong opposition can be 
expected from some groups (e.g., organized 
labor) if their programs (e.g., training) were 
included. 
. Results in realignment and temporary disrup¬ 
tion of the greatest number of agencies and 
programs. 
. Reduces the likelihood of effective linkages 
with income assistance and health financing 
programs that are now possible through DHEW. 
. Expands the number of Cabinet departments and 
increases the number of education and social 
service issues likely to come before the 
President (unless some independent agencies 
are consolidated within this new department) . 
3. A Strengthened Education Division within DHEW 
Advantages 
. Enhances the capacity of the Education Division 
through overdue and clearly workable management 
improvements. 
. Maintains the opportunity to coordinate 
education with health, income and social 
service programs within DHEW. (Many of the 
central components of a broadly based 
department are now part of DHEW). 
Avoids increasing the number of agencies that 
report directly to the President, and 
encourages priority setting between major 
functions at the department level. 




. Disappoints and antagonizes the NEA and other 
elementary and secondary education groups that 
strongly support Cabinet—level status for 
education. 
. Retains within one department the substantial 
diversity of programs that now place heavy co¬ 
ordination and policy development demands on 
the Secretary of DHEV7. 
. reduces the likelihood of cross-division 
reorganization within DHEW (e.g., consolidating 
education and human development services) if 
the status and authority of the chief education 



























Fred Bohen (HEW) 
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Appendix G 
February 6, 1978 
Outline for a Political Strategy 
for Establishing a Department of Education 
This paper outlines a broad strategy for managing the 
politics of establishing the proposed Department of 
Education. The strategy suggests a three-part, seauential 
process: 
1. Interest group conversations. 
2. Highly focused congressional consultations. 
3. Timely presidential leadership. 
Three action-forcing events provide opportunities for 
momentum and substantive guidance: 
1. The President's Education Message, scheduled for late 
February. 
2. A possible Mondale-Mclntyre-Califano news conference 
on the initiative, tentatively set for February. 
3. The hearings by Senator Ribicoff on his bill to 
create a department, scheduled for mid-March. 
The strategy is based on several major premises, and seeks 
to rectify the problems they imply: 
1. The President's and Vice President's strong personal 
convictions on this initiative assure that it can 
receive top-level leadership. 
2. The Administration's position in favor of the depart¬ 
ment mav be seen by many as a political response to 
the NEA for its campaign support, and not as an 
initiative advanced primarily because of its merits. 
3. Some will think that Administration support for the 
department is divided. 
4. Legislation creating a department should be enacted 
this vear, but reluctance to deal with controversy 
before elections, this year's short session, and 
other major issues before the Congress (e.g., Panama, 
energy, taxes) compound possible congressional 




5. Most congressional interest in establishing a new 
department is centered in the Senate, and little 
enthusiasm now exists in the House. 
6. Congressional momentum, particularly in the House, 
to create a new department will be prompted pri¬ 
marily by the activity and support of organized 
interest groups. 
7. The education interest groups will not oppose includ¬ 
ing most programs which could become part of the 
department, as long as they feel a proposal is not 
too controversial, and will thereby endanger the 
entire initiative. Higher education groups will 
continue to remain aloof from the issue. 
'he following strategy is based on these assumptions. The 
;trategy is oriented toward Congress and the constituent 
frouDsI If interest group support is critical to congres¬ 
sional action on this initiative, the key interest groups 
^st be actively involved in shaping and supporting the de¬ 
partment. Active opposition from certain interest groups 
/ould create sufficient controversy to delay any action 
intil after the upcoming elections (assuming that no Member 
pf Conaress desires to alienate these groups in an election 
/ear) / Finally, many of the interest groups m this area 
Uve strong ties to the Democratic Party, and any disagree 
nent among them may lead to disputes among Democrats tnat 
nany wish to avoid. 
Us noted, this strategy is intended to achieve the enactment 
of legislation to create the department by the 
Ls.- 
1980 will undercut some support an act^on is formulated 
tive. Third, unless a direct pi i caiiing for the 
and pursued, the President s^gooc faith m call g 
department will be questioned. 
The strategy's sequential nature ihe^nterest^roups into 
carefully developed suppor will feel comfortable 
S/Sl^thfdeLi^nt- 
as'a'pre-election""winner?" %he sequential steps include: 
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o Winning the Interest Groups 
The major political effort should be directed at winning 
the active and enthusiastic support of appropriate interest 
groups. This effort should be viewed as a "snowball" ap¬ 
proach, in which we carefully nurture various clusters 
^■L interest groups so that they will support the inclusion 
of "their" programs in the new department. This will, in 
turn, both stimulate other groups to join the department, 
and encourage the groups to promote the proposal with their 
congressional counterparts. 
{!) First Round of Consultations 
Interest groups in the following clusters should be 




. Child Nutrition 
. Children 
. Science 
. Arts and Humanities 
. Labor 
During these contacts the comparative advantages of 
including programs in these areas in the new depart¬ 
ment should be discussed thoroughly. Each discussion 
should explore a specific theme which project stafi 
believe might characterize the department. The theme 
most appropriate for each group should be discussed, 
e.g., education and social■services with the handi¬ 
capped groups, education and science with the researcn 
qroups, .though other themes under consideration shou_c 
also be discussed. The ultimate thrust or these 
consultations should be to determine whether there is 
support for transferring certain clusters or programs 
to the department. 
(2) Second Round of Consultations 
Once these sessions are completed, similar discussions 
should be held with organizations representing Sta- 
and local officials, the civil rights community, an. 
education groups that have expressed reserva 
about a new department. The primary purpo 
discussions should be to determine ^h^her they s J 
port transfers of programs clusterea around themes 
the first round of consultees prererrea. 
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These two rounds of consultations should provide a 
roster of programs that major interest groups would 
generally support for inclusion in the new deDart- 
ment. The broad themes for a department should also 
have emerged. 
(3) Third Round of Consultations 
This "roster" and the theme (s) should be discussed in 
a third round of consultations with other education 
interest groups. This should provide a consensus 
on the outlines of a new department. The consensus 
would provide the agenda for detailed congressional 
consultations. 
A tentative list of key interest groups that should be consul¬ 
ted during this process is attached as Tab 1. 
o Hichlv Focused Congressional Consultations 
Rather than conducting a wide range of congressional con¬ 
sultations, this strategy proposes a highly focused effort. 
Many congressional contacts would begin after the interest 
group process outlined above is started. This effort 
would concentrate on three distinct sets of Congressmen: 
(1) Kev congressional leaders, including Senators Ribi- 
coff. Pell, Williams and Byrd, and Representatives 
Perkins, Braaemas, Ford, Brooks and O'Neill. These 
members should be involved at the beginning ot the 
process to be briefed on the strategy and to solicn 
their views on programs that should be located in 
the department. They would be consulted ag<=.in 
after the three-round process described above. 
(2) Subcommittee chairmen and ranking minority members 
who have jurisdiction over procrams includes in tne 
aareed-uoon transfer clusters. Their support win _ 
be critical. The consultation becomes highly focusec 
chairmen of committees with jurisdiction over programs 
that are verv unlikely candidates for inclusion won 
not be called on. If the premise that Members will re 
soond primarily to the desires or the appropriate n 
terest groups is correct, then no realisric tran., - 
opportunities will be missed. Time will ce savea, 




By cascading the consultation in this manner, the dis¬ 
cussions with congressional leaders can begin with the 
assurance that the relevant interest groups support 
the proposal being discussed. This will provide some 
initial positive support and interest. When confirmed 
later with the groups by the Member, it may build con¬ 
fidence in the Administration's competence in handling 
this issue. 
(3) Members of the Governmental Affairs and Government 
Operations Committees likely to have an interest and 
to support this initiative. 
Charts identifying congressional members who will probably need 
to be consulted are attached as Tab 2. 
o Timely Presidential Leadership 
After this "snowball" consultation process, the President 
should become involved publicly. He would be able to enun¬ 
ciate the broad theme (s) that should characterize the educa¬ 
tion department and announce his support for a detailed 
oroDosal, perhaps as part of the education message which 
is scheduled for late February. 
The possible Mondale-Mclntyre-Califano news conference.could 
follow this statement and elaborate on the Administration's 
position. 
This aoproach would provide an opportunity for the President 
to take a public leadership role on the issue before the^ 
Ribicoff hearings. It would become his initiative. At the 
same time, the consultations process outlined above will^ _ 
protect him from supporting a proposal that cannot pass c.na 
demonstrate good management of the issue. If this.approac. 
is followed,"the President could refer positively in a pu~ 
lie forum to the congressional leaders who are supporting 
the proposal. This would enhance efforts_to motivate them 
to obtain enactment of the legislation this year. 
Several tactical objectives_should characterize this three-part 
sequential strategy. They include. 




Ribicoff can be counted on 
A comparable House advoca 
sional consultation process 
to steer a bill in the 
te is needed and the 




focus on identifying such an advocate (s). Administration 
spokespeople should be careful not to overplay the Senate's 
role at the risk of slighting potential House allies who 
might feel they are receiving second-rate treatment. 
Special emphasis should be placed on getting the House to 
begin consideration of a bill at the same time the Ribi- 
coff hearings begin in March. If this is not done and 
the House waits for Senate action on a bill, the year's 
short session will probably preclude enactment this year. 
House action will be complicated by the fears of some 
senior Members that establishment of a new department 
will split the Education and Labor Committee into two 
committees. Consideration should be given to discuss¬ 
ing with Speaker O'Neill ways this concern can be 
alleviated. 
o * Utilizing "Good Government" Spokespeople 
Individuals who are viewed as "good government" people 
should be used in order to downplay speculation that the 
Administration's position is soley a political response 
to the NEA. Several senior people who fit this description 
especially well and who can legitimately represent the Ad¬ 
ministration on this issue include Jim McIntyre and Scotty 
Campbell. Mrs. Carter might also become involved. She 
could emphasize her "cities in schools" themes if a cluster 
of youth programs is proposed to become part of the department. 
Respected and well known opinion leaders outside government, 
such as Doc Howe and Clark Kerr, should also be asked to 
helo promote establishing the departments. It might be 
possible to involve several former HEW Secretaries as well. 
With this involvement, the character of the Administration s 
suDDort for the new department could focus on good govern¬ 
ment" themes — 
ResDonsiveness, by breaking up a department tha^ is too 
large. 
Coordination of the Federal government's education 
activities. 
Prioritv-setting for an area important to all Americans 
Foresight, by creating an administrative environment 
that will be able to respond to emerging neecs ana 




“Early and Continued Involvement of Affected Cabinet 
Officers " -  
It is important that the Administration present a united 
front on this initiative in order to minimize interest 
group and congressional opposition to the proposal. Next 
■wee.<, the President should write to Cabinet officers and 
agency heads who might be affected by the initiative to 
remind them of his decision, explain briefly his reasons 
for making it, and request their cooperation and staff 
resources. This should be followed by consultation with 
the affected oxficials to discuss the merits of certain 
transfers. These consultations should take place at the 
same time meetings are being held with interest groups. 
Prtor to the President's late February announcement and 
the subsequent news conference, the affected officials 
Should be informed of the details of the President's 
decision. Another letter from the President might be 
appropriate. 
If Secretary Califano's role in this process is quiet, he 
“will be thought by some to be opposing the initiative. 
He should be involved deeply in promoting the new depart¬ 
ment. This should be done through major public events 
like the joint news conference, speeches and congressional 
testimony. 
A chart outlining the timing of the proposed process is attached 











American Vocational Association 
Youth 
Youth Alternatives Project 
National Network of Runaway and Youth Services 
Coalition for Children and Youth 
Handicapped 
Council of Exceptional Children 
Council of State Administrators of Vocational Rehabilitation 
American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities 
American Council of the Blind 
National Association for Retarded Citizens 
Indians 
National Tribal Charimans Association 
National Indian Law Center 
Child nutrition 
American School Food Service Association 
Children's Foundation 
Food Research Action Center 
Children 
Children.' s Defense Fund 
Head Start Parents Association 
National Head Start Directors Association 
Science 
Arts and Humanities 
State and Local Officials 
National Governors Association 
National Association of Counties 
League of Cities 
Conference of Mayors 
National Conference of State Legislators 
National Association of Regional Councils 
Council of State Governments 
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P.age 2: Key Interest Groups 
■Civil Rights 
National Urban League 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
National Congress of Hispanic .American Citizens 
National Organization for Women 
National Women's Political Caucus 
NAACP 
Education 
Big 6: NEA, and the National School Boards Association, PTA, 
American Association of School Administrators, Council 
of Chief State School Officers and the National Association 
of State Boards of Education 
Council of Great Citv Schools 
AFT 
American Council on Education 
AAUP 
National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education 
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WE STRONGLY URGE YOU TO REJECT THE INCLUSION OF HEADSTARTcJ^Tfe 
CURRENT REORGANIZATION PROPOSAL FOR A SEPARATE DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION AND IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE 
RIBICOFF COMMITTEE. AS LEADERS OF ORGANIZATIONS COMMITED TO 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND RACIAL JUSTICE WE KNOW WHAT HEADSTART 
HAS MEANT TO POOR BLACK COMMUNITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. 
THE UNIQUE INVOLVEMENT OF PARENTS THE BROAD ATTENTION TO 
-1201 (RMS) j 
- .. ,'-T-—---.--cl V 
mm 22 ft, 7, 3E 
health nutrition and mental health needs have made it not only 
^EDUCATION SUCCESS BUT A MODEL E0R COMPRESHENS.VE FAMILY- 
ENTERED PROGRAMS. OVER THE LAST DECADE « HAVE SUCCESSrULLY 
DEPENDED HEADSTART'S INDEPENDENCE AGAINST SK^A^ONISTS 
THE SOUTH AND THE MACHINATIONS OF ITS BUREAUCRATIC FO S I qHINGT0N ITS UNIQUE QUALITIES V1LL NOT BE PRESERVED IN .HE 
P E DEP „ MENT OF EDUCATION INEVITABLY DOMINATED BY 
ZZ ESTABLISHED INTERESTS. NO MEANINGFUL “ ^ 
nr rTuFN to PREVENT THE GRADUAL DESTRUCTION 0, T - ■ ' 
UNDER THIS PROPOSAL. TO THREATEN THE INTEGRITY OF HEADSTART AT 
THIS TIME COULD ONLY BE VIEWED AS A BETRAYAL BY 
POOR VHO^HAVE FOUND HOPE IN ITS REALITY AND EAlTH IN THE 
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BERKELEY G. BURRELL PRESIDENT NATIONAL BUSINESS LEAGUE 
JULIUS L. CHAMBERS PRESIDENT LEGAL DEFENSE A EDUCATIONAL FUND 
RICHARD G. HATCHER MAYOR GARY INDIANA 
DOROTHY HEIGHT PRESIDENT NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN 
PI. CARL HOLMAN PRESIDENT NATIONAL URBAN COALITION 
JESSE JACKSON PRESIDENT PUSH 
VERNON E JORDAN JR PRESIDENT NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE 
CORETTA SCOTT KING PRESIDENT MARTIN LUTHER KING CENTER FOR 
SOCIAL CHANGE 
JOSEPH E LOWERY PRESIDENT SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
BAYARD RUSTIN PRESIDENT A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE 
EDDIE N. WILLIAMS PRESIDENT JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES 
ELTON JOLLY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OIC 











AD HOC COMMITTEE MEETING 
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING 
JANUARY 24, 1979 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY AND JUNIOR COLLEGES 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
AMERICAN EDUCATION RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 
AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION 
AMERICAN VOCATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT 
COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 
COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS 
EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION 
NATIONAL AUDIO VISUAL ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CITIZENS IN EDUCATION 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF PARENTS AND TEACHERS 
NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL SCHOOL VOLUNTEER PROGRAM 
UNITED STATES STUDENT ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ADMINISTRATORS OF STATE & FEDERAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES OF TEACHER EDUCATION 
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF WORKERS FOR THE BLIND 
COUNCIL FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE SOCIAL STUDIES 
MEXICAN-AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND 
AMERICAN PERSONNEL AND GUIDANCE ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE DIRECTORS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 
NATIONAL STUDENT EDUCATIONAL FUND 
UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON, OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
SPEECH COMMUNICATION ASSOCIATION 
COUNCIL FOR ADVANCEMENT AND SUPPORT OF EDUCATION 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF MATHEMATICS 
CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
FLORIDA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
ILLINOIS OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
NEW JERSEY STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
NORTH CAROLINA STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
STATE OF TEXAS - TEXAS EDUCATION AGENCY 
WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, CIT7 OF NEW YORK 
COALITION OF INDEPENDENT COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
NATIONAL GOVERNORS" ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ART EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
ASSOCIATION OF CHILDHOOD EDUCATION INTERNATIONAL 
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
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INTERNATIONAL READING ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF EDUCATION 
AMERICAN THEATRE ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL GUILD COMMUNITY SCHOOLS OF THE ARTS 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL PSYCHOLOGIST 
CITY OF CHIGAGO, BOARD OF EDUCATION 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF ENGLISH 
RESEARCH FOR BETTER SCHOOLS 
MUSIC EDUCATORS NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
STATE HIGHER EDUCATION EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
AMERICAN ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH, PHYSICAL EDUCATION & RECREATION 
AMERICAN COALITION OF CITIZENS WITH DISABILITIES 
COUNCIL OF GREAT CITY SCHOOLS 
NATIONAL REHABILITATION ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY EXTENSION ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA RAZA 
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND 
NATIONAL SCHOOL PUBLIC RELATIONS ASSOCIATION 
OVERSEAS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL 0:r FINE ARTS DEANS 
CONGRESS OF D.C. PTA 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS OF ART 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS OF MUSIC 
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE TRUSTEES 
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES - U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MEXICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 
EL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE ASUNTOS COLEGIALES 
SAM HALPERIN (Institute for Educational Leadership) 
BARBARA WARDEN (American Home Economics Association) 
MIRIAM KAZANJIAN (New York State Department of Education) 
SANDRA KISSICK (National Conference of State Legislatures) 
CHARLES SAUNDERS (American Council on Education) 
STEPHANIE H. COONEY (Home Economics Education Association) 
ALLAN OSTAR (Association of State Colleges and Universities) 
ROBERT L. LAMBORN (Council for American Private Education) 
NATIONAL SCHOOL SUPPLY & EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATION 
JOAN H. KING (U.S. Office of Education) 
CONNIE STEWART (Office of the Assistant Secretary of Education, DHEW) 
WILLIAM BLAKEY (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Legislation, DHEW) 
MICHAEL O'KEEFE (Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning & Evaluation, DHEW) 
MA.RILYN HARRIS (Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate) 
ROBERT HEFFERNAN (Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate) 
JEAN FROHLICHER.(Committee on Human Resources, U.S. Senate) 
JACK JENNINGS (Subcommittee on Elementary, Secondary & Vocational Education, 
U.S. House of Representatives) 
LETITIA CHAMBERS (Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate) 
EILEEN WINKELMAN (Special Commitee on Aging, U.S. Senate) 
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXTENSION AND CONTINUING EDUCATION) 
THERESA HOLT (Senate Democratic Policy Committee) 
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Appendix K 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
""fact SHEET 
Departmen^o^Educatio^woul^consolidat^aDoro^01^^'^ee' the 
of Education larger than ^vp'pv^i-^10^ making the Department 
Justice, Commerce, Interim and sltl?. ??* w^in^e?^' 
* |f^^3^seconS^ilduc^iorp^- 
grams anc researcn activities, HEW. 
Ecticat ion-re la ted activities of the Office 
for Civil Rights . hfw~-— 
Overseas Dopencpnts 
Department of = 
Schools of the 
upr ense. 
— rofessions student loan 
^._ocr ams or ~r,d law enforcement student 
—an Programs or me Department of Justice. 
u.ne Coiiec; Housing Loan Program, HUD. 
O 
Migrant education procrams of the Deoartment 
Q- Laoori- ~- 




Technical 1* n s t i 
u--ns ror wnich HEW exercises 
tght, including Howard 
laudet College, the American 
for the Blind and the National 
tute for the Deaf. 
O 
-Lc - ecsrn.ur.: luciops Men-Broad cast 
Program, :.’Ea\ ' 
Demonstration 
E . JM ce Schoc 
O 
(-,-r"a-ri science education programs of the 
National Science Foundation. 
Vocational P.ehabi 1 i tat ion Procram, HEW. 
I.ncian education programs of the Department 
o 1 Interior. 
295 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
(PROPOSED) 
__ INDICATES offices stipulated in legislation. 
_indicates possible offices not stipulated in legislation. 
MARCH-79 
297 
DUPLICATION OF FUNCTIONS IN HEW EDUCATION OFFICES 
Chart I (CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE) 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 














*'0**tCl«i<a | j ,,tl0^t 
OFFICE OF EDUCATION 
j— J OJl'CKiJf 
U Wll.eauv,i 
ii cui moil 
■ ®***u II auiKMi 
Join.... j Lr 
CIHItilt | (9«iaa(M j 
* li>«l«9'IIIMIi»i 
a— 
• OMlvO'V ) igai *u O'Octu'ai'O 
fiaa«(i«i (tfllaaci j *ao aoui 11 ooccu 
(=□■ 
CZi' 
■ i-.- ■ • '-.r -v--: 
•£- •: t*-> r 
Chart I-A 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
(PROPOSED) 
STRUCTURE OF STAFF FUNCTIONS 
- INDICATES OFFICES STIPULATED IN LEGISLATION. 
-INDICATES POSSIBLE OFFICES NOT STIPULATED IN LEGISLATION. 
LEGISLATION AND CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS 
PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 
PLANNING, EVALUATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT 
THE ADMINISTRATION’S BILL PROVIDES THREE ADDITIONAL EXECUTIVE 
LEVEL POSITIONS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE OVERSEAS DEPENDENTS 
SCHOOLS AND FOR OTHER STAFF AND PROGRAM OFFICES THAT THE 











































































February 26, 1979 
Upcoming Meetinas Relevant to Department of frin- ation 
March 2 International Conference of the 
Association for Children with Learning 
Disabilities 
San Francis 
March 3-7 Association for Supervision and 
Curriculum Development 
Detroit 




**March 4-7 Legislative and Policy Action Conference 
of the Council of Great City Schools 
Washington 
March 5-7 National Association of Counties 
(Legislative Conference) 
Washington 
March 7-10 National Council for Social Studies Boston 
March 14-16 American Association of University 
Administrators 
Washington 
*March 21-23 National Association of Administrators 
of State and Federal Education Programs 
Washington 
***March 23-27 National Science Teachers Association Atlanta 




* Incicateb"groups-that have been very supportive; we should 
participate tc ensure Administration visibility. 
** Indicates groups that have been generally supportive but may 
be wavering 
***Indicates groups that uo not support DOE. 
Appendix M 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
WA S H I N GTO N 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION BRIEFING: 
INVITEES: 
MARCH 15 
10:A 5 am. 
Roosevelt Room 
Robert E. German, Jr. 214-363-1011 
Vice President, 
Hunan Resources 
Bonanza International, Inc. 
Hylan Lyon 214-238-5586 ' 
Manager, Go ve r nme n t — Indus t ry 
Planning rVfc 
Texas Instruments 
Janes N. Juliana 659-4546 
Director, Federal Affairs 
Brani.fi Airlines, Inc. 
Janes A. Borthick 305-596-7613 
Manager, Gov. Relations 
Burger King, Inc. 
Ronald L. Platt 305-596-7613 
Director, Gov. Relations 
Burger King, Inc. 
Robert E. McCov 8&2n0200 
Assistant Manager" * 
Wash. Atfairs-EXXON 
Phillip Buckminster 862-5400 
V.P. Washington Affairs 
Chrysler Corn. 




V.P. Government Affairs 
American Motors 
James A.R. Johnson 554-1771 
Manager, Gov. Affairs 
Xerox 
Wendell Holloway 785-6024 
Product Manager 
Ford Motors 
Phillies S. Peter 637-4455 
Director, Gov. Affairs 
General Electric 
Wi11iam Sen t er 554-1771 
Pres. Publishing Division 
Xerox 
Alix Ritchie 457-2233 
Director, Public Affairs 
AT&T 
Janes Johnston 53 7-5090 
Government Affairs 
General Motors 
George L. White 393-4720 
Corp. Support Programs 
Bethlehem Steel 
Rudo1ch Vignone 872-8500 
Government Relations 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Paul Petrus 862-1300 
General Manager, Gov. Relations 
Mobil Oil 
Patrick O'Donnell 
Asst. Mtr. Federal Gov. Rel. 
J.C. Penny 
E.Rogers Pleasants - Dupont 
Dir. F e c e ra1Affairs 342-0658 
Christian J. Lund 785-7416 
Dir. of State Cov. Relations 
United Technologies Corp. 
Robert Craigs- 6 59-9598 
Director of Communication 
American Society for Training 
and Development 
Christine Evers 659-9598 
Associate Director of Commnnicnms 
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unstca wr.n • Woip* 
Van Deerl'.a WhiUey Wrtjct 
Vento Written Wyatt 
Voikur.er Williams. Ohio Yatron 
Wzciplsr Wilson. Tex. Youta Alaska 
Watkins Wirth Younf. Mo. 










































Daniel. R- W. 
Dannetneyer 























































































Miller. Ohio . 
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WVior.. Boo Zrfrrattl 
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Baker Cam Hunk 
Bauc'ja C.’enn Fiavocd 
Bellm.on Hart Pell 
Denizen Hatch Perry 
Biden Hatha Id Pmi. rr 
Boren nedin Pryo* 
Boscr.wtu Helss nAnceJon 
Brad.cy Hoi’.inca P. It. caff 
Bumoera Hucc.esvon Plena 
Burdick Jackson Rota 
Byrd. Rohers C. Javtta Sa: eases 
Cannon John* too Simpicn 
Chafe* Kennedy 6ter.au 
Chtlex Leahy Etc Teas 
Cochran Lena 8lcvcasen 
Cranston Lcac Stewart 
Culver Mzeaaaon S’cae 
Dan forth Mstotax Talmadie 
DeCorc.nl Mtnunsfa Thurmcnd 
Dement cl McC.ura Tvsneee 
Durmserfer M-Oceem V/eicxer 
Durk.n Melcner WJllama 
Eaeieton SJetzeanaum Tcrjrtc 
Ford He.son Zonasxy 
Navs — 21 
Armstrong 
Byrd. 
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AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY AND JUNIOR 
#1 Dupont Circle, N.W., Suite 410, Washington 
John Tirrell; Bette Hamilton (202/293-7050) 
COLLEGES (AACJC) 
, D.C. 20036 
^mIwAN^?SM°CIATI0N 0F SCH00L ADMINISTRATORS (AASA) 
I.?01 North Moore Street, Arlington, Virainia 22209 
J_im Kirkpatrick; Charlotte Friedman (703/528-0700) 
3. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (AAUP) 
5up°nt Cj!?cle’ N-w-> #5°0» Washington, D.C. 20036 
A1 Sumberq (202/466-8050) 
4‘ ® 1 Ali EDUCATION RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (AERA) 
1025 15th Street, N.W., #8, Washington, D.C. 20005 
Dave Florio; Michael Behrmann (202/783-1926) 
5. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION (ALA) 
110 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Box 54, Washington, D.C. 20002 
Eileen Cooke; Carol Henderson (202/547-4440) 
6. AMERICAN VOCATIONAL ASSOCIATION (AVA) 
2020 North 14th Street, Arlington, Virginia 22201 
Gene Bottoms; Wayne Leroy (703/522-6121) 
7. ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT (ASCD) 
1701 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 
Steve Hallmark (202/467-6480) 
8. COUNCIL FOR EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (CEC) 
1920 Association Drive, Reston, Virginia 22091 
Fred Weintraub; Joseph Ballard; Jeff Zettel; Barbara Smith (703/620-3660) 
9. COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS (CCSSO) 
400 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 379, Washincton, D.C. 20001 
William Pierce; Ron Cartwright (202/624-7702) 
10. EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES (ECS) 
444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 321, Washington, D.C. 20001 
Aims McGuinness (202/624-5838) 
11. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS (NASSP) 
1904 Association Drive, Reston, Virginia 22091 
Ivan Gluckman; Dick Kruse (703/860-0200) 
12. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS (NAESP) 
1801 North Moore Street, Arlington, Virginia 22209 
















NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION (NASBE) 
444 North Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 526, Washington, D.C. 
Wes Apker; Bob Berlam (202/624-5845) 20001 
NATIONAL AUDIO VISUAL ASSOCIATION (NAVA) 
3150 Spring Street, Fairfax, Virginia 22031 
Kenton Pattie; Glenda Surovell (703/273-7200) 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR CITIZENS IN EDUCATION (NCCE) 
2415 Davis Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22303 
Ann Henderson; Arleen Courtney; Stanley Salett (703/548-9455) 
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (NEA) 
1201 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 
Rpsalyn Baker; Howard Carroll; Jim Green; Gail Bramblett; Dale Lestina (202/833-5411) 
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20 Inaugurated as 39th President of the United 
States. 
2 Signs Emergency Natural-Gas Act. 
First fireside chat. 
30 SALT II proposals rejected by Soviet Union. 
4 First meeting with Sadat in Washington. 
6 Signs Reorganization Act. 
IS Address to the Nation on Energy. 
7-8 London Economic Summit. 
22 Foreign Affairs Address at Notre Dame. 
30 JC announces B-l bomber production will be 
halted. 
19 First meeting with Begin in Washington. 
4 Department of Energy established. 
7 Panama Canal treaties signing ceremony. 
21 Bert Lance resigns. 
27 JC reaches agreement with Gromyko on framework 
for SALT II. 
5 Signs International Covenants on Human Rights. 
21 Sends letter to Sadat asking support for Middle 
East peace effort. 
15 Shah of Iran visits White House. 
19-21 Sadat visits Israel. 
29- JC travels to Poland, Iran, India, Saudi 










16 Senate ratifies first Panama Treaty. 
7 JC defers production of enhanced radiation 
weapons 
18 Senate ratifies second Panama Treaty. 
7 Foreign Policy Address at U.S. Naval Academy. 
16 JC visits Panama. 
16 Bonn Economic Summit. 
4 Camp David summit on Middle East peace begins. 
17 Camp David accords signed. 
13 JC signs Civil Service Reform Act. 
15 Congress passes energy package. 
15, JC announces normalization of relations between 




Jan. 4-9 Meets in Guadeloupe with leaders of France, 
Great Britain, and Germany. 
16 
29-31 
Shah leaves Iran. 
First visit of Deng Xiaoping to Washington. 
Feb. 1 
20 
Khomeini returns to Iran. 




Peace mission to Egypt and Israel. 
Fpvptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signing ceremony. 
Accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power 
plant. 
Apr. 5 Address to the Nation on energy. 
Jun. 12 
18 
JC proposes national health plan to Congress. 
Signs SALT II Treaty with Brezhnev at Vienna 
Summit. 
28-29 Tokyo Economic Summit. 
Jul. 3-12 Energy speech canceled; meetings at Camp David 
on the state of the administration. 
15 Address to the Nation on energy and national 
17-20 
goals. 
Announcement of Cabinet and senior staff 
26 
changes. 
JC signs Trade Agreements Act. 
Aug. 15 
31 
Andrew Young resigns. 
Soviet combat troops reported in Cuba. 
Oct. 17 
20 
Department of Education established. 




U.S. Embassy in Iran overrun. 




JC announces candidacy for reelection. 
NATO agrees to deploy theater nuclear weapons 














Keeping Faith, Bantam Books, New York, 1982. 
Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 
Governing America, Simon and Schuster, New 
York, 1981. 
Josephson, Matthew, 
The President Makers; The Culture of Politics 
and Leadership in an Age of Enlightenment, 
G.P. Putnam & Sons, New York, 1979. 
Goodlad, John I., et. al., 
Early Schooling in the United States, McGraw 
Hill, New York, 1973. 
Cohen, Allan R., et. al., 
Effective Behavior in Organizations; Richard 
D. Irwin, Inc., 1980, Homewood, Illinois. 
Steele, Fritz, 
Consulting for Organizational Change,University 
of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, Mass., 1975. 
Stroud, Kandy, 
How Jimmy Won, William Morrow and Company, 
New York, 1977. 
Collier, Barney 
Hope and Fear in Washington. The Dial Press, 
New York, NY, 1975. 
Learner, Laurence 
Playing for Keeps in Washington, The Dial Press, 
New York, NY, 1977. 
Silberman, Charles E. 
Crisis in the Classroom, Random House, New York, 
NY, 1970. 
Allison, Graham 
Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile 




12. Hamilton, Alexander, et. al. 
The Federalist (original text). The Modern 
Library, New York, NY, 1984. 
13. Barger, Harold M. 
The Impossible Presidency; Illusions and 
Realities of Executive Power. Scott, Foresman 
and Co., Glenview, Illinois, 1984. 
14. Ripley, Randall, Editor 
Public Policies and Their Politics, W.W. Norton 
and Co., New York, NY, 1966. 
15. Fenno, Richard T., Jr. 
The President's Cabinet, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1959. 
16. Mann, Thomas E. and Ornstein, Norman J., Editors 
The New Congress, The American Enterprise 
Institute, Washington, D.C., 1981. 
17. Jencks, Christopher and Riesman, David 
The Academic Revolution, Doubleday, New York, 
NY, 1968. 
18. Fleishman, Joel L., Editor 
Public Duties: The Moral Obligations of 
Government Officials, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1981. 
19. Witcover, Jules 
Marathon, The Pursuit of the Presidency 1972-76. 
Viking Press, New York, NY, 1977. 
20. Friedman, Milton and Friedman, Rose 
Freedom to Choose, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 
New York, NY, 1979. 
21. Gaylin, Willard, et. al. 
Doing Good; The Limits of Benevolence 
Pantheon, New York, NY, 1978. 
22. Levitan, Sar and Taggart, Robert 
The Promise of Greatness, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1976. 
318 
23. Rutter, Michael, et al. 
150,000 Hours: Secondary Schools and Their 
Effects on Children, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1979. 
24. Wildavsky, Aaron, 
Perspectives on the Presidency, Little, Brown & 
Co., Boston, 1975. 
25. Cronin, Thomas E., 
The State of the Presidency (Second Edition), 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1980. 
26. Wildavsky, Aaron and Polsby, Nelson W.; 
American Governmental Institutions, Rand- 
McNally, Chicago, 1968. 
27. Harris Fred R.; 
Americas' Democracy; The Ideal and the Reality? 
Scott, Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois, 
1986. 
28. Neustadt, Richard E.; 
Presidential Power - The Politics of Leadership 
from FDR to Carter; John Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 1980. 
29. Hirschfield, Richard S.; 
The Power of the Presidency - Concepts and 
Controversy (Third Edition); Aldine Publishing 
Company, New York, 1982. 
30. Hodgson, Godfrey; 
All Things to All Men - The False Promise of 
the Modern American Presidency from Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt to Ronald Reagan; Simon and 
Schuster, New York, 1981. 
31. Jordan, Hamilton, 
Crisis - The Last Year of the Carter Presidency, 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1982. 
32. Bramson, Robert M., Dr.; 
Coping with Difficult People, Anchor Press/ 
Doubleday, New York, 1978. 
Burkhart, James. A., et. al., 
American Government - The Clash of Issues, 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964. 
33. 
319 
34. Carter, Rosalyn, 
First Lady from Plains, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston, 1984. 
35. Adrian, Charles R., 
State and Local Governments - A Study in the 
Political Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1960. 
36. Stalvey, Lois Marck, 
Getting Ready - The Education of a White Family 
in Inner City Schools, William Morrow & Co. , 
New York, 1974. 
37. Schram, Martin, 
Running for President 1976 - The Carter 
Campaign, Stein and Day, New York, 1977. 
38. Powell, Jody; 
The Other Side of the Story, William Morrow & 
Co., New York, 1984. 
39. Lance, LaBelle, 
This Too Shall Pass, Christian Herald Books, 
Chappaqua, N.Y., 1978. 
40. Schell, Jonathan, 
The Time of Illusion, Vintage Books (Random 
House), New York, 1976. 
41. White, Theodore, 
America in Search of Itself - The Making of the 
President 1956-1980, Harper and Row, New York, 
1982. 
42. Bray, Howard, 
The Pillars of the Post, The Makings of a News 
Empire in Washington, W.W. Norton and Co., New 
York, 1980. 
43. Fisher, Louis, 
The Constitution Between Friends, St. Martins 
Press, New York, 1978. 
44. Carter, Jimmy, 
Why Not The Best, Broadman Press, Nashville, 
Tennessee, 1975. 
320 
45. Ceaser, James W. , 
Presidential Selection Theory and Development, 
Princeton University Press; 1979. " " 
46. Reid, T.R., 
Congressional Odyssey - The Saga of a Senate 
Bill> W.H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 
1980. 
47. Rosenthal, Alan; 
Legislative Life, Harper and Row, New York, 
1981. 
48. Mann, Thoms E. and Ornstein, Norman J. (Editors); 
The New Congress; American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research (Third Printing), 
Washinton, D.C., 1982. 
49. Broder, David, 
Changing of the Guard - Power and Leadership 
in America, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1980. 
r 
* 
% 

